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rope may consider themselves as accomplices in the butchery; if the latter, a radiating star will be added to our system, whose beneficent light and heat may produce effects beyond the narrow limits of Peloponnesus.
In taking these views of the improbability that Greece will receive any efficient aid from the Christian powers of Europe, (in which we shall rejoice to be found mistaken), we may naturally be asked, why does America remain cold and inactive? With her republican principles; with her mass of free, enlightened citizens; with her increasing means; why does she content herself with the sympathetic declarations of her President, or the eloquent effusions of her members of Congress? The question is fair, and deserves to be answered. We might, in the first place, assign as one reason for our quiescence, the extreme distance at which we are situated, and the consequent difficulty of transporting an adequate auxiliary force. We might add, that such a force as it would be now in our power to send, would be short of what would be due both to their wants and our own character, and that before it could be raised, and reach the port of debarkation, the Greeks will probably be so successful as not to need it, or so reduced that it could be of no service. But on these reasons we do not rely. We advert to our own Constitution, which, in relation to the present subject, absolutely disarms us.
Our states, individually, have no power to fit out the smallest ship of war, or raise a single soldier, unless in the case of actual invasion, without the assent of congress. Whatever is done in respect to foreign countries, must be the act of congress alone. But the power constitutionally invested in congress, is emphatically of a defensive nature. It is only when war has been declared against us, or when, without declaring it, a series of violent and unjust acts, committed by a foreign nation upon our citizens, has become equivalent to an avowed war, that congress can, without violating the principles of our great national compact, enter upon hostilities. No such event has taken place between us and the government of Turkey; and under these peculiar limitations of power, both as to our states separately and united, we perceive the difference between us and the sovereigns of Europe, who lie under no similar restraints. We may feel, but we cannot act; they may act, but they do not appear to feel.
The general impression through our country, has been that of sympathy for these unfortunate people. When we have received intelligence of their successes, we have rejoiced; and
a less sum, are to be deducted. It does not appear that in the course of the intervening period any detailed accounts were transmitted to the deputies by the two houses, although we may presume that general Lallemand did not neglect his duty in keeping them as fully informed, as lay in his power; but his functions did not lead him to an intimate acquaintance with the details. The two houses had, with great propriety, associated him as one of a committee which they constituted as soon as captain Chauncey was engaged, who were to hold frequent and stated meetings, and receive a weekly report from the captain; but the general was neither a merchant nor a shipbuilder, and although he was bound to report to his principals whether their business was carried on negligently or otherwise, he probably abstained from all details of naval architecture, and certainly from all matters of account. In respect to the latter, we have direct proof, in a matter which has produced much acrimony between the parties, and which we shall notice hereafter. The bankers of the deputies in London, had continued by their orders to honour the draughts sent, sometimes on what they term "confirmed credits," and sometimes without such previous sanction. The houses at times sold their bills in this country, and aWimes drew in favour of their own bankers in London. But the bills drawn on the 23d of November, were protested by order of the deputies; and to account for this strong measure, it will be necessary to consider their relative situation. The provisional government of Greece, had sent them to England for the purpose of applying in the best manner, the large sum which the good feelings of that country had loaned for their assistance. Their instructions were to procure frigates of a certain size. The deputies had already intrusted the mercantile houses in New-York, with a larger sum of money than the first representations of one of them seemed to require. The period had already passed over, when the frigates, according to the representations of the two houses, ought at least to have been launched, if not ready for sea.* A joint letter from the two houses, dated on the 31st of October 1825, had been received, in which the deputies were assured that the frigates were advancing rapidly, and a "well founded hope" expressed, that they would be ready to put to sea in four months. The cost and outfits were estimated at 500,000 dollars each, but for the sake of prudence, the deputies are invited to value them at
• In their letter of the 15th of April, the two houses indirectly bold up the term of six months for having the frigates built, and ready for sea. I.—Ko. 1. 35