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chiefly attributable to the aid she afforded to us, in the achievement of our independence; that the troops she sent over to this continent, returned with strong impressions in favour of liberty, and a chastened democracy; that if her writers were prevented, by the restrictions on the press, from much latitude of discussion on these subjects, they formed the chief topics of conversation throughout the kingdom, and that the minds of men were thus engaged on subjects, which, beginning in the approbation, terminated in the adoption of principles, that to us were salvation; to her, desolation and disgrace. Monarchy is now the only idol, absolute power the only religion of her ruling dynasty; and, while the race of Capet remains, a new republic will be reluctantly acknowledged or countenanced.

The partial recognition of the new governments in South America, the unwilling and ungracious concessions to Hayti, do not impair the force of these remarks. The latter it was impossible to resist, and it would, therefore, be useless to de-. lay; and the South Americans having secured their independence, without assistance, and having already received the recognition of the United States and of Great Britain, the commercial interests of France impelled her to secure, if possible, an equal share of their trade. But that independence which has been attained by the internal force of unassisted revolt, and which seems to be admitted by the cessation of the efforts of the mother country to subdue it, is widely different from that which is yet to be fought for, and which to them appears distant and improbable.

It remains to consider the policy and probable conduct of Great Britain. We may at once exculpate her from the influence of some of the motives that we have attributed to France, Austria, and Russia. She conceives herself too happy and too strong in her own constitution, to fear any evil consequences from the erection of new republican forms in any part of the world. Her refusal to unite in that arbitrary and intolerant compact, profanely termed the Holy Alliance, does her much credit in our American eyes; her exertions in opposition to the slave trade, and her benevolent measures for the melioration of slaves in her West India islands, at the hazard of ultimately losing her colonies, evince her sincerity in relation to the general rights of the human race. But in respect to Greece, she appears to have permitted impulses of this nature to be controlled by considerations of policy. The humanity which shudders and turns pale at the transportation of the African from slavery in one country, to a continuance of slavery in another, can view without emotion, the servitude and sorrows of an en

lightened part of our species, in every quality and attribute most germane to ourselves, and make no effort for their relief-because it is not the interest of Britain to weaken the power of Turkey.

Considerations of the same nature, though not in all respects, or to an equal extent, the same as those which we have ascribed to France, must be considered as actuating Great Britain. It is unnecessary to repeat them, but we may conclude this part of our remarks, by observing how little influence on the conduct of all the European cabinets, is derived from the contrast of the religion of the oppressor and the oppressed. The time once was, when the enthusiasm of Christians led hundreds of thousands in military array to attempt the recovery of the Holy Land from its infidel conquerors. Nearly two millions of Christians are now writhing under every species of affliction from the same hands. The habitual severity of oppression is rendered more poignant by the contumelies thrown upon their worship and their creed, and by the difficulties, and sometimes the impossibility of continuing in their ancient faith. Extortion is practised upon all, and doubled upon those who will not submit to become Mahometans. Those who refuse to exchange a blessed Saviour for a vile impostor, are coldly abandoned by fellow Christians to sorrow and despair, because it would be contrary to national policy to relieve them. While so much pains are annually taken to convert distant quarters of the globe to Christianity, it is wonderfully inconsistent that the same spirit should not produce a single effort to protect those who were among the first in Europe to adopt it.

But on these themes it is equally painful and useless to enlarge. Of late, there have been rumours of a successful mediation with the Porte in behalf of the Greeks. Of the particulars we are not apprized; but we may confidently presume, that the absolute independence of the Greeks has formed no part either. of the application of one party, or the assent of the other. Yet, with nothing short of absolute independence will these brave, enlightened men be satisfied. No Turkish promise to lessen the weight of their chains will be relied on; no continuance of provincial subjection will be submitted to. They have before their eyes the noble example of their own ancestors when invaded by Persia; and of this country, when it resisted Great Britain. They have seen how firmness and perseverance may produce success; and that courage, which nothing has yet intimidated; that patience, which nothing has yet exhausted; if not closed by extermination, must end in independence. If the former should ensue, the selfish sovereigns of Eu

rope may consider themselves as accomplices in the butchery; if the latter, a radiating star will be added to our system, whose beneficent light and heat may produce effects beyond the narrow limits of Peloponnesus.

In taking these views of the improbability that Greece will receive any efficient aid from the Christian powers of Europe, (in which we shall rejoice to be found mistaken), we may naturally be asked, why does America remain cold and inactive? With her republican principles; with her mass of free, enlightened citizens; with her increasing means; why does she content herself with the sympathetic declarations of her President, or the eloquent effusions of her members of Congress? The question is fair, and deserves to be answered. We might, in the first place, assign as one reason for our quiescence, the extreme distance at which we are situated, and the consequent difficulty of transporting an adequate auxiliary force. We might add, that such a force as it would be now in our power to send, would be short of what would be due both to their wants and our own character, and that before it could be raised, and reach the port of debarkation, the Greeks will probably be so successful as not to need it, or so reduced that it could be of no service. But on these reasons we do not rely. We advert to our own Constitution, which, in relation to the present subject, absolutely disarms us.

Our states, individually, have no power to fit out the smallest ship of war, or raise a single soldier, unless in the case of actual invasion, without the assent of congress. Whatever is done in respect to foreign countries, must be the act of congress alone. But the power constitutionally invested in congress, is emphatically of a defensive nature. It is only when war has been declared against us, or when, without declaring it, a series of violent and unjust acts, committed by a foreign nation upon our citizens, has become equivalent to an avowed war, that congress can, without violating the principles of our great national compact, enter upon hostilities. No such event has taken place between us and the government of Turkey; and under these peculiar limitations of power, both as to our states separately and united, we perceive the difference between us and the sovereigns of Europe, who lie under no similar restraints. We may feel, but we cannot act; they may act, but they do not appear to feel.

The general impression through our country, has been that of sympathy for these unfortunate people. When we have received intelligence of their successes, we have rejoiced; and

when the accounts were unfavourable, we have felt a deep regret. There has, it must be confessed, been little individual aid afforded to them. Several plans have been proposed without success, although it is hoped that the recent contribution of provisions, rendered more important since the desolation of the country by the troops from Egypt, may reach them in safety.

These considerations, which show that we have no great title to be praised, lead us to wish that we were also exempted from just reproach. If we have not, like the Phil-Hellenists of England, raised large sums of money by way of loan, to be applied to their assistance, we ought at least to be exempted from the charge of having, out of such a fund, appropriated a part to selfish and private emolument. The character of a nation is sometimes involved in the conduct of a few individuals who belong to it; and however unjust this mode of reasoning may be, it is a duty to avoid even hasty and superficial censure, by examination and inquiry into the facts on which we may be charged. Under this impression, we have concluded to present to our readers a candid and impartial view of the late transactions at New-York, which have produced the publications, the titles of which appear at the head of this article.

A narrative of facts will best enable our readers to understand and appreciate the different publications on this subject. We are aware both of the importance and the difficulty of perfect accuracy in such an undertaking; our materials are to be chiefly drawn from these publications. We may safely adopt what both parties agree upon; we may receive as secondary evidence, what one asserts, and the other does not deny; but when we find that positive assertions are met by positive contradictions, it is no small difficulty to decide on whom to repose belief. In such cases, the only resource is to compare testimony with circumstances, and to give the preference to that which best consists with other transactions distinctly proved or admitted.

In 1824, a loan was opened in England for the benefit of the Greek cause, and upwards of a million of pounds sterling was raised. A great object of the central government which then existed in Greece, was to apply a part of this fund to the increase of their naval force; and the Greek deputies in London cast their eyes on this country as that where they could most readily obtain, either by purchase, or by causing them to be built, some suitable vessels, with their necessary armaments.

The deputies proceeded with much caution; they first addressed a letter of inquiry to a highly respected house at New-York, desiring information of the cost of a frigate of the largest class. The estimate of the cost of a ship of fifty guns was speedily returned. It was to be built of live oak, sheathed with copper, and including guns and carriages, would amount to 247,500 dollars. In communicating this estimate, Le Roy, Bayard & Co. profess their readiness to undertake its construction, their experience and ability in matters of this sort, and their zeal for the cause of the Greeks. Satisfied with these representations, the deputies appear to have lost no time in their proceedings. They determined to have two such frigates built or purchased immediately; they made the necessary pecuniary arrangements; and, impressed with the importance of having an agent on the spot, whose sole business it should be to superintend and hasten the completion of the work, they engaged, at a very liberal salary, the services of general Lallemand, a French officer who had taken the most lively interest in their cause, and who is represented to be a man of high honour, improved mind, and good understanding. Specific and well-conceived instructions were given to him. His duty was not to make contracts, but to see to their execution; and to expedite the departure of the two vessels, when fully prepared for service, with American officers and crews.

From some cause which does not fully appear, the deputies thought fit to unite the house of G. G. & S. Howland, with Le Roy, Bayard & Co.; and general Lallemand, furnished with letters of introduction to both houses, left England, and arrived in New-York the 10th of April, 1825. He brought out with him, and delivered to the two houses, letters of credit to the amount of 50,000 pounds sterling, and an urgent request that if purchases could not be made, the two vessels should be built, and sent off with the utmost expedition. The two houses entered heartily into the measure. No purchase could be made, and therefore it was necessary to build: it was determined, with the approbation of general Lallemand, to construct two frigates of larger dimensions than those to which the transmitted estimate applied. The first attempt, was to contract with a builder to construct them both for a given sum. The lowest price at which it was offered to undertake the construction of one was 377,000 dollars, without armament. The two houses then determined to adopt another plan, and build two vessels "by day's work." General Lallemand fully approved of the measure. For this purpose, ship-yards were to be engaged, materials to be pro

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