OUTLINE OF JURISPRUDENCE. By the late Mr. Austin (The Province of Jurisprudence Determined) the term Jurisprudence is confined to law as it is. Law as it ought to be, he defines as The Science of Legislation. But if "the science of jurisprudence (or simply and briefly, jurisprudence) is concerned with positive laws, or with laws strictly so called, considered without regard to their goodness or badness," according to the definition of that distinguished thinker, of what advantage is the science? Mr. Austin, however, admits in another part of his work, "that the sciences of jurisprudence and legislation are connected by numerous and indissoluble ties." In a work (Jurisprudence, Murray), published last year, (1863), Mr. Phillips define jurisprudence as "the science which teaches us to analyse and classify the rules of justice;" and if so, jurisprudence is equivalent to law as it ought to be. The same author excludes the idea that jurisprudence teaches us, or can possibly teach us what the rules of justice are." If there is any distinction between jurisprudence and legislation, it appears to be that the former determines the principles which ought to be common to all laws, while the latter is confined to the determination of the system of laws suited for each particular country. A complete system of jurisprudence appears to comprise : 1. The nature of Law. 2. The standard of Law. 4. The subject-matter of Law. 5. The object of Law. The nature of law has given rise to numerous dis cussions. By many writers law is defined as a command from a superior to an inferior, but if this definition is to prevail the existence of International Law is ignored, nations being regarded as equals; or if not ignored, International Law must be defined according to Mr. Austin, as International Morality. Besides a large portion of law derives its force from custom, and not from any command of a superior. Mr. Austin, however, is of an opposite opinion. According to him, custom only becomes law "when it is adopted as such by the court of justice, and when the judicial decisions fashioned upon it are enforced by the power of the State." If however, this opinion is to prevail, "the conclusion," as Professor Foster justly remarks, (Elements of Jurisprudence) "is inevitable, that a defendant may be cast in damages in a court of law, only because he has not complied with requisitions which at the time they were made upon him, it was not legal to demand." The same author defines law as that course of human conduct which is morally enforceable by public authority. This definition does not however include the Divine Law, which is the command of a superior to an inferior being, and must be obeyed without hesitation. The term Law is however used in various senses. Every one feels that the meaning is quite different in the expressions: "The laws of God;" "the laws of nature,' "and the laws of the land." Yet, the difference of meaning few can assign. Law in its most general sense is a cause of uniformity of event. If the uniformity be in natural phenomena, the cause of it is a law of nature, if it be in human conduct, the cause is a moral law, or a positive law. A moral or positive law may be further defined as a rule enforced by a sanction. The sanction is that which gives effect to the rule. The sanctions of moral law are the rewards and punishments of a future state, and "which God will award to every one according to his works." The sanction of positive law is the punishment or coercion by which it is enforced by the superior power in a state. The moral law therefore embraces all human actions; positive law, only such as are enforceable by governments. Here the question arises, what are the acts enforced by the Divine or moral sanction? and what are those enforceable by the positive sanction? The determination of the former belongs to the sciences of Theology and Ethics; that of the latter is the proper province of jurisprudence. Whatever is in accordance with the laws of morality is right, whatever is in accordance with the positive law is just, and the great question of the scicnee of morals and jurisprudence is the determination of what is right; and what is just. In Although, as we have seen, the quality of the subject-matter of jurisprudence is, according to the opinion of Mr. Austin, no part of that science; still that author admits that, "As the nature of the index to the tacit commands of the Deity is an all-important object of the science of legislation, it is a fit and important object of the kindred science of jurisprudence." These tacit commands of the Deity are only employed when the Divine Law is silent. Christian countries this Divine Law is called Revelation. The Christian dispensation does not, however, contain any system of rules out of which a body of law can be formed, and consequently these tacit commands of the Deity must be deduced from theories which are considered to be most in accordance with the revealed character of God. These theories or standards have generally been considered to be two: General Utility, and the Moral Sense. The former theory rests on the revealed and unrevealed principle that God designs the happiness of his creatures, and has for its object "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."-Bentham. Mr. Austin adopts this theory, but he admits that utility is in some degree a matter of taste, and is also determined by the age in which men live. The moral sense, as is well stated by Professor Foster, "simply appoints conscience high arbitrer without either assuming that he is necessarily right or providing a rule for his guidance. Besides there are numerous acts which |