mode is varied, but the principle is the same. Here Great Britain takes the stamp of the Irish parliament; Great Britain is to prescribe, and Ireland is to obey! We anticipate the rape by previous surrender, and throw into the scale our honour, as well as our liberty. Do not imagine that all these resolutions are mere acts of regulation; they are solid substantial revenue, great part of your additional duty. I allow the bill excepts rum and tobacco; but the principle is retained, and the operation of it only kept back. I have stated that Great Britain may by these propositions crush your commerce, but shall be told that the commercial jealousy of Great Britain is at an end. But are her wants at an end? Are her wishes for Irish subsidy at an end? No; and may be gratified by laying colony duties on herself, and so raising on Ireland an imperial revenue to be subscribed by our parliament, without the consent of our parliament, and in despite of our people. Or if a minister should please to turn himself to a general excise, if wishing to relieve from the weight of further additional duties the hereditary revenue now alienated, if wishing to relieve the alarms of the English manufacturers, who complain of our exemption from excises, particularly on soap, candles, and leather: he should proceed on those already registered articles of taxation, he might tax you by threats, suggesting that if you refuse to raise an excise on yourself, England will raise colony duties on both.-See what a mighty instrument of coercion this bill and these resolu

tions-stir and the minister can crush you in the name of Great Britain; he can crush your exports; he can do this in a manner peculiarly mortifying, by virtue of a clause in a British act of parliament that would seem to impose the same restrictions ou Great Britain; he can do this in a manner still more offensive, by the immediate means of your own parliament, who would then be an active cypher, and notorious stamp in the hands of Great Britain, to forge and falsify the name and authority of the people of Ireland. I have considered your situation under these propositions with respect to Great Britain: see what would be your situation with respect to the crown? You would have granted to the king a permanent money bill, or a money bill to continue as long as the parliament of Great Britain shall please, with a covenant to increase it as often as the British parliament shall please. By the resolutions a great part of the additional duty would have been so granted; the trade of the country is made dependant on the parliament of Great Britain, and the crown is made less dependent on the parliament of Ireland, and a code of prerogative added to a code of empire. If the merchant after this should petition you to lower your duties on the articles of trade, your answer, "trade is no covenant." If your constituents should instruct you to limit the bill of supply, or pass a short money bill, your answer, "the purse of the nation like her trade is in covenant." No more of six months money bills; no more of instructions from con

stituents; that connection is broken by this bill, pass this you have no constituent-you are not the representative of the people of Ireland, but the register of the British parliament, and the equalizer of British duties!

In order to complete this chain of power, one link, (I do acknowledge) was wanting, a perpetual revenue bill, or a covenant from time to time to renew the bill for the collection thereof. The twentieth resolution, and this bill founded upon it, attain that object. Sir, this house rests on three pillars, your power over the annual mutiny bill; your power over the annual additional duties; your power over the collection of the revenue. The latter power is of great consequence, because a great part of our revenues are granted for ever. Your ancestors were slaves; and for their estates, that is, for the act of settlement, granted the hereditary revenue, and from that moment ceased to be a parliament; nor was it till many years after that parliament revived; but it revived as you under this bill would continue; without parliamentary power; every evil measure derived argument, energy and essence from this unconstitutional fund. If a country gentleman complained of the expences of the crown, he was told a frugal government could go on without a parliament, and that we held our existence, by withholding the discharge of our duty. However, though the funds were granted for ever, the provision for the collection was inadequate; the smuggler learned to evade the penalties, and parliament, though not neces

sary for granting the hereditary revenue, became necessary for its collections. Here then we rest on three pillars: the annual mutiny bill, the annual additional supply, and the annual collection of the revenue. If you remove all these, this fabric falls; remove any one of them, and it totters; for it is not the mace, nor the chair, nor this dome, but the deliberate voice resident therein that constitutes the essence of parliament. Clog your deliberations, and you are no longer a parliament, with a thousand gaudy surviving circumstances of shew and authority.

Contemplate for a moment the powers this bill presumes to perpetuate; a perpetual repeal of trial by jury; a perpetual repeal of the great charter; a perpetual writ of assistance; a perpetual felony to strike an exciseman!

The late Chief Baron Burgh, speaking on the revenue bill, exclaimed, "you give to the dipping rule, what you should deny to the sceptre.'

All the unconstitutional powers of the excise we are about to perpetuate, the constitutional powers of parliament we are to abdicate. Can we do all this? can we make these bulky surrenders, in diminution of the power, in derogation of the pride of parliament, and in violation of those eternal relationships, which the body that represents should bear to the community which constitutes?

The pretence given for this unconstitutional idea is weak indeed; that as the benefits are permanent, so should be the compensation. But trade laws are to follow their nature, revenue

laws to follow their's. On the permanent nature of commercial advantages depends the faith of trade, on the limited nature of revenue laws depends the existence of parliament; but the error of the argument arises from the vice of dealing. It is a market for a constitution, and a logic applicable to barter only, is applied to freedom. To qualify this dereliction of every principle and power, the surrender is made constitutional; that is, the British market for the Irish constitution, the shadow of a market for the substance of a constitution! You are to reserve an option, trade or liberty; if you mean to come to the British market, you must pass under the British yoke. I object to this principle in every shape, whether you are, as the resolution was first worded, directly to transfer legislative power to the British parliament; whether, as it was afterwards altered, you are to covenant to subscribe her acts; or whether, as it is now softened, you are to take the chance of the British market, so long as you wave the blessings of the British constitution-~~ terms dishonourable, derogatory, incapable of forming the foundation of any fair and friendly settlement, injurious to the political morality of the nation; I would not harbour a slavish principle, nor give it the hospitality of a night's lodging in a land of liberty! Slavery is like any other vice, tolerate and you embrace; you should guard your constitution by settled maxims of honour, as well as wholesome rules of law; and one maxim should be, never to tolerate a condition which trenches on the privilege of parlia2 L

VOL. IV.