(8) People ex rel. Brooklyn, Queens County and Suburban Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission.

(9) People ex rel. Coney Island and Brooklyn Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission.

(10) People ex rel. Nassau Electric Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission.

(11) People ex rel. New York and Queens Gas Company v. McCall.

(12) People ex rel. New York and Queens County Railway Company v. Public Service Commission.

(13) People ex rel. Jay Street Connecting Railroad Company v. McCall.

(14) People ex rel. New York and Queens County Railway Company v. Public Service Commission.

(15) People ex rel. The Newtown Gas Company v. Public Service Commission.

(16) People ex rel. Jamaica Gas Light Company v. Public Service Commission.

(17) People ex rel. Richmond Hill and Queens County Gas Light Company v. Public Service Commission.

(18) People ex rel. Woodhaven Gas Light Company v. Public Service Commission.

(19) People ex rel. Kings County Lighting Company v. Public Service Commission.

(20) People ex rel. New York Railways Company v. Public Service Commission.

(21) People ex rel. New York Railways Company v. Public Service Commission.

(22) People ex rel. City of New York v. Cram.

(23) People ex rel. State of New York v. Cram.

(24) People ex rel. The Long Island Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission.

(25) People ex rel. The Long Island Railroad Company and The Newtown Gas Company v. Public Service Commission.

Appeals under Railroad Law from Orders of the Commission
(26) In the Matter of 241st Street.
(27) In the Matter of 189th Street.

Proceedings to Enforce the Law or an Order of the Commission (28) Public Service Commission v. Brooklyn Borough Gas Company.

(29) Public Service Commission v. New York and Queens County Railway Company.

(30) Public Service Commission v. Richmond Light and Railroad Company.

(31) Public Service Commission v. The Long Island Railroad Company.

Penalty Actions

(32) People v. New York Consolidated Railroad Company. (33) People v. The Long Island Railroad Company. (34) People v. Bush Terminal Railroad Company. (35) People v. Ocean Electric Railway Company.

ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE RAPID TRANSIT POWERS OF THE COMMISSION

Actions Relative to Construction of Rapid Transit Railroads

(36) Chesebrough Building Company v. McCall.

(37) Morris v. City et al.

(38) Morris et al. v. City et al.

(39) Napier v. New York Municipal Railway Corporation et al. (40) Union Real Estate Company v. City.

(41) Williams v. Straus.

(42) Astor v. City.

(43) Cowenhoven v. City.

Actions to Foreclose Liens

(44) Marshall et al. v. Richensteen et al.

(45) Martin Motor Trucking Company v. Degnon. (46) Perfect Coatfront Pad Company v. Therry.

(47) Hamerschlag v. Daily.

(48) Mayhew Company Inc. v. New York and North Shore Traction Company.

(49) New York Title and Mortgage Company v. Goodman et al.

Actions Relating to Determinations by Chief Engineer (50) City v. Interborough Rapid Transit Company et al. (51) City v. New York Municipal Railway Corporation et al.

MISCELLANEOUS LITIGATION

Civil Service

(52) Re Cullen v. Straus.

Workmen's Compensation

(53) Sexton v. City.

Personal Injuries

(54) Bandholtz v. Fahys Watch Case Company.

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING VIOLATIONS OF ORDERS OF THE COMMISSION

(55) People v. Dempsey.

(56) People v. Maher.

(57) People v. Williams.

ACTIONS TO ENJOIN ENFORCEMENT OF ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE (1) Kings County Lighting Company v. Woodbury et al. Supreme Court, New York County.

By Chapter 604 of the Laws of 1916, which amended Chapter 125 of the Laws of 1906 as amended, and which became a law with the approval of the Governor on May 19, 1916, the Legislature prescribed 80 cents per thousand cubic feet as the rate to be charged by gas companies in the Borough of Brooklyn. The Kings County Lighting Company, a gas corporation located in that borough, instituted an action in the Supreme Court, New York County, to have so much of the Act as provided a penalty or forfeiture for the violation of its provisions adjudged unconstitutional and void, and for a temporary and permanent injunction. The application for a temporary injunction was granted by Mr. Justice Clark at the Special Term of the Supreme Court, New York County, who handed down the following memorandum:

"The application for a temporary injunction will be granted. Plaintiff will be required to deposit with a depository to be named by the court on the first of each month until the issues between the plaintiff and the defendants shall finally have been determined by this court the difference between the amount collected during the preceding month at the rate established by the legislature for private consumers and the amount theretofore paid by such consumers. Such amount shall remain on deposit, subject to the further order of the court. In the event of any unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiff in the prosecution of this suit the defendants or any of them may apply upon notice for an order suspending and vacating this injunction.

An order was entered later permitting the company to file an undertaking in lieu of depositing the difference between the amount collected at the rate established by the Legislature and the rate theretofore paid. On an appeal to the Appellate Division the order at Special Term, granting the application for a temporary injunction, was affirmed without opinion. The AttorneyGeneral then made an application for an order directing a compulsory reference. This application was heard before Mr. Justice Greenbaum at a Special Term of the Supreme Court, New York County, who granted the application referring the issues to a referee to hear and determine. The court said among other things:

"It is equally well settled that in an action in equity where no absolute right to trial by jury exists it is nevertheless a prerequisite to granting a compulsory order of reference to show that the case falls within the legislative authority to order such a reference. In other words, it must appear that the trial will require the examination of a long account on either side, and will not require the decision of a difficult question of law. It is also well recognized that a compulsory reference may not be ordered where the accounts to be examined do not directly arise in the action, whether upon the complaint therein or the defense, but are merely collaterally or incidentally involved. * * *We thus have a case in equity where the issue tendered by the plaintiff is peculiarly one which in its very nature involves the consideration of a long account, which in no sense may be recorded as collateral and where it has not been shown that any difficult questions. of law need be considered."

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division from the order at Special Term. The Appellate Division reversed the order at Special Term and denied the motion for a reference.

there said:

The court

"In our opinion it cannot be said that the trial will involve the examination of a long account as those words are construed by the adjudicated cases. It is true that

in order to establish certain facts which it will be incum-
bent upon the plaintiff to prove reference may be necessary
to its books of account but such reference will be merely
incidental, and it is by no means certain that even this
reference to the books of account will have to be made
before the court. * * *
Camp v. Ingersoll (86 N. Y.
433), which is a leading case, was a suit in equity, or
at least was assumed to be such for the purposes of the
decision as to its referability. The ultimate facts to
be determined was the value of the capital stock of a cor-
poration and it was conceded that to ascertain that value
it would be necessary to examine the books of accounts
of the corporation. The Court of Appeals held that this
circumstance did not make the cause referable under
section 1013 of the Code because the accounts to be
examined within the purview of that section 'must be
the immediate object of the action, or the ground of
defense, and must be directly and not collaterally involved.'
The court expressly recognized, as we recognize in the
present case, that a reference might afford a more con-
venient method of trying the cause than to try it in court,
and that a trial before the court might prove to be tedious
and unsatisfactory, but notwithstanding that, felt bound
to hold, as we do, that the cause was not referable against
the objection of one of the parties.

66

Having arrived at this conclusion it is unnecessary to inquire whether any difficult questions of law will require decision, although it seems quite probable that some such may arise.

"We feel constrained to hold, upon the authorities above referred to and many others, that the action is not one in which a compulsory reference to hear and determine can be ordered.”

Just prior to the hearing of the application for a temporary injunction the District Attorney of Kings County, one of the defendants in the action, made a motion for a change of venue