create a very near and intimate relation to him; so far forth as he trusts him, he puts his case into his hands, and deposits his interest in his disposal, and thereby creates him his proxy, or his second self. So that when I accept of the trust which another offers me, whether it be to be an arbitrator in his cause, or an executor of his will, or a guardian to his children, or a keeper of any pledge or depositum he commits to me, I do thereby enter into a close alliance and relation with him; I put on his person, engage to supply his place, to act as his representative, or alter ego, and, so far as he trusts and confides in me, to do for him as if the case were my own, to determine his cause, to execute his will, and dispose of his children, and secure his pledges to him, as if I were himself, and those were all my own. And by entering into this near relation to him, I give him a right, so far forth as he intrusts me, to my skill and care, fidelity and industry; all which, by putting on his person, I have listed and engaged in his service. So that if, by my own carelessness or neglect, I suffer any of his trusts to miscarry, I am highly dishonest and injurious to him; because I undertook to do for him all that I can suppose he would have done for himself, had he been master of my skill and ability. But if for a bribe, or to serve my interest, I betray the trust he committed to me, or convert it to my own advantage, I rob him more basely and infamously, than if I bade him stand, and demanded his purse on the highway: for then I had robbed him in the person of an enemy, but now I rob him in his own, and make use of that trust to betray his interest, by which I was as much obliged to secure and defend it, as if I had exchanged per sons with him, and his interest were my own: and to betray his interest for my own advantage, when he had made me his second self, and I had engaged myself to be so, is a piece of the most inhuman and disingenuous perfidiousness and injustice; because by thus doing I abuse his good opinion of me, for which I stand obliged to him, into an occasion of betraying him. So that in effect I have borrowed his person, which he freely lent me, only to rob and despoil him; and from his confidence in my truth and fidelity, by which he was justly entitled to it, have basely taken occasion to defraud him of that trust which he freely deposited in my hands and disposal. 8. There is the relation of the benefactor to the receiver. For he who doth good to another doth thereby contract a relation to him; because in doing good to him he espouses his interest, and in espousing his interest he espouses himself; he performs the part of his brother, of his father, and his God, whose highest character and eulogium is to be good and to do good; and consequently in all these capacities he stands related to him. And by virtue of this relation he acquires a right in the person obliged to be esteemed and beloved by him; to be prayed for and requited by him, whenever he hath opportunity and ability. For there is always a right acquired by benefits, where there was none antecedently: he who doth a good turn deserves and merits of him that receives it; and what he deserves, he hath a right to. So that every receiver is debtor to his benefactor; he owes him all the good he receives from him, and is always obliged to a thankful acknowledgment, and, whenever he hath opportunity, to an equivalent requital. For though my benefactor gives me his benefit freely, as having no need of it himself, or at least not so much as I, and therefore cannot legally demand a repayment of it; yet whatsoever he gives me he deserves of me, and whenever our circumstances change, and he hath my need, and I his ability, I am in conscience as much obliged to repay it, as if he had lent it me upon bond. In this case, my ability is security for the benefit I owe him, and his need is a just demand of it; and therefore since what he hath merited of me is his due, I am extremely unjust, if, when his needs do demand it, I do not repay him so far as I am able. But if either I am not able to repay him an equivalent benefit, or he hath no need or occasion for it, I am bound in justice to express my gratitude to him in thankful remembrances and acknowledgments, to take all fair occasions to own and celebrate his goodness, and, by all the little services I can render him, to express a forward willingness to make him a full requital. For as in matter of debt, he who cannot pay all must compound, and pay so far as he is able; so in the matter of benefits, he who cannot make a complete requital, is obliged in justice to make some small composition, and pay so much in the pound as his ability extends to; and if he can do no more, to express a grateful sense of them, and give thankful words for beneficial deeds; which all generous benefactors esteem the noblest requital. But he who receives benefits without some thankful acknowledgment acts the part of a swine, that greedily devours the acorns, and never looks up towards the tree from whence they drop; and he who requites benefits with injuries acts the part of a devil, that would fain have thrown that blessed Being out of heaven who created and placed him in it. 9. Ninthly and lastly, There is the relation of creditor and debtor: for he who lends to another man, and gives him credit either for money or commodities, or accepts of his security for what he lends to another, doth thereby contract a relation to him; by which he acquires a right to be justly repaid according to contract and agreement. For lending and crediting doth not alienate the property; the debtor hath only a right to use what he borrows for his present conveniency or necessity, but the property remains in the hands of the creditor, who hath the same right to it as when it was in his own possession. And it being so, the rule of common justice obliges us, that we do not borrow more than we have a fair prospect of repaying, unless he that credits us knows our inability, and is willing to run the hazard. For he who engages himself in debt beyond what he can reasonably hope to repay, takes that from his creditor upon promise of payment, which he knows he is never likely to restore him; which is at least as high an injustice, as if he had taken it by force and violence. And the same is to be said of borrowing upon false or insufficient securities, such as bad mortgages, counterfeit pawns, or insolvent bondsmen: for he who takes up his neighbour's goods or money upon such securities as he knows are incapable of repaying him, doth as manifestly wrong him, as if he had taken them by stealth, or robbery. And since our debts are our creditor's rights, if we would be just debtors, we must neither reckon what we owe to be our own, nor so dispose of it, as to put it out of our power to restore it to the true proprietor: he that hath so much of his own, and so much of other men's, ought not to spend, or give, as if it were all his own. For if he that hath borrowed one thousand pounds and is worth another, lives to the utmost height and proportion of two thousand, he must necessarily spend upon what he hath borrowed, and put it out of his power to restore it; and in so doing rob and despoil his creditor, to maintain himself in his prodigality. And as debtors ought to be careful so to dispose of what they owe, as that they may be able to repay it; so they ought to be no less careful to repay it upon due demand, or according to contract and agreement. For as it is unjust to deprive a creditor of his money, so it is unjust to deprive him of the use and possession of it, any longer than he consents and agrees to it; because as he hath right to his money, so he hath right to possess and use it. And therefore for debtors to defer and protract their payments without their creditors' consent, when it is in their power to discharge them, to put them upon fruitless attendances, and make advantages of their money against their consent, and beyond their contracts and agreements, is a degree of injustice next to that of robbing and despoiling them of it; because by thus doing, they do not only force their creditors to waste their time in tedious attendances, and take them off from their other businesses, but also rob them of the use and possession of their money, which they have as much right to as to the money itself. And if to defer payment be so unrighteous in a debtor, then to refuse and deny it, or take indirect courses either to abate or avoid it, is much more unrighteous; because this is not only to |