immutable right is still paramount of all his creation, and every thing in it unalienably belongeth to him. And as for those enclosed properties with which he hath vested us in such unequal proportions, he hath committed them to us as stewards, and not transferred them upon us as masters; and so without any injury to us may appropriate what part of them he pleaseth to what use he pleaseth; which when he hath done, we cannot without manifest injustice otherwise dispose of that appropriate part, than to the use and service for which he hath appointed it. Now out of every man's estate and property he hath actually reserved some appropriate portion to be disposed of to the poor and needy, who have nothing else to subsist by; and in this part of our estates the poor have the same right from God that we have in all the other parts of it. So that this world being now cantoned out so very unequally among men, yet according to God's allotment every man hath right to such a share of it as is at least sufficient to keep him from being starved, or pinched with extremity of need; and in this method God hath assigned to every man a child's portion, which in some fair way or other ought to be obtained, viz. either by legal right or by humble request; which latter, in conscience, ought to take effect, as well as the former. For now, according to this latter constitution, he hath appointed the rich to be his stewards and treasurers for the poor; with a strict charge that they dispense to every one his meat in due season. The honour of distributing is conferred on the former, as a trial of their fidelity and bounty; the right of receiving is conferred on the latter, as a trial of their patience and gratitude:

and thus God hath wisely projected, that all his children should be both effectually and quietly provided for; that one man's abundance should supply another's wants, that so there might be an equality, as St. Paul expresses it, 2 Cor. viii. 14. For since no man can enjoy more than he needeth, and every man ought to have so much, as he needeth, there could be no great inequality among men, if things were administered according to the institution of God. But if out of our abundance we refuse to relieve the poor man's necessities, we are unjust both to God and him; to God, because we misapply his goods, and cross his orders; to him, because we wrongfully usurp, and detain from him the portion which God hath allowed him; and so, under a vizard of right and possession, we are no better than robbers in the account of God: when by refusing to relieve our brother's necessities we spoil him of his goods; his goods, I say, by the very same title that any thing is ours, even by the free donation of God. It is the hungry man's bread which we hoard up in our barns, his meat that we glut, and his drink that we guzzle; it is the naked man's apparel that we shut up in our presses, and do so exorbitantly ruffle and flaunt in; and what we deny out of our abundance to an object of real pity and charity, is in the account of God an unjust usurpation of his right. For by the institution of God, I owe every man this right; not to see him pine, and perish for want, whilst I surfeit, and swim in plenty. And thus you see what rights appertain to a man in his first capacity, viz. as inhabiting a mortal body.

CHAP. II.

Of justice in preserving the rights of men, considered as rational creatures.

II. I PROCEED in the second place to observe, that there are other rights accruing to men, as they are rational creatures: for it is this indeed that gives a right to common justice, to be governed by laws, and by rewards and punishments, that we are free and rational agents, who can choose or refuse, and determine ourselves which way soever we think fit or reasonable. For without reason and free-will, we could no more be capable of laws, nor subject to rewards and punishments, than stones or trees are. For no law can oblige a being that hath no power over his own actions; nor can he deserve to be rewarded when he doth well, nor punished when he doth evil, if it be not in his power to do otherwise : and therefore beasts cannot be said to do either justly or unjustly towards one another; because whatsoever good or evil they do one another, they do it necessarily, and it was not in their power to do otherwise. But because men are free agents, and have power to determine themselves either to do good or evil to one another; therefore of right they claim of each other the mutual performance of such goods, and forbearance of such evils, as agree or disagree with the state and condition of their natures. And hence every rational creature hath a right to be used and treated by those of his own kind agreeably to the state of his rational nature; and for one man to treat another otherwise, is not only hurtful, but also injurious. Now the rights which one rational creature may by the condition of

his nature claim of another, may be reduced to these four particulars :

First, Every man has a right to an equitable treatment from every man.

Secondly, Every man hath a right to judge for himself so far as he is capable.

Thirdly, Every man hath a right not to be forced or impelled to act contrary to the judgment of right

reason.

Fourthly, Every man hath a right to be respected by every man according to the dignity of his na

ture.

1. Every man hath a right to an equitable treatment from every man; that is, to be treated according to the measures of that golden rule of equity prescribed by our Saviour, Matt. vii. 12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets: i. e. In all your intercourses with men, suppose you had exchanged conditions with them, and that you were in theirs, and they in yours; and be sure you do them all that good, which, upon a due consideration of the case, you could reasonably expect or desire of them, if you were in their persons and circumstances. And this right of being treated by others as they would expect to be treated by us, supposing they were in our circumstances, arises from that equality of nature that is between us, which gives every one a right to be equally treated by every one, and to claim all those good offices from others, which they might reasonably claim of him, if they were in his state and circumstances. For we being all propagated from the same loins, and partakers of the same nature,

every man in the world is by cognation of blood, and agreement of nature, every man's brother and kinsman. We are all but so many several streams issuing from one common source, but so many several twigs sprouting from the same stock: we are all of us but one blood derived through several chanels; but one substance multiplied, and dilated into several times and places, by the miraculous efficacy of the divine benediction. We are all fashioned according to the same original idea, resembling God our common Father: 'we are all endowed with the same faculties, inclinations, and affections; and do all conspire in the same essential ingredients of our nature and there is nothing doth distinguish or diversify us, but what is accidental to our being; such as age and place, figure and stature, colour and garb; so that every man is not only our most lively image, but in a manner our very substance, or another ourself, under a small yariation of present circumstances: which circumstances are to be considered in every application of the above-named rule of equality to our actions. If I am superior to another, either in my place or relation, or in the goods of my mind or fortune; I am only obliged by this rule to do that by him which I might reasonably desire he should do by me, were he as much my superior as I am his. But when all men naturally as such are equal, and do stand upon even terms and level ground, there ought to be no other inequality in their mutual treatment of one another, but what is owing to the inequality of their circumstances and he who doth that to another man, which upon good reason he would not have another do to him in the same circumstances, doth unjustly