merit of his measures, and he will have the lefs temptation and neceffity to impoverish the people, by squandering their treasure in paying our representatives for facrificing the public interest to his own fecurity. Should he, then, continue to apply the national purse and offices to the attainment of parliamentary influence, he should be divested of the power to bestow them (a). SECT. II. POWER OF PARLIAMENT. THE POWER OF PARLIAMENT, that great fecretary and privy counsellor, Sir Thomas Smith, describes in the following words: In comitiis parliamentariis pofita eft omnis auguftæ abfolutæque poteftatis vis, quippe quemadmodum robur et virtus Angliæ dicuntur in acie refidere, parliamentaria comitia, veteres leges, jubent effe irritas, novas inducunt, præfentibus juxta ac futuris modum conftituunt, jura et poffeffiones hominum privatorum commutant; Spurios natalibus reftituunt ; cultum divinum fan&tionibus corroborant; pondera et menfuras variant; jus in 1 regno regno fuccedendi præfcribunt, incerti juris contro verfias dirimunt, ubi nihil lege cautum fuit, cenfum agunt, capitationes et vectigalia indicunt, delictorum gratiam faciunt, afflictas et majorum fceleribus perditas familias erigunt, vitæ necifque poteftatem in eos obtinent, quos ad hujufmodi difquifitiones princeps ad-. vocaverat, atque ut concludam breviter, quicquid in centuriatis comitiis, aut in tribunitiis populus Romanus efficere potuiffet, id omne in comitiis Anglicanis tanquam in cætu principem populumque reprefentante commode tranfigitur. Intereffe enim in illo conventu omnes intelligimur cujufcunque amplitudinis, flatus aut dignitatis, princepfve aut plebs fuerit, five per fe ipfum hoc fiat, five per procuratorem ; nam omnibus peræque, gratum effe oportet quicquid ex fenatus confulto parliamentario profe&um eft. By the above quotation, from that wife and learned author, we learn, that parliament has power to repeal old laws, and to establifh new; to regulate times prefent and future; to decide on all matters of property; to legitimate the fpurious; to establish public worship; to determine the royal fucceffion; to decide on all controverfies without appeal, where there is no other law to judge; to levy taxes; to pardon offenders; to fupport the oppreffed, and to punish the oppreffor; to dif pense penfe life and death; and, in a word, to perform whatever could be done by the comitia centuriata or tribunitia, i, e. all the people of Rome. The above is their active power. Their conftituent power, according to the fame authority, confifts in every Englishman, from the prince to the peafant, and of whatever ftate, dignity, or quality, poffeffing the right of being present in parliament either in perfon or by procuration or attorney; and the confent of the parliament is understood to be every man's confent, PARLIAMENT being thus vefted with fuch eminent powers, as comprehend the entire difpofal of our lives and properties, the greateft care should be taken to preferve those checks the conftitution has provided against their abuse. In our great and just anxiety to diminish corrupt influence, we may improvidentially render our legiflators our tyrants in perpetuity. Although venality has rendered the parliament too dependant on the crown, yet, in correcting this evil, we should be careful not to empower our legiflative fervants to affume the authority of taskmafters. To remedy the minifterial abuse of the executive power, is a fubject of as much difficulty as danger. It is only to be effected by a tem a temperate restriction. Were we rafhly to enable the commons to use any part of the executive power themselves, because it has been injuriously administered by thofe in whom it is wifely lodged by the conftitution, might render us as oppreffed as those are in the republics of Italy. We fhould then depend entirely on the moderation of our parliament for not finding, as in Venice, our representatives become our stateinquifitors. As Montefquicu fays, they might not only enact tyrannical laws, but execute them in a tyrannical manner. The hiftory of our parliament affords two lamentable inftances of perhaps too ardent a zeal to correct and punish court venality. The commons, uncorrupt in themselves, felt fuch indignation at fecing their privileges invaded by the defigns of venal courtiers and tyrannical fovereigns, that, in the moments of enthufiaftic patriotifm, they intemperately facrificed two monarchs at the fhrine of public vengeance. Inftead of applying themfelves, with wifdom and moderation, to prevent the evil in future, they employed themselves in criminating, and punishing with death, the royal offenders. At thofe times, it might have been thought expedient Richard the Second and Charles the First. pedient to make these regal tyrants exemplary victims to the vengeance of an injured people. But experience has fince too fatally proved, kings are not to be taught modération by fuch fangui nary leffons. For however the above monarchs were difpofed to raise prerogative on the ruins. of liberty, yet we find corruption has ever fince been forming itself into a fyftem. And fo formidable is this ftate-poison, that it seems to derive increasing energy from all the means that have been yet exerted to expel it from the conftitution. Mindful of the fate attending Richard the Second and Charles the Firft, fucceeding monarchs have been careful how they avowed their defpotic intentions. Not daring, therefore, to attack, like an open enemy, our privileges, the undermining arts of corruption are used to make us flaves with our own confent. Thus, it is evident that, from an enthufiaftic and intemperate defire to punish tyranny and vindicate privilege, we are now rendered the wretched dependants on ministerial influence. Taught by this leffon, let us imitate the wisdom and forbearance of the NATIONAL ASSEMBLY in all our proccedings, to reftore our constitution to its priftine vigour. Instead of directing their ven geance |