fhould recur to the original nature of the conftitution, before we even fuggeft, and much less apply, the remedy. By too hafty a desire to reform, deftuction may enfue. To allay, therefore, the heat of party, to prepare the public mind for deliberate investigation, and to prove that our liberties may be renovated without the deftruction of the conftitution or perfonal facrifice, is the immediate purpose of our prefent enquiry into the first establishment of our liberties, by a free, equal, and entire representation of the people. The chief

principles of this enquiry are:

FIRST.-That, as our conftitution was, from the earliest periods, founded on liberty, it fhould not be destroyed, as if it were the government of defpotifm.

SECONDLY.-That, as all our political evils arife from the abuse of the practice, and not from defect of principle, the original purity of its spirit may be restored without violence to the body.

THIRDLY.—That, as the corrupt state of the

representation originates with all parties, its ancient purity is only to be revived by the unanimous and difinterested efforts of every rank and degree in the kingdom.

FOURTH

FOURTHLY.-That, as nothing but a patriotic and difinterested refolution, in all, to recur to the first principles of our conftitution can reftore us to the entire poffeffion of our ancient liberties, it is not the fall of one party, or the rife of another, that should be the the object of public purfuit. And, FIFTHLY.-That, as the restoration of our liberties is equally due to all, no difference of opinion, fituation, or circumstances, should prevent every individual peaceably uniting in the attainment of this invaluable bleffing.

CHAP. II.

PARLIAMENT.

ITS MEANING, POWER, AND PRIVILEGES, WITH

ATTENDANT OBSERVATIONS.

SECT. I.

MEANING.

PARLIAMENT is derived from Parlement, which is the name the Normans gave to our national affemblies. The word itself, being derived from parler, i. c. to fpeak, implies an affembly appropriated for speaking, or debating. And as it was, and is fummoned by writs from the king, pro quibus, arduis & urgentibus negotiis nos, flat. & defenfionem regni noftri & ecclef. Anglic. concernent. †, upon some arduous and urgent business concerning the king, ftate and defence of the kingdom and established church, it is evident the intention of parliament is to collect the fenfe of the people on what relates, not only to the king--but to their own temporal and eternal welfare. Here the reprefentatives are affembled and enjoined colloquium habere & tractare t, to treat and hold conference on the urgent concerns of the nation. And

* Extract from the Copy of a Writ in Hakewell. + Ibid.

as

1

as no conference can be efficient without freedom of opinion, every fpecies of influence that tends to reftrain or controul the fentiments of our representatives, is not only a violation of the constitution—but a direct opposition to the positive commands of the fovereign. Ministerial influence is, therefore, as difloyal to the king as it is injurious to the people. The throne is deprived of that impartial advice meant to be collected from the affembling of parliament; the representation is tempted to betray the rights and properties it was chofen to preferve, and the minister is rendered, by this artifice, independent of the fovereign, and fecure from all the confequences he might suffer from the responsibility he owes to the country. To remedy this grievance, the prerogative of the king is not to be infringed, nor is the conftitution to be fubverted. The power of affembling parliament is wifely attached to royalty. When his majesty finds the concerns of the nation too weighty for him and his privy-council to determine, it is the greatest act of national prudence to veft him with the power of collecting the fenfe of his fubjects by affembling his parliament. And when the advice of the country is thus taken, his power to pro

rogue

rogue or dismiss his national counsellors, is equally founded on policy and propriety. They might, otherwise, continue to confer, and thus perplex him in the execution of thofe defigns they had before advised him to adopt for the public welfare. And should he find their fentiments inimical to the public welfare, by tending to destroy that mutual confidence which fhould exist between him and his fubjects, he should have the power of diffolving or difmiffing them, as improper counsellors on "arduous and urgent concerns of the nation." If, therefore, the freedom of debate in parliament is perverted by ministerial influence, it should not be corrected, by violating the conftitution in diminishing any part of the royal prerogative, which relates to the affembling, proroguing, or diffolving of parliament. To prevent this abuse, the minifter should be deprived of the means by which he creates an undue influence in the representation. And the moft effe&tual method would be, to remove all the temptation he could poffibly have to acquire a fervile majority in the fenate. The danger he knows of the endeavours to fupplant him in his office, causes him to adopt the mode of corruption to fecure himfelf. Let him ftand or fall by the merit or de

merit