DESIRE TO APPROPRIATE CUBA,

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diminished their returns. Yet this did not prevent the whole body of Slave States from working steadily together in promoting that policy which the maintenance of the Slave Power, as a political system, demanded. A still more striking instance of the readiness to sacrifice particular interests to the political ascendancy of the body is furnished by the conduct of the South in its dealings with Cuba. The annexation of this island has long been, as all the world knows, a darling project of Southern ambition. The bearing of the acquisition on the general interests of the South is very obvious. It would add to its domain a district of incomparable fertility. It would give it a commanding position in the Gulf of Mexico. It would increase its political weight in the Union. But there is one state in the South which could not fail to be injured in a pecuniary sense by the acquisition. The principal industry of the State of Louisiana is the same as that of Cuba-the cultivation of sugar. But the soils of Louisiana are far inferior to those of Cuba-so much so that the planters of that State are only able to hold their ground against the competition of their Cuban rivals by the assistance of a high protective duty. Now the immediate consequence of the annexation of Cuba to the South would be the abolition of the protection which the planters of Louisiana now enjoy-an event which could not fail to be followed by the disappearance, in great pat, of the artificial production which it sustains. Nevertheless, Louisiana has formed no exception to the general eagerness of the South to appropriate Cuba; so far from this, it has curiously enough happened that the man who has been most prominent among the piratical party who have advocated this step is Mr. Slidell,* the senator in Congress for the State of Louisiana. The sympathies which bind slaveholders together have thus always proved more powerful than the particular interests which would sunder them; and whatever course the necessities of slavery, as a system, have prescribed, that the whole array of slaveholders, with a disregard for private ends, which, in a good cause, would be the highest virtue, has never hesitated to pur

sue.

The precedents, therefore, afforded by the past history of the South would lead us to expect that, so soon as the expediency of the African slave trade, in promoting the political interests of the Slave Power, became clear, the private advantage of particular states would be waived in deference to the requirements of the whole Confederacy. But, though this should not be so *This was the gentleman selected by Southern tact to recommend the cause of the South to Europe.

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FREE TRADE IN SLAVES.

-though the border states, when the trial came, should prove deficient in that public spirit which the working states in similar circumstances have never failed to exhibit—it is still quite inconceivable that what the public interests required should be permanently postponed to an opposition resting on such a basis. The men who now guide the councils of the Confederacy, from the moment of their accession to power to the present time, have never shrunk from any act essential to their ends: such men, having triumphantly carried their party through a bloody civil war, would hardly allow themselves to be baffled by the selfish obstinacy of a few of their number. Indeed already the particular expedient to which, in the event of protracted obstinacy, recourse might be had, has been hinted at in no obscure terms. Mr. De Bow has advocated the reopening of the African slave trade upon the distinct ground that it is necessary to extend the basis of slavery by bringing slaves within the reach of a larger number than, at their present price, are able to purchase them. By this means, he argues, increased stability would be given to the institution in proportion as the numbers interested in maintaining it should be increased. Of the soundness of this policy from the stand-point of the Slave Power there can, I think, be no question; and for the means of carrying it out in the last resort the extreme party could be at no loss. Let the reader observe the purpose to which this argument might be turned in the event of a schism between the breeding and the working states on the point in question. It is well known that the possession of a slave is the great object of the poor white's ambition, and the most effectual means of gratifying this ambition would be to make slaves cheap. To rally, then, to the cause of free trade in slaves this numerous class would be, indeed, an easy task. Nothing more would be needed than to appeal to their most obvious interest, to give play to their most cherished passion. Everywhere-in Virginia and Kentucky no less than in the states of the extreme South-the opening of the African slave trade would be hailed with enthusiasm by the great bulk of the people; and thus, whenever convenience demanded it, the resistance of an interested section might be overborne by the almost universal voice of the rest of the community.

To sum up the results of this part of the discussion :-on every hypothesis of Southern independence, save that which would be equivalent to the early extinction of the Slave Power, the reopening of the African slave trade would be recommended to the South by almost irresistible inducements-in one contingency by considerations which appeal to interests that are

DUTY OF EUROPE-NEUTRALITY.

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vital. The only source of opposition would be the private interests of the breeding states; but private interests in the history of the South have always yielded to the demands of public policy, and would probably do so in this case. In the event, however, of the breeding states proving refractory, the leaders of the extreme party would have the remedy in their own hands. The protest of a narrow minority would be wholly powerless to stem the tide of popular feeling which they have it in their power at any moment to evoke.

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

WHAT is the duty of European nations towards North America in the present crisis of its history? I answer—to observe a strict neutrality between the contending parties, giving their moral support to that settlement of the question which is most. in accordance with the general interest of the world. What ground is there for European interference in the quarrel? In the present aspect of affairs absolutely none-none, that is to say, which would not equally justify interference in every war which ever occurred. I say, in the present aspect of affairs, for in a different aspect of affairs I can well imagine that a different course would be justifiable, and might even become a duty. Supposing free society in North America in danger of being overborne by the Slave Power, would not the threatened predominance in the new world of a confederacy resting on slavery as its corner stone, and proclaiming the propagandism of slavery as its mission, be an occasion for the interference of civilized nations? If there be reason that civilized nations should combine to resist the aggressions of Russia-a country containing the germs of a vigorous and progressive civilization -would there be none for opposing the establishment of "a barbarous and barbarizing Power"—a Power of whose existence slavery is the final cause? But that contingency is happily not now probable; and in the present position of the American contest there is not even a plausible pretext for intervention. It is unhappily true that our trade is suffering, that much distress prevails in our manufacturing districts, and that we are threatened with even more serious consequences than have yet been felt. But is this a plausible pretext for interfering in a foreign war? How can a great war be carried on without dis

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IMPOLICY OF INTERVENTION.

turbing the commerce of the world? For what purpose are blockades instituted and permitted? To say that, because we are injuriously affected by a blockade we will not recognize it, is simply to say that we do not choose to be bound by laws longer than it suits our convenience is to throw away even the pretence of justice. But interference in the present case would be not merely immoral, it would be futile-nay, if the relief of distress be really the object of those who urge it, it would, we can scarce doubt, aggravate a hundred-fold the evils. it was intended to cure. For, supposing the blockade of the Southern ports to be raised, to what purpose would be this result if the war continued? It would, doubtless, carry comfort to the Slave Confederacy; it might possibly bring a few hundred thousand bales of cotton to Europe; but, in the present condition of the South, with Northern armies encamped on its soil, it would not cause cotton to be grown, and still less would it open Northern markets to our manufactures. A fleet A fleet may raise a blockade, but it cannot compel people to buy goods who do not want them. Intervention in America would, therefore, fail to restore trade to its normal channels; and it is admittedly to a disturbance in the normal channels of trade far more than to scarcity of any single commodity-to a cessation of Northern demand far more than to an interruption of Southern supplythat the distress ng experienced in England is due.* Now the cessation of Northern demand will continue as long as the war continues; so that the effect of intervention on manufacturing distress would depend on its effect on the duration of the war. And what would be this effect? On such a subject it would be absurd to speak with confidence; but there is one historical parallel which comes so close to the present case that we should do well to ponder it. In 1792 an armed intervention of European Powers tk place in France. The allied sovereigns were not less confident of their ability to impose conditions on the French people, than are those who now urge intervention in America of the ability of France and England to settle the affairs of that continent. But we know how the intervention of 1792 ended. The spirit of democracy, allying itself with the spirit of patriotism, kindled in the people of France an energy which not merely drove back the invaders from their soil, but which carried the invaded people as conquerors over the length and breadth of continental Europe. Such was the effect of a policy of intervention in the affairs of a great European nation. What reason have we to expect a different result from a similar policy pursued in America? Has democracy in

* See the Economist, 26th April, 1862.

OBLIGATION TO RENDER MORAL SUPPORT.

149

America shown less energy than in Europe? Is its organization less effective? Is the spirit of its patriotism less powerful? Are the resources which it commands for war less extensive? Or will the adversaries of democracy fight it with greater advantage across the reach of the Atlantic? I am assuming that an intervention, if attempted, would be resolutely carried out that a mere interference by our navies would only exacerbate and prolong the quarrel is so obvious as to disentitle such a proposition to a moment's serious regard. The duty of neutrality is, therefore, in the present case as plainly marked out by the dictates of selfish policy as by the maxims of morality and law. While intervention would fail to alleviate the evils under which we suffer, it would almost certainly add to those evils the calamity of a great war-a war which would bequeath to the posterity of the combatants a legacy of mutual hatred, destined to embitter their relations for centuries to come.

But the duty of neutrality is not incompatible with the rendering of moral support. We may be required to abstain from giving effect to our convictions by force, but we can never be justly required to abstain from advancing them by moral means. Nay, so long as the conflict between good and evil lasts, the obligation to sustain the right cause by sympathy and counsel is one from which we cannot relieve ourselves. It becomes, therefore, of extreme importance to consider what is that settlement of the American contest which deserves the moral support of Europe.

There are two modes of terminating the present war, either of which must, it seems to me, be almost equally deprecated by every friend of freedom and of the American people :—such a triumph of the Southern party as would give to it the command of the unsettled districts to the south and west; and such a reconstruction of the Union as would restore slavery to its former footing in the Republic. It is, I think, difficult to say which of these results would be the more extensively disastrous. The one would establish, amid all the éclat of victory, a slave empire, commanding the resources of half a continent, fired with an ardent ambition, and cherishing vast designs of aggression and conquest. The other would once more commit a moral and freedom-loving people-the main hope of civilization in the New World--to complicity with the damning guilt of slavery. The Union, restored on the principle of restricting slavery, would not indeed be the same Union as that in which the Slave Power was predominant. But fortune is capricious. in politics as in war. A few years might bring a change in the position of parties; and a revolution of the wheel might once