COURT OF ADMIRALTY. THE LAUREL.-Dec. 13. Bottomry-Advertisement-Maritime interest. The master, in a port of refuge, consigned the vessel to a merchant to advance money for her repairs, the law of the country allowing a lien on the vessel for such advances; no agreement was made at the time whether the advance was to be made on personal security or on bottomry, and the merchant did not himself determine on having bottomry security until shortly before the ship sailed, when he demanded a bond, which the master executed. The Court upheld the bond. It is proper for the master to advertise previous to taking advances on bottomry; but the absence of advertisement will not of itself ivalidate a bottomry bond. A bottomry bond, if it expresses a maritime risk, is not affected by the omission of a bottomry premium. The amount of the commissions may be a reason for impeaching a bottomry bond on the ground of fraud, but cannot otherwise affect its validity. The question at issue in this case was the validity of a bottomry bond upon The Laurel and her freight. The circumstances are amply stated in the judgment. Dr. Deane, Q. C., and E. C. Clarkson, for the plaintiffs, cited The Alexander (1 Dods. 278) and The Prince George (4 Moo. P. C. 25). Brett, Q. C., and Vernon Lushington, for the defendants, cited The Hersey (3 Hagg. 404; 3 Moo. P. C. 79); The Augusta (1 Dods. 283); The Osmanli (3 W. Rob. 198); The Aurora (1 Wheat. 104); The Gosfabrick (Swab. 344); and The Oriental (7 Moo. P. C. 398). Dec. 13.-Dr. LUSHINGTON.-The question at issue in this cause is the validity of a bottomry bond, bearing date the 13th December, 1862, by which bond the vessel The Laurel and her freight are purported to be hypothecated. The Laurel belonged to Messrs. Willis, of London, and was bound from Shanghai to London with a very valuable cargo of tea and silk. On the 24th October she struck upon a rock in the Java seas, and the master was ultimately compelled, by the crew refusing to proceed, to put into Batavia, where she arrived on the 31st October. There was at Batavia a firm which carried on the business of merchants, under the name of Maclaine, Watson, & Co.; of this firm, Mr. Maclachlan, the British consul, was a partner, and another partner of the firm was Lloyd's agent. The master, soon after his arrival at Batavia, communicated with Mr. Machlachlan, and I am satisfied that such communication took place with him in his character of British consul, and not as a partner in the firm of Maclaine, Watson, & Co. Mr. Machlachlan informed the master that he could not assist him, unless he consented to a survey of the ship; and here, though I have not direct evidence of the fact, I have no doubt, from all the res gestæ in the case, that the true inference is, that he, the British consul, could not interfere to compel the crew to prosecute the voyage, without a survey being first held, to ascertain if the ship was seaworthy. It is impossible, I think, to say that this was an improper precaution, before measures were adopted to compel the crew to continue the voyage. The vessel had been, as I have said, on a rock, and there could be no certainty as to the extent of damage without a survey. There had, indeed, been a previous survey or examination by a diver, and the 21 report then made was, not that the ship was fit to go to London, but might go to the Mauritius; even to proceeding to that island the crew had objected, and refused to navigate the vessel. A survey was accordingly held at Batavia, a copy of which is in these proceedings; and the surveyor recommended that the ship should be docked, and the cargo discharged. This survey is dated the 3rd November. The master then states, "That as The Laurel was to go into dock, I considered it necessary to arrange with some house to act as agents for my owner, and I, therefore, offered the consignment of the ship to Maclaine, Watson, & Co., which they agreed to take. I offered the consignment to them, because I had learned that they were connected with the house of Maclaine, Fraser, & Co., of Singapore, to whom the owners of The Laurel were well known, and who had been used to act as their agents at Singapore." And these facts he mentioned to Messrs. Maclaine & Co. when he offered them the agency, and they agreed to accept it. It is of great importance to the correct decision of this case, to consider with care the evidence as to what took place at the time when Maclaine, Watson, & Co. accepted the agency; and the result, in my judgment, is this, that not a word was said by Maclaine & Co., nor by the master, as to bottomry, nor as to the advance of money on personal security. If a previous stipulation for a bottomry bond be an indispensable requisite, there was nothing of the kind, not even any understanding; on the other hand, there was no agreement, no understanding, that money would be advanced on personal security. There was an arrangement, so the master says, that Maclaine & Co. would charge for their trouble a commission of 21. 10s. per cent. on the repairs, and 51. per cent. on the disbursement. I doubt, however, whether the master is strictly correct in saying that he arranged this matter at that time, for arrangement infers final agreement; and it is clear that the master, after Maclaine & Co. told him of their terms, made inquiries of other houses as to the terms on which they would do the business. It appears to me, however this may be, even if it were an agreement, that it has nothing to do with advance of money in any shape, either on bottomry or personal security, but is only an agreement as to the rate of commission. The evidence is not very satisfactory as to all that occurred. Indeed, I must conlieve I state the facts truly according to the evidence, jecture in some respects what happened; and I beand the necessary inferences to be drawn therefrom, that, without any further communication between the master and Messrs. Maclaine & Co., the ship was docked, the cargo landed, the repairs done, the cargo unladen and reladen. How these expenses were actually paid I know not, but there is really no dispute that, in some shape or other, they were paid by Maclaine & Co. Very shortly, indeed immediately, before the ship was ready to sail, Maclaine & Co. presented their accounts to the master, and required him to sign a draft upon his owners for the amount, and also a bottomry bond. I do not say that the master signed this draft or executed this bond under duress or compulsion, but it is quite clear that he had no alternative, nor do I think it of importance to inquire further as to this point; because the true question is, not whether he was reluctant to sign the bond, but whether it was a proper bond to be executed under the circumstances. Now, having examined the evidence as to whether any agreement was made by Maclaine & Co. to advance the necessary funds on personal security, I think it right to look to their own account of the transaction as appears in their letters. I think that 21 the result of that evidence is this-that they accepted board, and will sail to-morrow. We are now busy the consignment without any obligation or agreement settling her account with Captain Garrick, amounting to advance the necessary funds on personal security; to (42) m, for which he is to give us a draft on his that during the transaction they doubted whether owners, John Willis & Sons, and a bottomry bond as they should make such advance on personal security, collateral security. We remit said bill and bond to or require a bottomry bond; that they corresponded Finlay, Hodgson, & Co., who we hope will have no with Maclaine, Fraser, & Co., and in the result they difficulty in collecting said amount. Watson, of Sindetermined to require a bottomry bond. It appears gapore, wrote Machlachlan favourably about said that Maclaine & Co. made no communication of such owners, and he would take the captain's bills on them their determination to the master until the moment for 10007., more or less; but as the expenses incurred they demanded the bond, for which I think that, amount to more than three times as much, I thought though the validity of the bond may not be destroyed it would be better to take a bond." by such their reticence, they were in fair dealing greatly to blame. I further think, that it is clearly proved that Maclaine & Co., having advanced money for the repairs of the ship, and other expenses incidental thereto, would, by the law of Batavia, have had a right to proceed against the ship itself to recover the sums so advanced. "I forgot to mention to you last mail, that the English ship Laurel, bound from Shanghai to London, with tea and silk, put in here, having got ashore on Brower's reef, and has had to discharge all her cargo. Her owners are John Willis & Sons, 18, East Indiachambers, Leadenhall-street; I believe highly respectable people. The captain places his ship in our hands, as Maclaine, Fraser, & Co. are the owner's agents at Singapore. The cargo is a very valuable one, about 1,300,000 f., so that we will get a handsome commission. I am not yet sure if it will not be better to take a bottomry on the vessel; but have written Watson, at Singapore, about the owner, and wait his answer before deciding anything." Two conclusions, I think, may safely be drawn from this letter-First, that there had been no agreement to advance on personal security. Secondly, that Maclaine & Co. had not told the master that they intended to require a bottomry bond, for they themselves were in doubt, and waited the result of inquiries they had made of Maclaine, Fraser, & Co., of Singapore, as to the credit of the house of Willis & Co., the owners. It is, I apprehend, also clear, that Mr. Machlachlan did not doubt that his house had a right to demand a bottomry bond; and this conviction could not well exist if they already promised an advance on personal security. There is another letter, dated Batavia, 13th December, 1862, from Mr. Blanckénhagen, a partner in the house of Maclaine & Co., to Mr. Bonhote, also a partner, resident in this country; and the contents of that letter are as follows: "The Laurel, regarding her, Machlachlan has, no doubt, written you about, has again her cargo on doubt whether to require a bottomry bond or not, It is manifest from this letter, that having been in Maclaine & Co. awaited the answer from Singapore; and though it was favourable to the credit of Messrs. account, they resolved to take, in addition to a draft Willis, yet, from the magnitude of the amount of the on the owners, a bottomry bond, not being bound by any previous agreement to the contrary. The Court must be guided solely by the facts in which possibly might have affected the case, though I evidence; there may be some omission of matters do not say they would; for instance, at what time Maclaine & Co. made themselves liable for the costs of the repairs, whether they paid the bills, or advanced money to the master; as, however, these circumstances are not in evidence, they cannot affect this case either way. Then, under these circumstances, without considering the bond itself, or other facts, could Maclaine & Co. lawfully demand, and the master execute, a valid bottomry bond? reference to decided cases, for it would be very diffiPerhaps this question will be best determined by cult to discover any governing principle. There is no case, I believe, precisely in point. The Augusta de Blun decided, that when money had been advanced on personal credit, it was lawful for the merchant to stop, and make his subsequent advances upon the faith of a bottomry bond, but that he could not include in the bond the prior advance on personal security. It had been argued in that case, that the merchant could do so, by reason of the lex loci which enabled him to detain a ship, and make it answerable for moneys advanced on its account. Lord Stowell refused to accede to this argument; but it must be recollected, that had he acceded, the effect would have been to have repealed a contract, and have converted an advance on personal security into an advance on bottomry; and this case is clearly distinguished, for there was no advance on personal security, nor any agreement for such advance. He I must now revert to the case of The Alexander, also reported in 1 Dodson. It is rather a complicated case, for a principal objection in that case was, that the bond was given by a master to the consignee, which master was appointed by themselves; but there are some observations by Lord Stowell pertinent to the present case. says, in substance, that the question is, whether the money was advanced on the credit of the ship; that the bondholders had no knowledge of the owners of the ship, and, therefore, they must have made the advance on the credit of the ship itself. "The bond was not," Lord Stowell says, "perhaps noticed at first, because in Pernambuco, as in other foreign States, there is no necessity for an instrument of this kind, for by the general maritime law the vessel itself is ipso facto liable for repairs. There was no necessity, therefore, for a bond till the ship was coming to this country, where from peculiar motives of policy, a special hypothecation is required." I agree with Mr. Clarkson, that this case of The Alexander closely COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Where the defendant has not caused his answer to be The defendant in this suit had been attached for want of answer, and had then filed his answer in writing, as directed by order, 6th March, 1860, rule 1, and left a copy of it with the Clerks of Records and Writs, who thereupon returned the copy, with a certificate, as directed by rule 2, and the defendant was then discharged. He did not, however, cause his answer to be printed, as directed by rule 3; and the Clerks of Records and Writs refused to certify that the cause was ready to be heard. The plaintiff thereupon moved, before the Master of the Rolls, that the Clerks of Records and Writs might be ordered to certify that the cause was ready for hearing. The Master of the Rolls refused to make the order, and suggested that the bill might be taken pro confesso. The plaintiff now applied by way of appeal to the Lords Justices. applies to the case under consideration. I cannot discover any substantial distinction; in neither case was there any agreement to advance on personal credit, or any repudiation, direct or indirect, of the right by the lex loci of making the ship answerable. In the present case, the only difference from The Alexander on this question is, that in the case of The Laurel there was a doubt in the minds of Maclaine & Co. whether they should take a bottomry bond. This, I think, is no distinction. It may be said, "How does the Court reconcile The Alexander with the subsequent case of The Augusta?" I do not know that I am bound to undertake that task, but there is a clear distinction between the two cases. In The Augusta there had been no advance on personal security, and the question was, whether such advance could be covered by a subsequent bond. In The Alexander there was no advance, and no promise or agreement. I will say one word as to The Prince George (4 Moo. P. C. 25). Lord Campbell's opinion is entitled to great weight. The inclination of that opinion was, that the power to arrest by the lex loci, and thereby make the ship answerable for repairs and her own debts, might be sufficient ground for a bottomry bond. There was not any decision of the Judicial Committee, nor was the question directly raised. I decline entering further into the consideration of the case. I think enough has been stated to justify any conclusion, that it was legally competent to Maclaine & Co. to require a bottomry bond. As to this branch of the subject, however, I think it right to add, that it is most desirable that both the merchant and the master should, at an early period of the transaction, have a distinct understanding whether the advances are to be made on personal credit or upon bottomry. One of the argu- LAUTOUR v. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL.-Jan. 16 ments against the bond has been grounded upon the absence of advertisement. It is very expedient that this practice should, under circumstances, be resorted to, but I cannot lay it down as a general rule_that | such practice is indispensable. The absence of advertisement may be an ingredient, with other facts, to shew fraud, especially where it is proved that the money might have been had on better terms; but such is not this case; therefore, I hold that such absence of advertisement is not alone fatal to the validity of this bond. I now come to a consideration of the bond itself: there is no botttomry premium. Where the question is, whether there be a maritime risk or not, the absence of a bottomry premium is very important; but no such question arises here; the maritime risk is clearly expressed. I must dismiss this objection. I do not think I am bound to conjecture, for I have no evidence, why bottomry premium was omitted. The only remaining subject to be noticed is the large amount of the commissions charged. Where a bond is impeached on the ground of fraud, it may be that the amount of the commission is a matter to be taken into consideration on the question of its validity; but, in my opinion, this should not be done unless in a very exceptional case. I shall, for the reasons I have stated, pronounce for the validity of this bond, and refer the accounts to the registrar and merchants in the usual way. I have been invited to point out special matters for their consideration. I decline to do so; they will have all the facts before them, and I doubt not will give due weight to all. I reserve the question of costs. Babington, in support of the application. THE LORDS JUSTICES refused the application, and said that the plaintiff might again attach the defendant, and compel him to comply with the order. and 17. Pleading-Demurrer. Demurrer overruled, on the ground that the bill raised questions of so much difficulty and delicacy that it ought to be answered. This was a demurrer to a bill filed by Major-General Lautour, claiming from the Crown a large tract of land in West Australia. A demurrer was put in, and Vice-Chancellor Stuart on the 22nd November over- Sir R. Palmer, A. G., and Wickens, for the Crown. Sir H. Cairns and Jessel, for the plaintiff, were not called upon. Sir J. L. KNIGHT BRUCE, L. J.-This bill, filed by the Crown, raises, or attempts to raise, questions of a subject against the Attorney-General, representing answered. Whether the order of the Vice-Chancellor so much difficulty and delicacy, that it ought to be ought to stand is another question. Sir G. J. TURNER, L. J.-The case is taken out of my hands by the opinion expressed by the Lord Justice, but, in my opinion, so far as I have heard the argument, I think the demurrer ought to have been allowed. The order of the Vice-Chancellor was varied, by adding a direction, that the benefit of the demurrer should be reserved to the hearing. Notes for reference-Ante, p. 7; Dan. Ch. Prac. 437. 23 COURT OF CHANCERY. Ex parte THOMAS, re THORP.—Jan. 14. Broker's agreement-Statute of Frauds. Where, in a sale between brokers, the bought and sold notes were not exchanged, and there was no evidence that the seller had notice of the contract, but the contract was in part performed-Held, that there was a binding memorandum, within the Statute of Frauds. This was an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Commissioner Perry, at Liverpool, presented by Messrs. Thomas & Rough, brokers, and sought to reverse the decision of the learned commissioner, on the ground that his Honor had refused to allow the applicants to be admitted as creditors for a sum of 8217. 10s. 6d., or to have damages assessed, under the 153rd section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861. The bankrupts, Messrs. Thorp, Goodier, & Fogg, carried on business as seedcrushers. In the course of the year 1863, they, through their brokers, entered into contracts with the appellants for the purchase of a quantity of linseed oil, to be delivered at intervals during the year. In October, 1863, Messrs. Bennett & Co., the brokers of Thorp & Co., became bankrupts. Shortly afterwards Thorp & Co. suspended payment, and in January, 1864, were adjudicated bankrupts. A considerable portion of the oil had been deEvered, but that which should have been delivered in November and December was sold by the appellants, who now sought to prove for the difference between what they realised and the amount due to their prineipals. On the examination of the bankrupt Thorp, five bought notes" were produced, out of his possession, dated respectively the 1st April, 24th April, 15th May, 10th July, and the 16th February. The first-mentioned of these notes was in the following terms: 3. Crosby-square, London, April 1, 1863. "Bought this day, for account of Messrs. Robert Thorp & Co., of Messrs. Thomas & Rough, thirty tons of linseed oil, of good merchantable quality, at 40s. per cwt., good strong iron-bound casks included, delivered to craft or trucks in Hull, free of expense, say five tons a month, during July to September next, both inclusive. Payment to be made by cash, less 21. 10s. per cent. discount, upon receipt of each invoice and delivery; each delivery to stand as a separate contract. "Brokerage to us, "BENNETT BROS. & Co., Brokers." The contract of the 24th April was in similar terms, with slight variations. It ran thus - "Bought this day, from Messrs. Robert Thorp & Co., of Messrs. Thomas & Rough, forty tons foreign brown rape oil, of good merchantable quality, at 457. 10s. per ton, real tares, and usual draft. To be free delivered, as follows: The contract of the 16th February began thus: Bought this day, for account of Messrs. Robert Thorp & Co., of our principals, thirty tons of linseed oil, &c., at 40s. 9d. per cwt., good strong casks, &c. To be deliverd as follows: "Five tons during all the month of July next, and so on for six months." All were signed as above, "Bennett Brothers & Co., Brokers." The appellants knew nothing about the bankrupts being Bennett's principals till after their bankruptcy. Bacon, Q. C., and Druce, for the appellants, were stopped by the Lord Chancellor. Charles Russell (Brett, Q. C., with him) appeared for the respondents.-The Statute of Frauds requires the memorandum to be in writing; but the first thing to be considered is, was there a contract good at common law? The memorandum does not contain all the essentials of a contract; nothing to shew that any seller is found by the contract. Thomas & Rough who are mentioned as principal vendors, swore that they were brokers. Although the statute does not require that the vendor's name should appear, yet at common law it is necessary that there should be a binding contract on the principal. Nothing to shew that Thomas & Rough ever assented to the contract. [He referred to Sebright v. Archbold (17 Q. B. 103, 114).] LORD CHANCELLOR.-I am of opinion that this memorandum is sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds; and though it appears never to have been delivered to the seller, yet, inasmuch as there is satisfactory evidence that the contract of the terms of which it is evidence was partly carried into effect by the seller, and that goods were received under it by the buyer, I have no doubt that the sellers have acquired a right to have it produced, and the memorandum cannot be considered as the private document of the buyer, and not to be communicated to the seller. Therefore, I think the learned commissioner was wrong in founding his judgment in the absence of interchange of bought and sold notes. The broker having signed the memorandum, the party claiming the benefit of the contract has, under the circumstances, a right to claim the production and use of that memorandum, although still in the custody of the bankrupt. I therefore discharge the order of the commissioner, without prejudice to any question. The deposit will be returned, and the assignee's costs will come out of the estate. Ex parte POTTER, re BARRON.-Dec. 7. Bankruptcy, act of—Adjudication-Assignment for benefit of creditors-Unstamped deed-Evidence. An unstamped deed of assignment of all a debtor's estate for benefit of creditors, executed under the 192nd section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1861, held to be inadmissible to prove an act of bankruptcy. The decision in Ex parte Wensley (1 De G., J., & S. 278) disapproved. This was an appeal from a decision of Mr. Commissioner Goulburn, whereby his Honor dismissed the petition of the appellants, Messrs. Potter, seeking to annul an adjudication in bankruptcy obtained by the bankrupt Edward George Barron on his own petition, and to obtain a new adjudication on the petition of the appellants. The petition stated that the bankrupt had executed a deed, dated the 13th June, 1864, whereby he assigned to trustees his estate and effects for the benefit of his creditors. The deed was executed in the form prescribed by Schedule (D.) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1861; but that the bankrupt being unable to obtain the statutable majority, the с deed was never stamped or registered under sect. 192 of the act; and the bankrupt subsequently, on the 17th June, filed a petition for adjudication against himself, under which he was adjudicated a bankrupt. The petitioners alleged that they had been informed, and believed, that the bankrupt had shortly before his bankruptcy made a transfer of goods, by way of fraudulent preference, to a person named Taylor; and that they were advised and believed that various questions might arise as to this preference, and also as to the validity of the deed, which could not properly be brought before the Court under the present petition. The petition prayed that the adjudication might be annulled and the petition dismissed, the petitioners undertaking immediately upon such dismissal to present a petition themselves for adjudication against the bankrupt. On the hearing of the petition, the deed was tendered in evidence as an act of bankruptcy, but Mr. Commissioner Goulburn held that the deed, being unstamped, was inadmissible, and dismissed the petition. The petitioners now appealed. Little appeared for the appellants, in support of the petition, and contended, that the execution of the deed was an act of bankruptcy; that the fact of the deed being unstamped did not invalidate it, for, on payment of the duty and penalty, it could be stamped at any time; and the usual course was to hand the penalty to the officer of the court. [He referred to the 5 & 6 Will. & M. c. 21; 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97, s. 12; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, ss. 28, 29; Ex parte Wensley (1 De G., J., & S. 273; S. C., 9 Jur., N. S., 315); and Ex parte Taylor (6 De G., Mac., & G. 737).] Sargood, for the bankrupt; and W. F. Robinson, for the assignees, were not called upon. LORD CHANCELLOR.-In this case the bankrupt had been adjudicated a bankrupt upon his own petition. Subsequently, a creditor applied to have an adjudication upon his own petition as creditor substituted for the adjudication upon the debtor's petition. I think that would have been a reasonable application, provided the petition had been founded upon an act of bankruptcy to support it. The creditor alleges, that the act of bankruptcy was an assignment by the debtor of all his property for the benefit of his creditors. That assignment, it was said, was intended to have had the character of a trust deed, and to have been registered under the provisions of the act of 1861; but that it had not been proceeded with, inasmuch as the requisite amount of creditors could not be obtained; and the deed had never been stamped, and it appeared, therefore, as a blank sheet of paper, signed by the debtor. Mr. Little undertook to satisfy the Court, that an instrument in this condition operated as an assignment of the bankrupt's property anterior to the adjudication in bankruptcy. But there was nothing to tell me that the deed can be made to operate as a complete transfer. The deed was produced in its existing form to the commissioner, and the commsssioner was asked to accept it as proof of an act of bankruptcy, that is to say, he was asked to predicate of this piece of paper that it was a deed operating as a transfer of all the debtor's property anterior to the adjudication. Now, the law on the subject is perfectly clear. The law has been merciful, and has allowed an unstamped deed to be admitted in evidence upon certain things being done. But what I have to consider is, whether this was a valid deed prior to the bankrupt's adjudication. Now the statute enacts, and the provision is repeated by the statutes subsequently enacted, that no such (i. e. unstamped) deed "shall be pleaded or given in any court, or admitted in any court to be good, useful, or available in law or equity." The proposition before me is, that this unstamped deed was a valid assignment of the bankrupt's property. But the absence of the stamp deprives the commissioner of the power of looking at the instrument. The subsequent statute of the 12 Geo. 1, c. 33, s. 8, enacts, that no such matter or thing shall be available in law or equity, or be given in evidence, or admitted in any court, "unless the duty and penalty be paid, and the deed be stamped." Now, whether the parties might have gone with this deed and got it stamped, and brought it back to the commissioner; and if they had done so, what the commissioner would then have done I do not pretend to say; but it is quite clear that the deed was produced to the commissioner as having been an effectual conveyance of the debtor's property anterior to the adjudication which the commissioner had made. I am of opinion, upon that proposition, that the commissioner did quite right in refusing to recognise any such conveyance, or any such effect or operation. I think, therefore, that this creditor has failed in limine in proving any act of bankruptcy. I do not think it requisite to refer to the language of the 192nd section, or to that of the 194th section, of the act of 1861, which declares that no unregistered instrument of this kind shall be received in evidence. I rely upon this-that this unstamped deed was produced to the commissioner in evidence as proof that a prior act of bankruptcy had been committed. I do not wish it to be understood that I accede to the decision that was come to in the case of Ex parte Wensley. I should require further argument before I could follow that case. Note for reference-Holland's Composition Deeds. LUFF v. LORD.-Jan. 20 and 21. Trustee and cestui que trust-Purchase by trustee-Allegations of fraud. A bill was filed by a cestui que trust to set aside a purchase by a trustee of a legacy, on the ground that the trustee had improperly alleged that the interest was contingent:-Held, that as the allegation of fraud was not substantiated, and the parties had dealt with one another on equal terms, the sale ought not to be set aside. Observations on allegations of fraud not proved. This was an appeal from a decision of Sir J. Romilly, M. R., reported 10 Jur., N. S., 1248, whereby his Honor refused to set aside the sale of a legacy of 20007., given by the will of Mrs. Lord to Mrs. Luff, the wife of the plaintiff. The facts of the case will be found sufficiently stated in the former report and in the judgment below. Baggallay, Q. C., and Morris appeared for the plaintiffs, the appellants. Selwyn, Q. C., and E. F. Smith, for the defendant James Lord. Davey, for another defendant. LORD CHANCELLOR.-At the conclusion of the opening of the plaintiff's counsel, I was certainly impressed with the idea that it would turn out that this transaction was liable to be impeached, upon the ground that the parties to it were not upon equal terms, and that the obligation which was incumbent upon the trustee, Mr. Lord, of giving the fullest possible information to the plaintiff, his cestui que trust, was an obligation that had not been discharged. I The case undoubtedly is a very peculiar one. have it presented to me by the plaintiff as a case to set aside the sale of an interest in the nature of a reversionary interest; but the plaintiff declines to make it part of his case, that the consideration given |