Assizes:-"On the 4th March, 1865, Morris Levi was " 'On the 10th November, 1864, an order was made by the Court of Bankruptcy, in the following words:"The Bankruptcy Act, 1861. "In the Court of Bankruptcy for the Birmingham District. In the matter of Morris Levi, of Edgbastonstreet, Birmingham, in the county of Warwick, clothier, against whom a petition for adjudication of bankruptcy hath been filed this 10th November, 1864. Upon the application of Mr. Hodgson, solicitor, in the matter of this petition, and upon reading his affidavit filed herewith, I do extend the time for opening the said petition until Saturday next, the 12th November instant, at twelve o'clock at noon. "G. W. SANDERS, Commissioner.' "On the 12th November, 1864, at about one o'clock in the afternoon, another order was made by the Birmingham Court of Bankruptcy, in the following words: 'The Bankruptcy Act, 1861. "The London Gazette of the 15th November, 1864, was duly proved and put in evidence, and contains the advertisement of the adjudication. Upon this it was contended for the defendant, that the adjudication of bankruptcy was invalid, because that the proceedings must have been taken either under the 101st section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1849, or under the 96th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861; that the 101st section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1849, was inconsistent with the 96th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, and was, therefore, repealed by the 230th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861; that under the 96th section of the Bankruptcy Act, a new petition ought to have been presented by James Murray, John Hardy, and John Kershaw. It was also contended that the adjudication was void, because it did not appear from the proceedings upon what petition the commissioner proceeded to adjudication. I reserved these points for the consideration of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. The act of bankruptcy on which the adjudication was made, and the only one proved at the trial before me, was an assignment by Morris Levi, made in the form given in Schedule (D.) to the Bankruptcy Act of 1861. The deed was dated the 5th November, 1864. It was stamped on the 9th December, 1864, and registered on the 10th December, 1864. It further appeared, that on the 10th December, 1864, an order was made in the following words: "The Bankruptcy Act, 1861. "In the Court of Bankruptcy, Basinghall-street, London, the 10th December, 1864.-In the matter of a trust deed executed by Morris Levi, of Birmingham, in the county of Warwick, clothier, bearing date the 5th November, 1864, and made between the said MorIn the Court of Bankruptcy for the Birmingham ris Levi of the one part, and Henry Howell, of BirDistrict. In the matter of Morris Levi, of Edgbaston-mingham aforesaid, accountant, of the other part, street, Birmingham, in the county of Warwick, clo- before Mr. Registrar Winslow, acting for Mr. Comthier, against whom a petition for adjudication of missioner Fonblanque, upon the application of Mr. bankruptcy has been filed on the 7th November, 1864. Burton, solicitor for the assignees of the estate and The petitioner, John Painter, not having proceeded to effects of the said Morris Levi, it is ordered that the obtain adjudication of bankruptcy within three days time for registration of the deed be extended to the of the filing the petition, nor within such extended 17th December instant, so that the same may be retime which was granted for the purpose, by order of ceivable in evidence, under the 194th section of the the Court, dated the 10th November instant, it is Bankruptcy Act, 1861; but the order is in no way to hereby ordered, upon the application of Mr. Herbert interfere with the fourth condition of the 192nd secWright, on behalf of James Murray, John Hardy, and tion of the said act. John Kershaw, creditors to the amount required to constitute a petitioning creditor, that the said James Murray, John Hardy, and John Kershaw be at liberty to proceed to obtain adjudication of bankruptcy against the said Morris Levi. "'G. W. SANDERS, Commissioner.' "On the same day Morris Levi was adjudicated a bankrupt, in the following words: "The Bankruptcy Act, 1861. In the Court of Bankruptcy for the Birmingham District. In the matter of Morris Levi, of Edgbastonstreet. Birmingham, clothier, against whom a petition for adjudication of bankruptcy was filed on the 7th November, 1864, before Mr. Commissioner Sanders, I, the said commissioner, upon good proof, upon oath before me this day taken, do find that the said Morris Levi became bankrupt, within the true intent and meaning of the law of bankruptcy, before the day of the date of the filing of the said petition against him, and I do therefore declare and adjudge him bankrupt accordingly. "G. W. SANDERS, Commissioner.' "The alleged bankrupt was within the United Kingdom at the date of the adjudication, and has not taken any step or proceeding to dispute or annul it. "'S. E. WINSLOW, Acting Commissioner (L.S.) "Filed 10th December, 1864.' "No evidence was given as to Mr. Winslow's authority to make this order. Upon this it was objected, that under sect. 192, clause 4, and sects. 193 and 194 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, the deed was invalid, and that it ought not to have been received in evidence of an act of bankruptcy before the Birmingham dication founded on it was void. It was also objected Court of Bankruptcy; and that, therefore, the adjuthat, under the same sections, the deed could not be received in evidence before me. It was further objected, that as the conditions of sect. 192, clause 4, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, had not been fulfilled, it was not competent to the Court in London to extend the time for its registration. It was also objected, that evidence ought to have appeared on the face of Mr. Winslow's order, or to have been given of Mr. Winslow's authority to act upon the occasion, under the provisions of the 27th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1849. I admitted the deed in evidence, and reserved these points for the consideration of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. I request the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal upon the following questions: 66 Fourthly, whether the deed of the 5th November, 1864, was admissible in evidence at all; and if so, whether upon any of the grounds stated in the case there was any irregularity or defect in it, or the manner in which it had been dealt with, or any proceedings taken upon it which prevented its being made use of at the trial as evidence of a good and available act of bankruptcy?" Fitzjames Stephen, for the prisoner.-The question here is, whether the bankrupt is precluded by virtue of the 233rd section of the Bankrupt-law Consolidation Act, 1849, from taking any objection to the validity of the adjudication. By that section it is enacted, "That if the bankrupt shall not (if he were within the United Kingdom at the date of the adjudication), within twenty-one days after the advertisement of the bankruptcy in the London Gazette, or (if he were in any other part of Europe at the date of the adjudication) within three months after such advertisement, or (if he were elsewhere at the time of the adjudication) within twelve months after such advertisement, have commenced an action, suit, or other proceeding, to dispute or annul the fiat or the petition for adjudication, and shall not have prosecuted the same with due diligence and with effect, the Gazette containing such advertisement shall be conclusive evidence in all cases as against such bankrupt; and in all actions at law or suits in equity brought by the assignees for any debt or demand for which such bankrupt might have sustained any action or suit, had he not been adjudged bankrupt; that such person so adjudged bankrupt became a bankrupt before the date and filing of the petition for adjudication; and that such fiat was sued forth, or such petition filed, on the day on which the same is stated in the Gazette to bear date." It is submitted that the provisions of that section do not apply to criminal proceedings, and if they do, then the proceedings having been put in, the defendant was entitled to take advantage of any irregularity which appears upon the face of them. [He cited Reg. v. Hilton (2 Cox, 318) and Reg. v. Lyons (9 Cox, 299).] Field (with him Mills), for the prosecution, was not called upon. ERLE, C. J.-The words of the section are, "The Gazette containing such advertisement shall be conclusive evidence in all cases as against such bankrupt." That must mean all cases, civil as well as criminal, so far as the bankrupt is concerned. In this case, therefore, the defendant was precluded from raising any objection to the adjudication, and the conviction must be affirmed.-Conviction affirmed. REG. v. GEORGE ROBINSON.-May 6. Uttering medals resembling current coin-" Figure" Evidence of-24 & 25 Vict. c. 99, s. 13. The defendant was indicted, under the above section, for uttering a medal “resembling in size, figure, and colour one of the Queen's current gold coins, called a half sovereign." At the trial the medal was produced by a witness, who stated that it was the same diameter as a Case reserved by the Common Serjeant:-" The prisoner was indicted, under the stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 99, s. 13. Central Criminal Court, to wit.-The jurors for our Lady the Queen, upon their oath, present, that George Robinson, on &c., one medal resem bling in size, figure, and colour one of the Queen's current gold coins called a half sovereign, the same medal then being of less value than one of the Queen's current gold coins called a half sovereign, unlawfully, unjustly, and with intent to defraud, did utter and put off to one Mary Piper as and for one of the Queen's said current gold coins called a half sovereign, against the statute, &c. "Second count, that the said George Robinson afterwards &c., one piece of mixed metals, resembling in size, figure, and colour one of the Queen's current gold coins called a half sovereign, the same piece of mixed metals then being of less value than one of the Queen's said gold current coins called a half sovereign, unlawfully, unjustly, and with intent to defraud, did utter and put off to the said Mary Piper as and for one of the said Queen's said current gold coins called a half sovereign. "Third count, that the said George Robinson afterwards &c., did, with intent to defraud, utter, and put off to the said Mary Piper as and for one of the Queen's current gold coins called a half sovereign, one coin not being such current gold coin called a half sovereign, but resembling in size, figure, and colour one of the Queen's said current gold coins called a half sovereign, the same coin so uttered and put off then being of less value than one of the said Queen's said current gold coins called a half sovereign. "After proof of the uttering by the prisoner of the medal, Mr. Webster, the inspector of coins to her Majesty's Mint, was called, and his evidence was as fol lows:- This' (the medal which was uttered) is a medal made of metal, the same diameter as a half sovereign, somewhat similar in colour. On the ob verse there is the head of the Queen, similar to that on the half sovereign. The legend is entirely dif ferent from that on a half sovereign, being 'Victoria, Queen of Great Britain,' instead of Victoria Dei Gratiâ.' The medal is guerled, but the guerling is round and not square. At this point in his evidence the witness accidentally dropped the medal, and it rolled on to the floor. Strict search was made for it by the witness, assisted by the ushers, for more thạn half an hour, but it could not be found. The witness then added-' The medal is of less value than a half sovereign.' It had been proved by a former witness, that the prisoner placed the medal in her hand when he uttered it, with the obverse side uppermost. The medal was not shewn to the jury. Mr. Webster was then about to give a description of the reverse of the medal from memory after it was lost, but this and counsel for the Crown declined to press it. For evidence was objected to by the prisoner's counsel. the prisoner, it was objected that the word 'figure in the indictment meant the impression on the medal, and that such impression must be similar to the im pression on the genuine coin, for which it was uttered, and that there was, under the circumstances stated. no evidence to go to the jury that the medal resem 10 bled in size, figure, and colour, a half sovereign. For the Crown, it was contended that 'figure' meant the general shape and outline of the medal, not the impression upon it, and that there was evidence for the jury. I thought it should be left for the jury; and the prisoner was found guilty, and remains in custody. "The questions for the Court are, first-What is the true meaning of the word 'figure' in the statute and the indictment? And, secondly, whether, under the circumstances stated, there was any evidence for the jury?" By the 5th section of the act of 1864, after reciting that plans and sections shewing the situation, lines, and levels of the reservoirs, aqueducts, and works by the act authorised, and the lands required for the purpose thereof, and books of reference to the places had been deposited with the proper officers, it was enacted, that it should be lawful for the company "to make and maintain the reservoirs, aqueducts, and other works thereinafter described in the line and situation, and on the levels, and upon the lands delineated on the said plans, and described in the said books of reference, and defined on the said sections, and to enter Francis, for the defendant.-The only question is as upon, take, and use such of the lands, streams, and to the meaning of the word "figure," as used in the waters mentioned in the said plans and book of restatute and the three counts of this indictment. The ference as the company might deem necessary for all words are, "resembling in size, figure, and colour;" or any of those purposes, and also all or any of the and here evidence was given as to the size and colour, mills, manufactories, and works, and the lands conbut, as regards the figure, the evidence was incom- nected therewith delineated on the said plans, and deplete, it not having been proved what was on the re-scribed in the said books of reference; and to take verse side; it might have been something in no way such water as the company might require for the purresembling a current coin, and therefore not likely to poses of the acts of 1853 and 1857, and this act and impose upon anybody. In fact, the impression on the the said incorporated acts." Sect. 7 of the same act reverse side was the Prince of Wales's feathers, a de- enumerated the works which it was lawful for the sign which could not have misled, as it is not to be company to execute, amongst which were "an aquefound on any current coin. The prosecution might duct, constructed in tunnel or otherwise, as shewn on have given secondary evidence, but, as it was, there the original plans, commencing on the south side of was no proof that this medal resembled in figure a the reservoir shewn on the plans, and terminating," &c. current coin. [Mellor, J.-It was proved to be of the same diameter as a half sovereign; and on the obverse there was the head of the Queen, similar to that on a half sovereign.] The diameter would be evidence of the size, not of the figure. Craufurd, for the Crown, was not called upon. ERLE, C. J.-We are all of opinion that there was some evidence for the jury that the medal uttered did resemble a half sovereign in size, figure, and colour; and the conviction, therefore, must be affirmed.-Contin affirmed. COURT OF CHANCERY. works. The plaintiffs, the Misses Simpson, were the owners in fee of a field opposite to their residence in Beaconstreet, Lichfield; and through this field the company, according to the plans and sections deposited before the act of 1864 was obtained, proposed to carry the above-mentioned aqueduct, by means of a tunnel, at a depth of about 45 feet below the surface. There was no indication upon the said plans and sections of any well or shaft, but the operations of the company were apparently confined to driving a tunnel, at the above-mentioned depth, through the plaintiffs' field, the whole of which was within the limits of deviation. The company, however, subsequently became desirous of obtaining a supply of water from the springs beneath the field, by sinking wells and shafts; and they proposed to erect upon the surface permanent pumping engines. Accordingly, they served the plaintiffs, on the 27th July, 1864, with notice to treat for the purchase of their interest in the whole field. The plaintiffs denied the right of the company permanently to take any portion of the field, except that which was bonâ fide required for the purpose of the aqueduct; and they accordingly filed a bill, in order to obtain a declaration to that effect, and moved for an injunction before Vice-Chancellor Kindersley, as vacation judge. An interim order, by arrangement, was then made, by which the company were restrained from proceeding under their notice to treat; but were, with the plain A waterworks company, before applying to Parliament, deposited plans, shewing that a certain field would be affected by a tunnel passing forty-five feet below the surface, and gave a notice to the owner accordingly. The company obtained their act, authorising them to construct their works according to those plans, and afterwards proposed to take the field, sink a well, and erect pumping machinery thereon:-Held, that they could not, by the exercise of their compulsory powers, take any portion of the field other than so much as was required fortiffs' consent, without prejudice, let into possession for the purpose of constructing their aqueduct. the tunnel. The company must distinctly prove the existence of the poncers they claim to exercise, and any doubt as to the extent of such powers will be solved by the Court for the benefit of the landowner. The 12th section of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 17), does not empower a company to execute any works which are not authorised by the special act of such company. The South Staffordshire Waterworks Company were incorporated by act of Parliament in 1853, for the purpose of supplying with water a certain district, including the city of Lichfield. The powers of the company were enlarged by an act of 1857, and finally by the South Staffordshire Waterworks Amendment Act, 1864, with which the Lands Clauses Act, 1845, the Lands Clauses Amendment Act, 1860, and the Waterworks Clauses Acts, 1847 and 1863, were incorporated. No. 544, VOL. XI., NEW SERIES. On the 19th November, 1864, the plaintiffs moved, before Vice-Chancellor Stuart, for an injunction to restrain the company from proceeding under their notice to treat, and also from using the field for any other purpose than the construction of their aqueduct. His Honor, however, thought, that as the whole of the field was delineated upon the deposited plans, and as the company was authorised to take the lands so delineated, and as the Waterworks Clauses Act (clause 12) empowered the company to sink wells, erect steamengines, &c., upon any lands which they were authorised by their special act to take, it followed that the company had power to purchase and permanently use the field for the purpose of their subsidiary works. His Honor, therefore, refused the injunction. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Lords Justices, but their Lordships differing in opinion, the appeal was, V at their Lordships' suggestion, now argued before the Lord Chancellor. The clauses of the Waterworks Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 17), applicable to the present case, and the arguments founded thereon, will sufficiently appear from his Lordship's judgment. Greene, Q. C., and F. O. Haynes, for the plaintiffs, cited Webb v. Manchester (4 M. & W. 116); Eversfield v. Mid Sussex (1 Giff. 153; 5 Jur., N. S., 776); Flower v. Brighton (ante, p. 406); and Stockton v. Brown (9 H. L. C. 246). Sir R. Palmer, A. G., Malins, Q. C., and Speed, for the company, referred to Richards v. Scarborough (23 L. J., Ch., 110); Sadd v. Maldon (6 Railw. Cas. 779); Weld v. South Western (32 Beav. 340); Cother v. Midland (2 Ph. 469); and Wood v. Epsom (2 Law T., N. S., 487). Greene, Q. C., in reply. LORD CHANCELLOR.-I much regret the course which this case has taken. There have been four hearings, and a great diversity of judicial opinion. Vice-Chancellor Kindersley thought the plaintiffs entitled to an injunction, and Vice-Chancellor Stuart refused the plaintiffs an injunction. The case was then heard before the Lords Justices, between whom there was also a difference of opinion. Under these circumstances, I shall reserve my judgment. May 6.-LORD CHANCELLOR.-In legislating for public undertakings, and conferring compulsory powers to take land, Parliament has at all times manifested the utmost anxiety to impose upon the company or the undertakers the obligation of giving to the landowner the most precise and definite information with regard to the quantity of land to be taken, and the manner in which the land is intended to be affected; and the enactments contained in the acts of Parliament conferring the powers to carry an undertaking into effect will be generally found to embody, by reference, the plans, and the notice given by the plans to the landowners of the intention of the company. Before adverting to the particular facts of this case, in illustration of the truth of that observation, I would remark, that I entirely concur in the rule laid down by Lord Cottenham, at an early time of the administration of justice with regard to these railway works, and other works of a similar description, that it was incumbent upon the company to prove clearly and distinctly from the act of Parliament the existence of the power which they claimed a right to exercise; and if there was any doubt with regard to the extent of the power claimed by them, that doubt undoubtedly should be for the benefit of the landowner, and should not be solved in a manner to give to the company any power that was not most clearly and expressly defined in the statute. I would also further remark, with reference to a point that was much dwelt upon in the argument, namely, the effect of the incorporation of the general act into the special act, that the general act must be looked at with reference to the powers conferred upon companies of dealing with the land when acquired, but that it is to the special act that you must especially have regard, for the purpose of ascertaining what I may call the contract between the landowner and the company, and the power which the company has conferred upon it of taking the land of the land owner. Now, with these general observations, I come, first, to consider what it is which, in plans and sections deposited by this company with the clerk of the peace, is indicated by those plans as the manner in which the company intend to deal with the land, and the extent of the landowner's interest which was intended to be taken by the company. Now, upon that point I 10 entirely concur in the representation of the effect of the plans which is contained in one or two passages of the affidavit of Mr. Hawksley, who, in the seventh paragraph of his affidavit, says, very correctly, "When it is intended to obtain the authority of Parliament to the sinking of wells and shafts for obtaining subterranean water, it is the common and general practice to indicate on the deposited plans and sections the situation of such wells and shafts, and to give notice to the owners and occupiers of the lands in which they are intended to be situated of such intention." He then goes on to say, that he has examined the plans deposited by the defendants for the purposes of the act of 1864, and that he does not find any well or shaft indicated thereon. He then further observes, that, in the case of tunnels and other subterranean works, it is the common practice of water companies not to take the entirety of the piece of land, or the surface of the land, but merely to acquire the right of carrying the tunnel through the land for the purposes of the works. He then goes on to state in his affidavit, that the deposited plans indicate, with reference to the land of the present plaintiffs, that the entirety of the contemplated works of the company would consist of a tunnel to be driven, at a certain depth, with a limited power of vertical deviation, and that the operations of the company, as indicated by their deposited plans, are limited to that work, and extend to nothing more. I have examined the plans and sections, and I think the representations contained in those parts of the affidavit to which I have referred are a very correct conclusion of the fact, which is indicated upon the face of the plans, as to the extent to which the company intend to deal with the lands of the plaintiffs. Now, that being the effect of the deposited plans, we next come to consider the language of the special act; for undoubtedly, although it is not the rule of Parliament, it would be competent to the Legislature, to confer a greater right than that which is indicated by the plans. The material section to which the argument was almost entirely directed (with the exception of one or two clauses in the general act of Parliament of 1847) is the 5th section, which contains the special definition of the power of the company with reference to the land of the plaintiffs; and I must call attention to it at some length. It first of all refers to the plans and sections deposited as shewing the situation, lines, and levels of the intended aqueduct, and the lands required for the purposes thereof. The preamble or narrative of the section, therefore, refers you to the plans for the purpose of ascertaining the land that was required. It then confers upon the company a special power; and the power is, “to make and maintain the reservoirs, aqueducts, and other works hereinafter described in the line and situation, and on the levels, and upon the lands delineated on the plans, and defined in the sections;" and then there is a power to take, purchase, and use such of the lands mentioned in the plans as the company may deem necessary" for all or any of those purposes." The power given to the company is to do the defined work "upon" the described land; and the power further is, to take the land, or so much of it as shall be necessary for that work. Now, a great deal of argument turned upon the use and meaning of the word "necessary;" and it was attempted on the part of the company to contend, that the word "necessary" extended so far as this-that they might take so much of the land as they should deem necessary, not for the particular work indicated, but for any collateral purposes connected with that work. I am by no means of opinion that such an extended construction can be given to the word. I 19 entirely concur in the conclusion (which, indeed, is rendered imperative by the decision of the House of Lords), that it would be entirely within the power and judgment of the company to determine for themselves the magnitude and extent of the particular work defined; as, for example-that work being a tunnelthat the tunnel should have a diameter of six, or ten, or twenty feet; but the word cannot be used for the purpose of extending the authority given to the company, so as to enable them to add upon the land other works, in addition to the works defined, and thereby to augment their power of taking the land of the landowner beyond that which was indicated in the plan, and, being indicated in the plan, is embodied and transferred by reference into this section of the act of Parliament. Now the power which is given to the company, is to make the reservoirs and aqueducts, and other works hereinafter described." The section of the act to which those words of reference relate is the 7th section, which, so far as it is applicable to the land of the plaintiffs, contains these words, "That it shall be lawful for the company to execute all or any of the following works shewn on the said plans, as the company shall from time to time deem expedient, that is to say," passing over a paragraph which is inapplicable, "an aqueduct constructed, in tunnel or otherwise, as shewn on the original plans," then the terminus à quo and the terminus ad quem of the aqueduct is defined in the section; and, applying that to the plans, we find that the aqueduct here referred to and there described, where it passes through the land of the plaintiffs, passes through it in tunnel only, and is limited entirely to the tunnel at a certain depth, passing through these lands. So far, therefore, as the 5th section and the relative 7th section are concerned, there is a definite authority conferred upon the company to make the work indicated in the plan, and further described as an aqueduct, consisting of a tunnel, with the license only, that they make that work as they deem it necessary, which of course must be limited to the work itself, and cannot be extended to give them power to superadd to these works other works of which there is no indication and no description at all. Then a good deal of argument was used on the part of the company with a view to shew that there were other words in this 5th section, which contained, by a species of implication, the right to extend the works beyond what was indicated in the plan. It would be very difficult to find any words admitting of such a construction, when they are in immediate connexion with words which give the company that precise and definite authority which I have already explained. But the words that were relied on by the company for this purpose, are the concluding words of the 5th section; by which the company is empowered to take such water as it may require for the purposes "of the acts of 1853 and 1857 of this act, and the incorporated acts." The argument was of the ordinary kind, namely, that, inasmuch as this was a general power to take such water from the lands as the purposes of these acts required, it contained, by necessary implication, the right to do everything that should be essential or necessary for the purpose of taking the water. I cannot arrive at any such construction; for the effect of it would be to supersede, and in truth to annul, all the directions that are previously contained, and to convert the whole section into a general authority to the company to take all the water that they could in any manner acquire throughout the whole course of the lands indicated, and to do whatever they might deem necessary for the purpose of taking that water. The * Stockton v. Brown (9 H. L. C. 246). laborious care shewn by Parliament in defining positively what they were to do, and in laying down the bounds on one side and on the other which they were not to transgress, would have been an idle superfluity, if these latter words were capable of such an interpretation. It is quite clear that the words have only this meaning, that, whilst they are authorised to make the works, they shall have a right to take, as incident to those works and as consequential on those works, whatever streams of water the works, when constructed in the line indicated, might tap or bring into their tunnel, or whatever water might percolate and flow by the natural agency or law of gravitation, from any part of the circumjacent soil into the tunnel that was to be constructed. That is the natural meaning of the words; that interpretation renders them consistent with the rest of the section, and I must adhere to that, and not adopt a wide and extended meaning, that would overrule and render in point of fact superfluous, as I have already observed, the rest of the enactment. The remaining arguments that were dwelt upon very much by the defendants were derived chiefly from the general act of Parliament in 1847, and they were urged with a good deal of ingenuity. First of all, it was contended that, by the interpretation clause of the general act of 1847, which is embodied in this act of 1864, the word "waterworks" was defined to mean "the waterworks and the works connected therewith," and therefore it was contended that, in authorising the company to make a reservoir, and to make an aqueduct, and to make a tunnel, inasmuch as the reservoir, and aqueduct, and tunnel were waterworks, the form of enactment carried with it the power to make other works connected therewith. Now, it would be a sufficient answer to that to say that the particular noun "waterworks" is not to be found in the enactment of the 5th section. But, in addition, the whole argument fails, because the language of the interpretation clause is not merely that the word "waterworks" shall mean "waterworks and works connected therewith," but it is, that they shall mean "the waterworks by the special act authorised to be constructed." We are again remitted, therefore, to the special act for the purpose of ascertaining what is thereby authorised to be constructed, and the answer to that question I have already endeavoured to give, out of that special act, the But this is not all, because the language of the 2nd section of the general act (the interpretation clause being given in the 3rd section) is definite, that the expression "the lands and streams" shall mean lands and streams of water which shall by the special act be authorised to be taken or used;" and the whole tenor of this general act of Parliament may be thus expressed, that it refers you by anticipation to the special act for the purpose of ascertaining therein, what is the land to be taken, and what are the works to be done upon the land. Referring you to that, it then invests the company with certain general powers which may be useful or necessary for the purpose of carrying into effect, upon the land authorised to be taken, the work which by the special act is definitely described. But then there was another argument derived from this general act of Parliament, and it was thus founded on the 12th section. The 12th section is a general enactment beginning thus:-"Subject to the provisions and restrictions in this and the special act, and any act incorporated therewith, the undertakers may execute any of the following works for constructing the waterworks," and then a number of collateral works are specified; and the argument, therefore, was that, being empowered by the special act to construct a tunnel, they are empowered by this section to add to |