will in this case we might consider it either as not having contained any direction as to accumulation, or that it had been expressly confined in its direction for accumulation to the period of twenty-one years next after the testator's death. Then the income of the share of the residue, called by the testator "his daughter's share," would, in the first case, have belonged to herself during her husband's life, or during the joint lives of herself and her husband from the testator's death, and, in the other case, from the end of twenty-one years next after his death, and it would have belonged to herself either during the joint lives, or during the life of the husband. That being so, it appeared to the Lord Justice, that the statute rendering void the direction to accumulate as from the end of twenty-one years, the income of the daughter's share from the end of twenty-one years, including the income of the original capital of the share, must belong to herself, and be enjoyable by herself either during the joint lives, or during the life of the husband. In this respect he agreed wholly with the view of the Master of the Rolls. He took also the same view which his Honor did as to the costs, and thought that more injustice would follow from any other mode of dealing with them. The income of the accumulated fund from the end of twenty-one years, and the income also of the capital of the shares from the same time, must be declared to belong to herself. He would be prepared to say during the life of the husband, but Lord Justice Turner thought that the declaration ought to be confined to her own life. during the life of the husband. It appeared to him, ROLLS COURT. Re THE CONSOLS INSURANCE ASSOCIATION.-BEN HAM'S CASE.-Feb. 25 and 27. Winding up-Contributory-Bona fide transfer. A petition presented by shareholders to wind up a company, was dismissed, upon condition that the company paid the costs of all parties to the petition, and upon the suggestion of the Court a committee was appointed to investigate the affairs of the company. The committee reported that it would be for the benefit of the shareholders that the company should go on, and that a voluntary loan should be obtained from the shareholders. B., a large shareholder, was dissatisfied with the report and with the statement of accounts upon which it was founded, and he informed the directors that unless a bonâ fide purchaser was obtained for his shares, and his other claims against the company were satisfied, he would present another petition to wind up the company. After some negotiations an officer of the company took a transfer of the shares, representing, as B. alleged, that he purchased them on his own account. In fact he purchased them at the instance of the directors, and by means of money belonging to the company, and no bonâ fide purchaser could be obtained-Held, that B.'s name must be placed upon the list of contributories. This was an application to have the name of Mr. Benham placed upon the list of contributories of this company, in respect of 1200 shares held by him in the company. The company was established in 1858, and in August of that year Mr. Benham was appointed solicitor. He was an original holder of 1200 shares. He ceased to be solicitor in January, 1861, when Mr. Ashwin was appointed solicitor in his place. In January, 1862, Messrs. King and Shipman presented a petition to wind up the company. It came on to be heard on the 19th February, when Mr. Benham instructed counsel to appear for him and oppose the petition, he being of opinion that the petition was unnecessary, and that a winding up would be injurious to the shareholders. Mr. Baylis, the manager, was cross-examined upon the petition, and Mr. Benham then learnt, for the first time, that the company had issued debentures for 31,000l., for which they had received cash and promissory notes to the amount of 10,000, and certain heritable bonds for 35,000l., which were alleged to be charged upon real estate in Scotland, belonging to a Mr. Micklam. Sir G. J. TURNER, L. J., said, that he had an opportunity of considering this case since the Court rose. The first question here was, whether there was, in the first place, an absolute gift of one-third of the residue to the daughter. The will has directed the whole property to be transferred, and the trustees to stand possessed of the residue of his estate. [His Lordship read portions of the will]. It was clear, then, that the testator had considered that point in his will, and had directed the shares of the sons to be paid to them. Was there, then, any distinction between the shares of the sons and the share of the daughter? It seemed to him, that there was a clear gift over, and a contrast between the shares of the sons and the share of the daughter, but this did not at all alter the effect of the previous bequest. It merely directed the mode in which the share was to be dealt with. Then comes the disposition to be made of the share of the daughter. [His Lordship read it.] Now, the effect of that direction was to raise the question here, because the direction was, to accumulate during the whole life of the husband, and it was clear, therefore, that all accumulation beyond twenty-one years would be void by law. Where, then, did it go? If there was an absolute gift to the daughter, that would take in as much of the original bequest as the limitations did not dispose of. Therefore it seemed to him, that beyond the period of twenty-one years, that would fall into the original absolute bequest. Then came the question as to the operation of the statute, which says, that where the trust extends beyond the twenty-one years, so far as the trust is not valid, the property will go to the persons who would be entitled thereto if the statute had not been passed. Let us try that, by supposing that there had been no direction for accumulation, but a limitation with a total absence of bequest during the A committee was accordingly appointed to examine life of the husband. Then during the life of the hus- into the affairs of the company, and Mr. Tindell, the band there would be no trust, and so far the original partner of Mr. Benham, acted as secretary of the comdisposition would take place; and so it would be if no mittee, at the request of the directors. The directors trust was declared which was valid by law as to part. laid before the committee a statement of accounts, Now, if part was undisposed of by reason of the staand gave explanations and information as to the positate, that would go in the same way as the whole would have gone if there had been no trust of income The petition was directed to stand over until the 20th March, and it was directed that in the meantime the accounts of the company should be verified by an independent accountant; that steps should be taken for providing means for carrying on the company; that a general meeting of the shareholders should be held, and the result of the meeting be reported to his Honor on the 20th March. tion and prospects of the company, and the result was, that the committee resolved that it would be for the benefit of the shareholders that the company should be carried on, and that a voluntary loan should be invited from the shareholders on the security of the said heritable bonds and certain policies of insurance on the life of Mr. Micklam. Mr. Tindell was requested by the committee to prepare the necessary deeds for assigning the bonds and policies of insurance to trustees for the parties advancing the money. After investigating the title of Mr. Micklam to the lands which he professed to charge, Mr. Tindell ascertained, and reported to the committee, that the grantor had no title to the estates; that even if he had, he had executed prior bonds, and had become insolvent; and that the statement made to the Master of the Rolls and the committee, as to the investigation of the title to the estates, were untrue. Messrs. Harding & Co., accountants, had also been called in to investigate the accounts. They made their report, and on the 16th April, 1862, a copy was sent to Mr. Benham. From the figures and statements contained in this report, Mr. Benham became convinced that the company was insolvent, and that the expenditure then being incurred in endeavouring to postpone the winding up, and to raise money to carry on the association, was so much additional loss, which would have to be borne by the shareholders. About the same time, Mr. Benham received from the company a circular, in which the manager, notwithstanding the report made by Mr. Tindell, alleged the heritable bonds to be a valid and valuable security, and it also contained a list of subscribers, to the number of thirty-four, shewing that 56347. had been subscried to the proposed loan. The petition came on again to be heard on the 26th April, when, in consequence of the information which Mr. Benham had received, and the alteration in his views as to the position of the company, he determined to support an immediate winding up of the company, and he instructed his counsel accordingly. The petition was ordered to come on again on the 3rd May, when the petition was dismissed, upon payment by the company of the costs of the petitioners, and of all shareholders appearing upon the petition. Mr. Benham was dissatisfied with the order; and, immediately after it was made, he informed the solicitor of the company and two of the directors, that he should insist on the company being wound up. On the 5th May he saw the solicitor, and informed him that he would not allow the company to go on if he was to remain a shareholder, and that, if other shareholders wished it to go on, they must buy his shares, and that he intended to present a petition to have the company wound up. He stated that he was willing to sell his shares, upon which 3007. had been paid up, for 51., if a purchaser could be found, and that if the company would come to some arrangement for the settlement of his claims against the company, he would not present the petition. No arrangement having been come to, Mr. Benham on the 9th May presented his petition to the Master of the Rolls to have the company wound up. On the 21st May the following arrangement was come to between Mr. Benham and the solicitor of the company. Mr. Benham was to pay the call then due on his shares, amounting to 3007. Such of the directors and shareholders as wished the company to go on were to find him a bonâ fide purchaser for his shares, upon which 6007. would have been paid, for 3051. The company was to pay Mr. Tindell 211. for his costs for attendance upon the committee, and 617. for the costs of the petition. The company were to give Mr. Benham and Mr. Tindell a new debenture at a short date in lieu of a debenture at a long date, which they then held. formed that a Mr. Colbourne was to be the purchaser; but, after a conversation with him, Mr. Benham was satisfied that he was not a bonâ fide purchaser, and that he would purchase on behalf of the company. He, therefore, declined to sell the shares to him, and informed the manager that he must proceed with his petition. The manager then proposed that they should meet on the following day, the 22nd May, but Mr. Benham not being able to attend them, executed a power of attorney to Mr. Tindell to sell and transfer his shares. Mr. Benham at the same time left a paper with Mr. Tindell, containing the conditions as to the terms upon which he was to sell:-"Transferee to be a bonâ fide transferee; his execution to be attested by Mr. Tindell. Purchase money to be paid by transferee. Transfer to be registered." On the 22nd May, Mr. Tindell attended at the office. and saw Mr. Scott, the secretary. Mr. Scott said that Mr. Quartley, the cashier, would take the shares, but Mr. Tindell objected, because he knew he was in the employment of the company. Mr. Tindell asked Mr. Quartley whether he was going to buy the shares, and was willing to take upon himself the responsibility: to which he answered, "Yes." He then asked him whe ther the company had indemnified him, and whether he was going to buy as a trustee for the company, to which Mr. Quartley replied in the negative. He then asked him whether he had the purchase money; when he answered that that was all arranged. Mr. Tindell then went to the public office, and paid the amount of the call, 3007., by means of a Bank of England note, and obtained a receipt. He then returned to the private office of the manager, and Mr. Scott was about to hand him Bank notes for the 3057, when he observed that one of them was the note which he had just paid in, and he objected to take it. Mr. Scott thereupon went out of the room, and returned with a cheque for 305, drawn by Mr. Heneage, one of the directors, on his private banker, which he gave to Mr. Tindell. Mr. Tindell alleged that he believed the transaction to have been bonâ fide, and that Mr. Quartley was purchasing the shares on his own account, or in conjunction with Mr. Scott, the secretary. The deed of transfer was executed by Mr. Tindeil and Mr. Quartley, and Mr. Tindell gave the following undertaking not to proceed with the petition, addressed to Mr. Scott: "I hereby undertake not to advertise, or take any further proceedings with reference to the petition presented by Mr. Benham to wind up this company, and to do whatever may be necessary to withdraw it, if desired, at the company's expense, Mr. Benham having this day executed a transfer of the shares to Mr. J. F. Quartley. The sum of 821. was at the same time paid to Mr. Tindell, in respect of his bill of costs in attending the committee, and the costs of Mr. Benham in presenting the petition. Mr. Quartley stated, that he merely took the shares until a transferee could be found, and to save the company being wound up; that he did it in the interest of his employers, who thought that if Mr. Benham's petition was disposed of, the company would, by the aid of the shareholders, be able to regain its position. On the 2nd June the shares were transferred into the name of Mr. Colbourne, who was the brother-in-law of Mr. Quartley. Another petition was shortly afterwards presented to wind up the company. The costs of the petition of Messrs. King and Shipman not having been paid, that petition was restored, and an order was made upon it on the 28th June for winding up the com Upon proceeding to the office, Mr. Benham was in-pany. 13 Scheyn, Q. C., and M'Naghten, for the official liquidator, contended that the purchase of the shares was really by and on behalf of the company, and was within the principle of Budd's case (30 Beav. 143) and Eyre's case (31 Beav. 177). [They cited De Pass's cuse (4 De G. & J. 544); Hyam's case (1 De G., F., & J. 75); and Rowley v. Adams (4 My. & C. 534).] Cole, Q. C., for the creditors' representative. Baggallay, Q. C., and Druce, for Mr. Benham.-The question is one of bona fides. In Eyre's case and Budd's case, all parties to the transaction knew that the company was insolvent; here the directors and a large number of the shareholders believed that the company might be carried on successfully. The Court, upon the original hearing of the petition, thought the company might yet go on, if funds were raised. Mr. Benham adopted every means to secure a bonâ fide purchaser, and there was no collusion between him and the directors. Feb. 27.-Sir J. ROMILLY, M. R.-I am of opinion that Mr. Benham's name must be added to the list of contributories. The facts bring the case within the principle of Eyre's case and the other authorities which have been cited. The company was established in 1858, and in August of that year Mr. Benham was appointed solicitor to the company, and he continued so until January, 1861. He became a holder of 1200 shares, and executed the deed for that number. In January, 1861, the company was in great difficulties, and had obtained a large loan. In January, 1862, King and Shipman presented a petition to wind up the company; and the petition stood over for a considerable time. In the meantime an unfavourable report was made by Messrs. Harding; but the committee appointed to investigate the accounts of the company resolved that it would be for the benefit of the shareholders that the company should be carried on, and that a voluntary loan should be made on the security of certain heritable bonds. Mr. Benham received a copy of the report in April, 1862. The petition came on again to be heard on the 3rd May, when a conditional order was made for the dismissal of the petition. A circular was thereupon issued to the members, to induce them to come forward and assist the company. Mr. Benham was very dissatisfied with the company, and felt convinced that it was insolvent; and he accordingly informed the directors that he should present a petition to wind up the company, unless the directors came to terms with him. He served his petition on the company, and the directors thereupon came to an arrangement with Mr. Benham to this effect:-Mr. Benham's shares were to be taken by a bonâ fide purchaser, to be found by the company, certain costs due to Mr. Benham and his partner were to be paid, and a debenture given to them by the company was to be exchanged for another debenture. Mr. Benham says that this arrangement was carried into effect on the 22nd May, 1862. The only question is, whether his shares were taken by a bonâ fide purchaser or by the company. I am of opinion that they were taken by the company. It was impossible to get any one to take them in the existing state of the company's affairs. The nature of the transactions between Mr. Tindell, on behalf of Mr. Benham, and Mr. Quartley, was this: -3001. was due on the shares for calls. Mr. Tindell took a bank note for that amount to the office, and paid it over the counter, and Mr. Quartley gave a receipt for the amount on account of calls. I am satisfied that Mr. Tindell would never have paid the amount, or Mr. Benham have sanctioned the payment, if he had not understood that the money was to be I am satisfied that the whole was one transaction. Mr. Benham wishes the Court to come to the conclusion that the money was paid by Mr. Quartley as a bonâ fide purchaser, as a speculation, while Mr. Quartley alleges that he never intended to pay for them, and that he acted in the matter merely to satisfy the company. If the Court sanctioned this proceeding, it must sanction every attempt to get relieved from liability. Every one connected with the office knew perfectly well that the company was insolvent, and that unless large subscriptions were obtained from the shareholders, it was impossible to meet its engagements. Upon the authority of all the cases, I am satisfied that this is a transaction which cannot stand. The sale was not bonâ fide unless Mr. Benham obtained a purchaser without the assistance of the company. As Mr. Scott expresses it, he knew he was asking what was impossible. Mr. Benham's name must, therefore, be placed upon the list of contributories. Note for reference-Lind. Part. 1128. VICE-CHANCELLOR KINDERSLEY'S COURT. Re CAPLIN.-April 21. Will-Power of appointment-" Relations and friends” -General bequest-Trust by implication for next of kin. 4 testator gave to the tenant for life of his general residuary estate a power of appointment by will among her "relations and friends." The donee of the power made a general bequest of her residuary estate, without reference to the power:-Held, that the power of appointment was special and not general. And, therefore, being not Held, also, that the Court would imply a trust in favour of well exercised by the will of the donee; the "relations" of the testator, and that this term must be limited to his next of kin under the statute. Petition.-Richard Caplin, by his will of the 6th May, 1864, after giving his wife Sarah Caplin, a life interest in his residuary estate, made the following gift after her death, of the same:-"One-third part thereof shall be paid unto such and so many of the relations and friends of her, my dear wife Sarah Caplin, as she, whether in my lifetime or afterwards, and notwithstanding such coverture, and as if she were a feme sole, shall by her last will and testament in writing, or any codicil thereto, or any writing in the nature of, or purporting to be, her will, legally executed, shall direct, limit, or appoint, give or bequeath the same." Sarah Caplin, by her will of the 5th November, 1857, bequeathed to the petitioners, as her executors and trustees, the residue of her personal estate, subject to her debts, upon certain trusts, as to several fourth parts into which the same was to be divided, for certain persons and classes of persons mentioned in her will. Those legatees were then living nephews and nieces of the testatrix, or children of deceased nephews and nieces. The fund was paid into court by the trustees and executors of the testator's will, and was now claimed by the petitioners, in their capacity of trustees and executors of the will of the testatrix; or in the alter native as her personal representatives, and so entitled It appears to me that this must be considered as a to one moiety, leaving the other moiety to be distri- special power. Then comes the question-a special buted among the next of kin of the testator, or other-power, in whose favour to be exercised? I think the wise as the Court should direct. Renshaw, for the petitioners.-This is a power, not a trust. It is a gift of a life estate, with a power of selecting objects. (Sugd. Pow. 657, 8th ed.; The Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin, 2 Ves. sen. 61; Forbes v. Ball, 3 Mer. 437). This is to be distinguished from cases where there is an entire interest in the donce of the power and an entire discretion. (Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 458; Brown v. Higgs, 4 Ves. 708; Gower v. Mainwaring, 2 Ves. sen. 86). This is a general appointment. H. C. Ward, for the next of kin of the testator.The power to appoint was a limited power, and was therefore not well exercised by the will of Sarah Caplin. (Clowes v. Awdry, 12 Beav. 604). The fund would, therefore, be distributed as in default of appointment. Surrage, for one of the next of kin of Sarah Caplin. -There is a trust by implication, for the next of kin, in default of appointment. This is a clear trust for relations. If the donee of the power of selection fails to select, the trust is not to fail, but the Court will exercise it in favour of all. Brown v. Higgs (sup.); Witts v. Boddington (3 Bro. C. C. 95); and Bernard v. Minshull (John. 276), went on the ground, that there was no trust in favour of a definite class of objects. [He referred to 1 Jarm. Wills, 514, 3rd ed.] Dickens, for James Stevens, in the same interest, cited Hawthorn v. Shedden (3 Sm. & Giff. 293). As to the meaning of "friends," he cited Gower v. Mainwaring (sup.) Sheffield, for the trustees and executors of Richard Caplin. Renshaw, in reply, relied on the distinction between a power and a trust. Which of the two it was, is to be decided by the consideration, whether or no it is the duty of the donee to execute it. Sir R. T. KINDERSLEY, V. C.-It is not possible, I apprehend, to reconcile all the cases which have been decided upon the various points that arise in this case. The first question is, what estate or interest did this lady take under the will? It appears to me clear that she took a life estate, and nothing more than a life estate. The next question is, whether, being tenant for life, with this power, it is a general or a special power, which involves, of course, the consideration of another question: who are meant by "relations or friends" of the donee of the power, because the direction is, that "onethird is to be paid unto such and so many of the relations or friends of her, my said dear wife" (that is, the donee of the power), "as she shall by will appoint." If you say that this expression means not only those who may be relations, but those who, not being relations, may be called "friends," then, what does "friends" mean? You cannot say that it means anybody whatever, as in the case of a general power; because, as has been already suggested, if it were a general power, she might appoint to the unborn children of a stranger, who would be no relations at all; or, as it has also been suggested, she might appoint to a charity, which cannot be called either a "relation or a friend." That would be the effect of a general power; but here it is clear that the intention was not to give a general power under these words, but to put some limit or other. I dare say, if you had asked the testator, he would have said he had not the smallest idea what he meant; whether he meant relations only, or whether he meant some class whom he considered her friends, who might not be her relations; or whether he meant they must be very intimate friends or common acquaintances, and so on. Court must necessarily put some limit upon the term "friends," and that the only limit to be put upon it is to give it the same construction as the word “relations." This was done in that case, before Lord Hardwicke, of Gower v. Mainwaring, where, though the words were not exactly what they are here, they are very near, and the two words "relations" and "friends" i are used. In that case it is "friends and relations," with the conjunctive particle, and in the case before me it is "relations or friends." I do not see how it is possible to put any other construction but that which was adopted in that case, which is, that it means "relations." Where there is a power to appoint among relations in this manner, I apprehend there is no reason why the donee of the power may not appoint among any relations, and not be limited to appoint amongst next of kin; and especially so in a case (which is not the case here) where the power might be exercised by deed or will. If it is to be exercised by deed, the person in his lifetime cannot tell who will be his next of kin at his death, and the question would arise-Does it mean the next of kin at his death; that is, those who, if he died at the moment when he exercised the power by deed, would be bis next of kin? It appears to me, that if it were a power to appoint among relations, which, I conceive, is the construction, there would be no reason why the donee of the power should not exercise it among any relations, although beyond the limits of next of kin. But where the Court holds that there is a trust in default of appointment-wherever it is a trust, in short, for relations-the Court puts this construction upon it that if it be a gift to one for life, and afterwards a gift to the relations of that person, it is to the next of kin to that person. So, here, I consider, first, that it is a mere life estate. Then, it appears to me, it is not a general power, and, therefore, that the will does not operate upon it, under the Wills Act, and that there is no execution of the power. It is a special power for relations, and, I conceive, that inasmuch as the Court has to say whether there is an implied trust or not, I must hold that there is an implied trust. That isolated case of Marlborough v. Godolphin is not sufficient to weigh against the strong current of authorities in cases just similar to this, where the Court has held there is an implied trust in favour of the objects of the power; those objects being, where it is a trust for relations, to be limited to next of kin. That being the case, it appears to me I must hold that the next of kin of the wife at her death are the persons entitled, and that there must be an inquiry who were next of kin, with the usual directions as to whether any of them are dead, and, if so, who are their legal personal representatives. THOMAS v. CROSS.-April 22. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13-Judgment-Charge on lands devised on trust for conversion-23 & 24 Vict. c. 38— Execution-Notice. The interest of a person entitled to a share of the procvals of real and leasehold estate, devised to trustees on a absolute trust (after the determination of a life estate for sale and conversion, has not such an interest in the lands (although not sold at the date of the judgmes!; as will be affected by a judgment registered in the Com mon Pleas, so as to give the judgment creditor priority over subsequent incumbrancers who have obtaini charging orders on the fund arising from the sale. A registered judgment is of no effect on the priority of an incumbrancer on land, unless execution be issued therein. , May 13, 1865 Adjourned summons.-The object of this summons was to ascertain the priorities of the several defendants to the suit (which was a suit for foreclosure), the fund being insufficient to satisfy all the incumbrancers. John Cross, by his will, proved on the 7th March, 1830, gave freehold, copyhold, and leasehold estate (part of which was in Middlesex) to trustees, upon trust for his wife for life; with remainder on trust to sell, and invest the proceeds on personal securities, and divide the income of such investment amongst his sons for life. The wife died in September, 1856, but the property was not sold till 1862, when the proceeds were paid into court in an administration suit of Cross v. Maltby. Whilst the property was still unsold, the defendant James Cross, one of the sons of the testator, had effected various charges on it; that of the plaintiff in the suit being admitted to stand first. The incumbrance of the defendant Batho was a judgment signed on the 18th February, 1861, and registered in the Common Pleas on the same day. This judgment was not registered in Middlesex, execution was not issued on it, nor was any charging order on the fund obtained in the suit; and nothing further was done in respect of the judgment. The defendants Banfill held a registered judgment, dated the 23rd February, 1861, and in respect of their claim a charging order was obtained on the 10th May, 1862, and a stop order on the fund on the 30th May. The defendants Hensman & Co. claimed under a written charge of the 6th June, 1862, and further charges of the 20th January and the 4th August, 1863, and the 1st December, 1864. With respect to these incumbrances, the question was raised on the part of Batho, whether or not, and at what date, they had notice of his judgment; but it was not necessary to decide this point. Eddie, for the defendant Batho.-The effect of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 13, was to make this judgment a charge on the land not in Middlesex (as to which part he could not maintain the charge), in which the defendant James Cross was "entitled for an estate or interest." (Harris v. Davison, 15 Sim. 128). He distinguished Foster v. Blackstone (1 My. & K. 297). The lien attaches at once on the registry of the judgment, although the remedy is postponed for a year. (Yescombe v. Landon, 28 Beav. 80). [He referred to Prideaux on Judgments, 22.] The charging orders and stop orders of the other defendants did not affect Batho's priority by his registered judgment, for the latter was a lien on the lands; the former only affected funds arising from the sale. had an interest in land; but the expression in the act is, that the judgment should operate as a charge on lands and hereditaments "of or to which any person was seised, possessed, or entitled for any estate or interest;" language used advisedly, and which does not apply to the share of James Cross. I must, therefore, hold that Batho's judgment gave him no lien on the proceeds of sale of the land in question. But even if I am wrong, then comes the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, sect. 1 of which provides, that no judgment shall affect land as to a mortgagee or purchaser, unless execution have issued. Therefore, Batho's judgment has no effect on the fund. Neither of the judgments affect the land; but the first incumbrancer who gave notice, or obtained a charging order or a stop order, has priority. This was done by the defendants Banfill; therefore, they have priority over Batho, and the 23 & 24 Vict. prevents him from having any priority over Hensman & Co. I only decide now as to Batho, leaving the question of priority as between the other two defendants. Declare, that the defendants Banfill and Hensman & Co. stand before Batho, who, if he has any charge, is last. Notes for reference-Sugd. Pow. 657; 2 Jarm. Wills, 97, Mortgage-Power of sale-Purchase by subsequent mort- A mortgagee, if he be not redeemed, is entitled to every Cause. The question was, whether the representatives of a mortgagor were entitled to redeem the mortgaged property against persons claiming under a sale made by prior mortgagees to a subsequent mortgagee. The facts were these. By an indenture, dated the 17th January, 1846, certain property was conveyed by Stephen Kirkwood to W. Cash, J. Feltham, S. Smith, and T. H. Lucas in fee, by way of mortgage for securing 55001. and inBaily, Q. C., and Jones, for the defendants Banfill.-terest, with a power of sale in case of default, In the cases cited there was not, as here, an imperative trust for sale, which operates as an immediate conversion. James Cross's interest was in equity an interest in money, not in land. It is affected only by the charging order, under sect. 14, and not by the judgment. As to notice, they cited The Consolidated Infatment Society v. Riley (1 Giff. 371; 5 Jur., N. S., 1283).] upon notice in writing being given to the mortgagor, his heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns; and by indenture, dated the 16th March, 1846, certain other property was conveyed by S. Kirkwood to G. Davidson, O. A. Davidson, and Sir J. Romilly in fee, by way of mortgage, for securing 40007. and interest. This last indenture also contained a power to the mortgagees to sell the property in case of default, without any further consent on the part of S. Kirkwood, his heirs or assigns, being requisite. By another indenture, dated the 16th June, 1846, the premises comprised in the mortgage to Cash and others were conveyed by S. Kirkwood, subject to that mortgage, to G. Davidson, O. A. Davidson, and Sir J. Romilly in fee, as a further security for the sum of 40007. and interest. This indenture contained a similar power of sale to that in the last mortgage. On the 10th December, 1847, S. Kirkwood conveyed all the premises to C. Thompson and J. Carr, trustees for the North of England Fire and Life Insurance |