ments in mat Of the effect of that we should do a violence to the fair meaning and import of foreign judgthe whole context, if we should hold the court to have so ters of prize, as decided and decreed on any other ground than this, viz. that the fact which is the subject of the warranty, was in their judgment substantially untrue." (m) proving a for feiture of neutrality. A ship, in order to be neutral, must be fur documents and proofs of na tional character required by if a foreign § 241. "The general rule for judging and deciding whether a captured ship be neutral or not, is the law of nations, subnished with all ject only to such alterations and modifications as may have been introduced by treaties. When a state, in amity with a belligerent power, has by treaty agreed that the ships of treaties hence, their subjects shall only have that character when furnished sentence of con- with certain precise documents, whoever warrants a ship to demnation proceeds expressly be the property of such subject should provide himself with on the ground those evidences, which have by the country to which he belongs been agreed to be necessary proofs of that character.”(n) Hence, if a sentence of condemnation profess to proceed on the ground (either alone or inter alia) that the ship warranted neutral has not those evidences of neutrality which are required by treaty, this is a falsification of the warranty. of her not being so docu mented, this is a forfeiture of the warranty of neutrality. Thus, where a ship, "warranted Dutch property," was condemned as prize mainly on the ground, though not specifically stated so to be in the adjudicative part of the sentence, that she was not properly documented as a Dutch ship, according to the treaty of Utrecht, this sentence was held conclusive to falsify the warranty. (0) So, where a ship described in the policy to be American (which is the same thing in effect as though she had been warranted American), was condemned by the sentence of a French prize court, in which no specific ground of adjudication was alleged, but from the whole of which taken together, it sufficiently appeared that she was condemned either as not being an American, or for not having those (m) Bolton v. Gladstone, 5 East, 155. S. C. in error, 2 Taunt. 82. (n) Per Mr. Justice Lawrence in Pollard v. Bell, 8 T. Rep. 444. (0) Barzillai v. Lewis, A. D. 1782, before Lord Mansfield, Marshall on Ins. 402. The true ground of the case is as stated in the text; see the remarks of Mr. J. Lawrence on this case in Pollard v. Bell, 8 T. Rep. 441, 442. treaty documents which entitled her to the privileges of the American flag, or for the misconduct of the captain and her crew: this was held conclusive to falsify the statement of her being an American. (p) Of the effect of foreign judgments in matters of prize, as proving a forfeiture of neutrality. Although de nation is, generally speaking, equivalent to: neutrality, yet the effect of such description may be warranty of done away with by special Although the ship be thus described in the policy as of a neutral state, this may be explained by a subsequent agree- scribing a ship ment, so as to preclude the effect of a foreign sentence of as of a neutral condemnation as enemy's property, where, in point of fact, the ship was neutral property. The ship, in the case now referred to, being described in the policy as "an American vessel," and doubts having arisen whether this was not a warranty of neutrality, the underwriters signed a written paper, agreeing "That, in case of capture or seizure, the assured, on producing papers to prove that the ship and cargo were really neutral, should be entitled to his loss." The ship was captured and condemned as enemy's property; but due proof being given that the ship and cargo were really neutral, the court held that, though describing the ship as American in the policy amounted to a warranty that she was so, yet the explanatory agreement, coupled with the required proof of neutrality, prevented the sentence from operating as a falsification of this warranty, as it otherwise would have done. (1) agreement, so far as to pre clude the con clusive effect of a foreign sentence condemning the ship as enemy's property, if she neutral. Henderson, be, in fact, Lothian v. 3 Bos. & Pull. 499. ship, in order must have all § 242. But although a ship cannot be neutral unless she But although a is properly documented as required by treaties, the same to be neutral, consequence does not follow from her mere failure to observe those arbitrary regulations, or ordinances of foreign states, which have not received the sanction of other nations. documents re quired by in ternational treaties, yet neutral ships are not bound to observe the pri vate marine In almost every maritime war the belligerents take upon themselves to make various marine regulations, adapted to their own respective situations and interests, but often con- regulations of trary to the law of nations, and inconsistent with the inde- belligerent pendence of other states. And, although it may be prudent consequently, if for the subjects of neutral states to conform to these regulations for their own safety, yet it is now settled that they are (p) Baring v. Claggett, 3 Bos. & Pull. 201. states; and, the sentence of a belligerent avowedly pro prize court Of the effect of not bound by them, and therefore a condemnation avowedly foreign judg- grounded on the non-observance of them will not amount to ters of prize, as proof of the forfeiture of the warranty. (r) ments in mat proving a forfeiture of neutrality. sentence will not falsify a warranty of neutrality. Mayne v. Walter, Marsh. on Ins. 402. Pollard v. Bell, 8 T. Rep. 434. Remarks of The principle is, that the law of nations is the sole rule for deciding all questions on matters of prize, except where it has been varied or departed from by mutual agreement among states, as signified by international treaties. Thus, where a ship, "warranted Portuguese," was condemned by a French prize court expressly "because she had an English supercargo on board," contrary to a recent ordinance of the French government, but not contrary to the law of nations, or to any treaty between France and Portugal, Lord Mansfield held that this sentence did not falsify the warranty. (s) On the same ground, where a ship, “warranted Danish,” was condemned by a French prize court on the express ground of her "captain's being an enemy," contrary to a French ordinance, set out in the sentence; as this was not shown to be contrary to the law of nations, or to the terms of any treaty between France and Denmark, the court held that the sentence did not falsify the warranty. (t) 66 "Was the ship in question condemned," asks Lord Kenyon, on the ground that she was not Danish property? Certainly not. It appears clear beyond all doubt that the ship was at last condemned on the ground that the captain was one of those persons whom, by their own ordinances only, they wished to proscribe. On the whole, I am of opinion, that though, if contrary to justice, the ship had been condemned simply because she was a Danish ship, we should have been concluded by that sentence, yet, as the courts abroad have stated, as the grounds of their condemnation, one of their own ordinances, which is not binding on other nations, this sentence does not prove that the ship in question was not a neutral.” (u) So, where a ship, which was American in fact, but not (r) Marshall on Ins. 401, 402. (s) Mayne v. Walter, A. D. 1782. Marshall on Ins. 402. (t) Pollard v. Bell, 8 T. Rep. 434. (u) Pollard v. Bell, 8 T. Rep. 487, 438. expressly warranted to be so, being furnished with all such papers as were required by the treaty between France and the United States, was condemned by a French prize court manifestly on the ground of a breach of French ordinances, the requisitions of which, as to ship's papers, went beyond those of the treaty: the court held that this sentence did not falsify the implied warranty that the ship should be furnished with American papers. (v) In the case of Bird v. Appleton the Court of King's Bench fully sustained their decision in Pollard v. Bell, and broadly laid down the principle that no one state has authority, by any ordinance of its own, to vary the general law of nations as to other states. (w) In one case, where the ground on which the sentence really proceeded was so ambiguous as to require collateral evidence to explain it, and upon such evidence being produced it appeared that the true ground of the condemnation was the violation of some private ordinance of the captor nation, Lord Mansfield held that such sentence was not conclusive to falsify a warranty of neutrality, and judgment was accordingly given for the plaintiff. (x) If, however, in a foreign sentence there be several grounds of condemnation set forth, and one of them be a good and legal ground, it will be conclusive to falsify the warranty, though joined with several bad ones. con Thus, where a ship, "warranted American," was demned by a French prize court, partly on the ground that she was not documented according to treaties, and partly for the breach of French ordinances, not binding upon America, the sentence was held conclusive to forfeit the warranty. (y) (v) Price v. Bell, 1 East, 663. 562. (x) Bernardi v. Motteux, Dougl. 575. Such appears from the language of Lord Mansfield in the case itself, and subsequently in Saloucci v. Wood mass (Marshall on Ins. 406.); and (y) Baring v. Royal Exch. Ass. General doctrine of seaworthiness. § 243. In every policy of marine insurance there is an implied warranty that the ship shall be seaworthy for the vogage, Meaning of the by which is meant that she shall be in a fit state, as to repairs, equipments, crew, and all other respects, to encounter the ordinary perils of the voyage insured at the time of sailing on it. (a) implied warranty of seaworthiness. Importance of enforcing a strict compliance with it. The ship's being sea worthy for the voyage, when she sails, is a condition precedent to the underwriter's liability for any loss incurred after sailing. There is nothing in the law of marine insurance more important, both with a view to the benefit of commerce and the preservation of human life, than to enforce, as far as possible, a strict compliance with this warranty; as otherwise the effect of insurance might be to render those who were protected from loss by the policy exceedingly careless about the condition of the ship and the consequent safety of the crew. (b) The courts, accordingly, have held that the seaworthiness of the ship for the voyage, when she sails, is a condition precedent to the underwriter's liability for any loss incurred in the course of the voyage. If she be not so seaworthy, says Lord Ellenborough, from whatever cause this may arise, and though no fraud was intended on the part of the assured, the underwriters may answer, 'We are not liable.'" (c) The premium is paid, says Mr. J. Lawrence, "in order that the owner of a ship which is capable of performing the (a) Per Parke, B., 5 Mees. & Wels. Rep. 276., and of Lord Redesdale in 414. (b) See the observations of Lord Eldon in Douglas v. Scougall, 4 Dow's |