Archbishop against this ignoble assault. But the writer's sophistry concerning the "Unam Sanctam" has on its surface a certain plausibility; and our reasoning in the preceding article may lose part of its effect with some minds, unless we encounter this writer in straightforward argument. Before beginning our reply however, we must make three or four preliminary statements to prevent misconception.

I. Whatever be the doctrine inculcated in the body of the Bull, Catholics as such are not obliged to accept that doctrine. In the first place, the large majority of Catholic writers consider that the Bull contains no ex cathedrâ definition (beyond an incidental one on the heresy of "two principles ") except in its last sentence. "Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omnem humanam creaturam declaramus, dicimus, definimus et pronunciamus omnino esse de necessitate salutis." Now the word "subesse" is certainly most vague; and the words of this final clause taken by themselves need not be understood as expressing more, than the strict obligation of obeying the Pope in matters exclusively spiritual. Many Catholics accordingly understand the Definition in this sense; and they have more than one plausible ground for their interpretation. When Leo X. and the Fifth Lateran Council confirmed the "Unam Sanctam " (see Leo X.'s "Pastor Eternus"), the Pope's words certainly ran as though he cited the Bull in testimony of no other doctrine than that just mentioned. Then (as has been pointed out to us by a friend who advocates this interpretation) the words themselves of this final clause are a quotation from S. Thomas ("contra errores Græcorum," c. 32); and his context makes it evident, that he is speaking exclusively of subjection in things purely spiritual. We may add also, that this interpretation of the "Unam Sanctam " has been lately brought before the notice of authority, and (to say the least) in no way discountenanced.

II. For ourselves however, as a matter of private opinion, such would not be our view of the Bull. It is true that Leo X. cites it only as testifying the Pope's just claim to spiritual allegiance. But it by no means follows (we think)— merely because such was his immediate purpose-that therefore he intended so to limit the sense of the Bull. The less so indeed, because no one doubts that he himself held that doctrine of the Pope's indirect temporal power, which (as we shall presently show) is indubitably the doctrine contained in the main body (as distinguished from the final sentence) of the "Unam Sanctam." And in the manner we do not at all see why Boniface VIII. should not use S. Thomas's words, in a sense wider than that in which S. Thomas used them.

This being so, although we admit that the word "subesse " is vague, we cannot think that it is reasonably open to any arbitrary interpretation. On the contrary, if the Definition be really confined to the final clause, we should say nevertheless that the "Preamble " affords the one authentic and exclusively admissible sense of the word "subesse." Catholics of every school hold, that the Vatican Definition on infallibility is authentically explained by the Preamble to that Definition and we should take the same principle for granted, in reference to the "Unam Sanctam."

;

But our own bias would be to consider, that the whole Bull contains a sustained ex cathedrâ Instruction; as in the case of S. Leo's celebrated Letter to S. Flavian, and of many other Pontifical utterances which are indubitably ex cathedrâ. At the same time, we need hardly say it is universally understood by Catholics in the case of such ex cathedrâ instructions, that infallibility appertains only to the substantial doctrine drawn out; not in any way to the arguments, Scriptural illustrations, &c., &c., by which it may be incidentally supported.

III. We see no ground whatever for thinking that the Bull-though indubitably containing a Definition ex cathedracontains a Definition of faith on the Pope's authority in temporals. Thus Fénélon's condemnation is admitted by every one to have been ex cathedrâ; yet it noted no one of Fénélon's propositions with the brand of heresy. In like manner the "Unam Sanctam" condemns implicitly any tenet contradictory to its main Definition, as theologically false; but we see no reason to think that it intends to condemn such tenet as heretical. On former occasions we have often set forth the important distinction between these two classes of definitions; but it would be quite out of place here to pursue the subject.

IV. Whatever be the purport of the actual Definition, it is of much importance at all events to show, that so solemn a Pontifical utterance as this famous Bull contains no such notion as that of the Pope's "universal" civil" monarchy over Christians; that it contains indeed nothing contrary to the traditional Catholic doctrine, on the due relations between Church and State.

The writer in "Macmillan " purports to establish the reverse of this. Here are his words: "The Bull . . . . asserts in its crudest and most aggressive form the great medieval doctrine of the Pope's universal monarchy over mankind, and of his direct authority (directa potestas) over all temporal princes" (p. 173). "The one object of the Bull was to enunciate this principle of the directa potestas' in the most unmistakable terms...

Words could not express more plainly the direct aud immediate jurisdiction claimed by the Supreme Pontiff over purely temporal matters" (p. 179). This statement we totally deny, and proceed to give grounds for our denial.

Nothing can be more intelligible, than the doctrine of the Pope's direct temporal power. Suarez, who of course entirely rejects it, thus sets it forth:

It was the opinion of some Catholics, especially jurists, that in Christ's Church not the spiritual rule only, but the temporal is monarchical; and thus that in the whole Church there is one only supreme temporal prince, having by himself and directly supreme civil power over the whole Church; and that this prince, by Christ's institution, is the Supreme Pontiff. From whence they consistently inferred, that no Republic, nor King, nor Emperor possesses supreme power in temporals.-"Defensio," 1. 3, c. 5, n. 4.

Here is the very doctrine ascribed by Mr. Gladstone to the mediæval Popes; the claim of "universal monarchy." We have already said that Suarez entirely rejects it; and he proceeds (c. 22) to lay down an entirely different one, as received by the common consent of Catholics": viz., that whereas princes derive their civil authority from God (not mediante Pontifice but) "mediante populo nevertheless the Pope has authority to "direct them "in the use of their temporal power, in order to a spiritual end; by reason of which he can enjoin or prohibit such or such use thereof, so far as may be expedient for spiritual good." The "Macmillan " writer has the audacity to say (p. 179) that the Jesuits invented this theory in the sixteenth century, and that the mediæval doctrine was different. Why, putting aside the "Unam Sanctam" which is here in debate, let him name if he can a mediæval Pope, who ever presented so much as the superficial appearance of putting forth any such claim as he alleges. F. Parkinson, as we have said in our article, cites the most express statements to the opposite effect, from those two mediæval Popes who are most accused of aggressiveness; viz. Innocent III. and Boniface VIII.: the latter being the very author of the "Unam Sanctam." We are now then to consider, whether the "Unam Sanctam " presents any exception to this received doctrine; and we need hardly point out at starting, how extremely improbable à priori is any such supposition. This is our first adverse remark.

Secondly our opponent (in some moment of inadvertence, we suppose) admits the very thesis which we maintain; for he says in p. 179 by most manifest implication, that, according to medieval doctrine, the Pope's power in temporals extended no further, than that "he might call the temporal prince

directly to account, for any of his temporal acts in which he discovered a sinful tendency." According to this writer himself then, the medieval Popes claimed no direct temporal power (out of their own temporal dominions), but only in relation to a spiritual end.

Thirdly, Boniface VIII.'s illustration of the "two swords," on which our opponent chiefly relies, is conclusive against him. According to the doctrine of the direct temporal power-a prince is as simply the Pope's delegate in temporally governing his people, as a Vicar Apostolic e.g. in spiritually governing his flock. But if this were so, there would not be "two swords" at all. No one ascribes any "sword" to the Vicar Apostolic, for the obvious reason that his whole authority is directly derived from the Pope; neither then would any "sword" be ascribed to the prince, if his authority were directly derived from the Pope.

Fourthly. "It is therefore necessary that we should clearly declare, that the spiritual power exceeds the temporal in dignity and nobility, in the same proportion that spiritual things excel temporal." This is the writer's own translation of a clause in the Bull; and the said clause emphatically negatives the notion, that the spiritual and temporal "swords" constitute one identical sovereignty vested in the Pope. The Bull speaks distinctly of a temporal sovereignty existing, with temporal affairs as its primary end.

Fifthly, the Bull proceeds to say that "it is the function of the spiritual power to instruct the earthly." Is it the function of the Pope to instruct himself?

It is not too much to say, that there is only one expression in the whole Bull, which presents even a colourable appearance of claiming the direct temporal power: viz. its affirmation, that the temporal sword is "in the power of the Pope," "in the power of the Church." It can very easily be shown however how completely this affirmation is in harmony with all the rest, if we read the Bull as a whole. Its scope and argument, as we understand the matter, run thus::

The Church by her divine constitution is one in communion, and her ruler is provided with means for imparting one and the same spiritual and moral doctrine to all her members. He has two different means given him by God for doing this. One of these is his exercise of the spiritual power, which directly belongs to him; and the other is his divinely-given

*The "Macmillan " writer reads "instruere." The true reading however is "instituere"; but the meaning is evidently the same.

authority over the prince's exercise of temporal power. If the prince had been permitted by God to exercise his temporal power without obedience to the Pope in matters indirectly spiritual, he might practically inculcate on his subjects a moral teaching most false and dangerous; and the Pontiff would have no means for securing unity of moral teaching within the Church. Nay generally, if princes were not subject to the censures of the Church in political matters bearing on religion, it would follow that as princes they are out of the Church; that the two powers are totally distinct from each other; and that they were descended from distinct and even opposed principles: -an error approaching to the error of the Manichees.*

Any fair-minded person, we think, who reads the Bull, will admit that such is its general purport. And if this be conceded, we see very easily the meaning of its statement, that the temporal sword is in the Pope's power. By this is not meant that the prince's civil authority is derived from the Pope; but that the Pope has power to sway the temporal sword into this or that direction, whenever it may happen that spiritual interests are concerned.

And here we must complain, that the writer whom we are criticising has perpetrated a somewhat serious mistranslation. He renders ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis" by the words, "at the Pontiff's nod and pleasure." Surely "pleasure " is a very odd version of " patientia." We would rather say, "according to the Pontiff's direction and sufferance." In the normal condition of Catholic civil society, what takes place is this. From time to time the Pope interferes with the course of civil government, for the protection of spiritual interests; and on such occasions the prince recognizes obedience to the Pope as of obligation. But very much more commonly the Pope exhibits "sufferance," or in other words sees no call to interfere; and so long as this is the case, it is the prince's duty to govern according to his own conviction of what will be for his people's highest good. Only he understands, that this is by the Pope's "sufferance"; or in other words that the Pope has power to interfere on spiritual grounds, whenever he may see fit. During these long intervals the prince, while carrying on the civil government, exercises a power, in no way derived from the Pope, but conferred on him by God "mediante populo."

So much on the contents of the Bull itself. But we shall not have been able fully to exhibit it in its true light, until

This last sentence is mainly taken from Dr. Döllinger's exposition of the "Unam Sanctam" cited by F. Parkinson.