as long as the fortune of war continued in the fame train, we were from the beginning apprehenfive that the new negotiation which we have fince feen opened, and for fome time carried on with fuch pleafing appearances, might in the iffue be attended with no better fuccefs.

There are indeed but two fituations in which peace can be very rationally expected. The firft fituation is that of equality; and this is, either where nothing is gained on any fide; fo that whenever mutual wearinefs, and unprofitable hoftilities have calmed the ardour of the warring powers, no intricate points intervene to fruftrate the first pacific difpofition; or it may be where the loffes are fo equal, that exchanges may easily be made, or the parties may reft mutually fatisfied with their advantage over each other.

The fecond fituation is that of necessity; where one of the parties is fo entirely broken and reduced, as to fubmit to receive conditions on the footing of conqueft, and to purchafe repofe by humiliating and enfeebling conceffions. A peace upon this latter bafis is always the grand popular object. In every war we flatter ou felves with the hope of it, againft an experience almoft uniform. In fact, it is to the laft degree difficult to reduce any of the great powers of Europe to this difgraceful neceffity. For to reduce any one of them to this state of fubmiffion, you muft, in a manner, te duce all of them to it. The war, if it continues, draws ftate after ftate into its vortex, until all Europe is involved. A fort of balance is then produced, and the peace of conqueft becomes inpracticable

It would prove of the utmost moment to the tranquillity of mankind, that this point were fufficiently regarded, and that they would willingly adopt that fyftem of equality, to which fooner or later, with more or fewer firuggles, they are fo often compelled to fubmit. When fel dom, a treaty is concluded on other terms, as the king of Pruffia has found by fevere experience, and as we obferve on a former occafion, is only a fhort ceffation, and not a perfect peace. But it must be acknowledged that this fituation, the moft coincident with their true intereft, is at the fame time the most contradictory to the paffions and prejudices of nations. It appears hard to lofe upon every fide every object of the war. A peace on this foundation will be cenfured, but it is the beft, on the fame principle that the shorteft follies are the beft and that no injured pride is left to brood over a future war. Contrary to the opinion of the warm patriots on all fides, we therefore imagined that the year feventeen hundred and fifty-eight, in the clofe of the third campaign, was the happy moment for negotiation. At this time, however, no propofitions had been made. The propofitions of feventeen hundred and fifty-nine were but flightly regarded, and obviously could end in nothing. But in the beginning of the year, of which we are now going to treat, the fcene of negotiation was opensed with far greater folemnity and parade; and as it was carried on with great diligence, it neceffarily makes a principal part of the hiftory of this year. It is indeed fomewhat fortunate both for the writers and the readers of thefe events that this treaty has intevented. The

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narrative otherwife had proved extremely barren and unentertaining. For though the an mofity of the belligerent powers was not, as we obferved, abated, their efforts, how ever, had confiderably flackened, and their operations began gradually to degenerate into the petiteguerre. Thofe vaft events that aftonith the mind, or hold it in a pleafin fufpenfe; thofe important battles and fieges; thofe rapid and well-conducted marches, and thofe lively enterprizes which diftinguifh the former years, except in a very few inttances, scarce make any part of the hiftory before us. But tho' the operations of the field had fallen into a state of languor, the cabinet became full of business, and negotiation flourished. In this fituation candour obliges us to acquaint our readers that we are ftill more liable to mistakes, than when we attempt to defcribe the tranfactions of the campaign. It very frequently happens, that the accounts of the military operations come authenti. cated from the hands of thofe great generals who have conducted them, and when we have allowed for the partiality of the account, there is nothing to be detracted from them for want of fufficient information. Even in the cafe of partiality, we are often able to correct the mifrepresentation or overcharge of one of the parties by that of the other. These things are done in the eve of the world. But the motives either to peace or war, and the fteps taken in a negotiation, are all behind the curtain. They do not appear for a long time, and fometimes they never appear completely. There is however, an advantage in the prefent conjuncture. For one of the powers at war, in order to juftify

to its fubjects and to the world, its part in the continuance of a war fo fatal to both, has published an account of the late negotiation; artful indeed, and probably in fome refpects unfair; but containing at the fame time many valuable and illuftrating pieces, the authenticity of which is not difputed. The point in fuch cafes to be dreaded is not the publication of falfe pieces, but the concealment of feveral that are real and important. The public information is probably rather incompleat, than untrue. We wait with impatience for that full and authentic narrative of fo important a negotiation, which undoubtedly our court propofes to publifh. We have delayed the fetting out our work the longer, in hopes of its appearance, by which we might have been able to perfect and correct our account of this tranfaction. The account of the Spanish negotiation has appeared late, but we have not failed to make use of it. At prefent we engage in our work, under thofe difficulties, which it is juft the reader should know and allow for. In the fucceeding year we fhall take care to profit of whatever further lights may be imparted.

Very carly in this year 1761, the courts of Petersburgh, Vienna, France, Sweden and Poland, agreed feverally and jointly to offer propofals towards renewing that negotiation for peace, which had abruptly been broken off in the close of the year 1759. France was the principal and first mover; for as it was her ambition which had made the war fo general, and her revenue which in a great measure fupported it; the former being now humbled by a feries of unfortunate events, and the latter reduced by most enor

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mous expences, fhe began at length to relent, and apparently to defire peace in earnest. The other members of the grand alliance could not decently, nor fafely oppofe thefe difpofitions of France. The court of Sweden in particular was given to understand, that the exhaufted condition of France was the

true motive of her moderation; that in fact, fhe was not able any longer to furnish the ftipulated fubfidies, nor to adhere to the letter of her engagements with her allies. Thefe circumstances, which fhe was neither able, nor feemed difpofed to conceal, formed the fureft guaranty of her fincerity.

The five parties to the war on that fide, made as many declarations, which were figned at Paris on the 25th of March, and delivered at London on the 31ft of the fame month. The counter declaration of Great Britain and Pruffia appeared on the 3d of April. Augf burgh, as the fituation moft commodious for the powers at war, was appointed for the congrefs.

Lord Egremont, Lord Stormont amballador in Poland, and general Yorke our ambaffador in Holland, were nominated as the English plenipotentiaries. On the part of France, the count de Choifeul was appointed. Augfburg now became the center of attention to all Europe, and each court prepared every thing towards this important meeting which it could furnifh of fplendor for the difplay of its dignity, and of ability for the fupport of its intereft. The public converfation was for a while diverted from scenes of horror, bloodshed, and pillage, and every mind was employed more agreeably on the public fcene of magnificence,

and the private game of policy, which was to enfue.

In the first place, it was unanimoufly agreed, in order that a negotiation, in itfelf fufficiently intricate, fhould be the lefs embarrassed, to admit to the treaty none but the parties principally concerned, together with their allies.

Although this exclufion of the neutral interefts tended greatly to difembarrafs and fimplify the nego tiation, yet fuch was the variety of feparate and independent matters, which still remained to be difcuffed, that it become advifable to make a further feparation, if they hoped to treat upon them with any tolerable eafe, or with any prospect of coming to a fpeedy decifion.

For this purpose it was neceflary to bring back the motives of the war to their first principles; and to difengage thofe feveral interefts which originally and in their own nature had no connection, from that mafs, in which mutual injuries and a common animofity had blended and confounded them. This propofition came first from France, and it was an early and happy omen of her inclination to peace.

The war which was truly and originally German, evidently had but a fingle, though this a very difficult object, to determine the fate of the king of Pruffia. So many powers were concerned in this determination, and their views of ag grandiferent, indemnification, and revenge, fo various and difficult to be reconciled, that this alone feemed matter enough for a feparate and very arduous negotiation. In effect, all the powers of the north were concerned in it. For this rea fon the other great object of the

general