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I. Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, justi atque injusti scientia.

De juris

II. His igitur generaliter cognitis, et incipientibus nobis exponere jura populi Romani, ita videntur posse tradi commodissimè, si primo levi ac simplici viâ, post deinde diligentissimâ atque exactissimâ interpretatione, singula tradantur; alioqui, si statim ab initio rudem adhuc et infirmum animum studiosi multitudine ac varietate rerum oneravermus, duorum

1. Jurisprudence is the knowledge of things divine and human; the science of what is just and un. just. methodo.

§ 2. these definitions being premised, we shall commence our exposition of the Roman Law most conveniently, if we take first the plainest and easiest path, and then proceed to treat each particular with the ultmost exactness: for, if at the beginning we overload the mind of the student with a multitude and variety of topics, we may cause him either wholly to abandon his

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TITULUS SECUNDUS.

DE JURE NATURALI, GENTIUM, ET CIVILI.
De jure naturali.

JUST naturale est, quod natura omnia animalia docuit: nam jus istud non humani generis proprium est, sed omnium animalium, quæ in cœlo, quæ in mari, nascuntur. Hinc descendit maris atque fœminæ conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus. Hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio.

The law of nature is a law not only to man, but likewise to all other animals, whether produced on the earth, in the air, or in the waters. From hence proceeds that conjunction of male and female, which we denominate matrimony; hence the procreation and education of children. We perceive also, that other

Videmus enim, cætera quoque animalia istius juris peritia censeri.

animals are considered as having some knowledge of this law.

Distinctio juris gentium et civilis, a definitione et etymologia.

I. Jus autem civile à jure gentium distinguitur, quod omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum, jure utuntur: nam quod quisque populus sibi jus constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est, vocaturque jus civile, quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis. Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes gentes peræque custoditur, vocaturque jus gentium, quasi duo jure omnes gentes utantur: et populus itaque Romanus, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum, jure utitur. Quæ singula qualia sint, suis locis proponemus.

§ 1. Civil law is distinguished from the law of nations, because every community governed by laws, uses partly its own and partly the laws which are common to all mankind. That law, which a people enacts for its own government is called the civil law of that people. But that law, which natural reason appoints for all mankind, is called the law of nations, because all nations make use of it. The people of Rome are governed partly by their own laws, and partly by the laws, which are common to all men. Of these we shall treat separately in their proper places.

Ab appellatione et effectibus.

§ II. Sed jus quidem civile ex unâquâque civitate appellatur, veluti Atheniensium: nam, si quis velit Solonis vel Draconis leges appellare jus civile Atheniensium, non erraverit. Sic enim et jus, quo Romanus populus utitur, jus civile Romanorum appellamus, vel jus Quiritum quo Quirites utuntur: Romani enim a Romulo, Quirites a Quirino, appellantur. Sed, quoties non addimus nomen cujus sit civitatis, nostrum jus significamus: sicuti cum poëtam dicimus, nec addimus nomen, subauditus apud Græcos egregius Homerus, apud nos Virgilius. Jus autem gentium omni humano generi commune est: nam, usu exigente et

$2. Civil laws take their denomination from that city, in which they are established: it would not therefore be erroneous to call the laws of Solon or Draco the civil laws of Athens: and thus the law, which the Roman people make use of, is styled the civil law of the Romans, or of the Quirites; for the Romans are also called Quirites from Quirinus. Whenever we mention the words civil law, without addition, we emphatically denote our own law; thus the Greeks, when they say the poet, mean Homer, and the Romans Virgil. The law of nations is common to all mankind and all nations have enacted some laws, as occasion

humanis necessitatibus, gentes humanæ jura qu dam sibi constituerunt: bella etenim orta sunt, et captivitates secuta, et servitutes, quæ sunt naturali juri contrariæ: jure enim naturali omnes homines ab initio liberi nascebantur: et ex hoc jure gentium, omnes penè contractus introducti sunt, ut emptio et venditio, locatio et conductio, socictas, depositum, mutuum, et alii innumerabiles.

and necessity required: for wars arose and the consequences were captivity and servitude; both which are contrary to the law of nature; for by that law, all men are born free. But almost all contracts were at first introduced by the law of nations; as for instance, buying, selling, letting, hireing, partnership, a deposit, a loan and others without number.

Divisio juris in scriptum et non scriptum; et subdivisio juris scripti.

§ III. Constat autem jus nostrum, quo utimur, aut scripto, aut sine scripto: ut apud Græcos. Tw νομων οι μεν εγραφοι, οι δε αγραφοι Scriptum autem jus, est, lex, plebiscitum, senatus-consultum, principum placita, magistratuum edicta, responsa prudentum.

$3. The Roman law is divided, like the Grecian, into written and unwritten. The written, consists of the plebiscites, the decrees of the senate, ordinances of princes, the edicts of magistrates, and the answers of the sages of the law.

De lege et plebiscito.

IV. Lex est, quod populus Romanus, senatorio magistratu interrogante, (veluti consule,) constituebat. Plebiscitum est, quod plebs, plebeio magistratu interrogante (veluti tribuno,) constituebat. Plebs autem a populo eo differt, quo species a genere; nam appellatione populi universi cives significantur, connumeratis etiam patriciis et senatoribus. Plebis autem, appellatione, sine patriciis et senatoribus, cæteri cives significantur. Sed et Sed et plebiscita, lege Hortensia lata, non minus valere, quam leges, cœperunt

$ 4. A law is what the Roman people enact at the request of a senatorial magistrate; as a consul. A plebiscite is what the commonalty enact, when requested by a plebeian magistrate, as a tribune. The word commonalty differs from people as a species from its genus; for all the citizens, including patricians and senators, are comprehended under the term people. The term commonalty, includes all the citizens, except patricians and senators. The plebiscites, by the Hortensian law, began to have the same force as the laws themselves.

De senatus-consulto.

SV. Senatus-consultum est, quod senatus jubet atque constituit: nam, cum auctus esset populus Romanus in eum modum, ut difficile esset, in unum eum convocari legis sanciendæ causâ, æquum visum est, senatum vice populi consuli.

5. A senatorial decree is what the senate commands and appoints: for, when the people of Rome became so increased that it was difficult to assemble them for the enacting of laws, it seemed right, that the senate should be consulted instead of the people.

De constitutione.

§ 6. The ordinance of the prince hath also the force of a law; for the people by the lex regia, make a concession to him of their whole power. Therefore whatever the emperor ordains by rescript, decree, or edict, is law. Such acts are called constitu

VI. Sed et, quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem: cum lege regia, quæ de ejus imperio lata est, populus ei, et in eum, omne imperium suum et potestatem concedat. Quodcunque ergo imperator per epistolam constituit, vel cognoscens decrevit, vel edicto præcepit, legem esse constat. Hæc sunt, quæ constitutiones appellantur. Planè ex his quædam sunt personales, quæ nec ad exemplum trahuntur, quoniam non hoc princeps vult: nam quod alicuí ob meritum indulsit, vel si quam pœnam irrogavit, vel si cui sine exemplo subvenit, personam non transgreditur. Aliæ autem, cum generales sint, omnes procul- all. dubio tenent.

tions. Of these, some are personal, and are not to be drawn into precedent; for, if the prince hath indulged any man on account of his merit, or inflicted any extraordinary punishment on a criminal, or granted some unprecedented assistance, these acts extend not beyond the individual. But other constitutions being general, undoubtedly bind

De jure honorario.

§ VII. Prætorum quoque edicta non modicam obtinent juris auctoritatem. Hoc etiam jus honorarium solemus appellare: quod, qui honores gerunt, (id est magistratus,) auctoritatem huic juri dederunt. Proponebant et ædiles 'curules edictum de quibusdam causis; quod et ipsum juris honorarii portio est.

$7. The edicts of the prætors are also of great authority. These edicts are called the honorary law, because the magistrates who bear honors in the state, have given them their sanction. The curule ædiles also, upon certain occasions, published their edicts, which became a part of the jus honorarium.

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