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bcbat, cum mnltis divisionibus, in actionem ex stipulatu, quae de dotibus exigendis proponitur, transtulerimus, mcrito rei uxoriae actione sublata. ex stipulatu actio, quae pro ca introducta est, naturam bonae fidei judicii tantum in exactione dotis meruit, ut bonro fidci sit; sed et tacitam ei dedimus hypothecam. Praeferri autem aliis creditoribus in hypothecis tunc censuimus, cum ipsa mulier de dote sua experiatur, cujus solius providentia hoc induximus.
tion to be more full and advantageous, we abrogated the action rei nxoria, and transferred all its effects, with the addition of many othcr powers, to the action of stipulation given to recover marriage portions. we then not only thought, that this action of stipulation, as far as it related to marriage portions, deserved to be numbered with actions of good faith, but we also added to it by implication, the effect of a mortgage: and we judged it proper, that women, in whose sole behalf we have thus ordained, should be preferred to all other creditors by mortgage, whenever they themselves sue for their marriage portions.
De potcstatc judicis in judicio bonae fidei, et de compensa
$ XXX. In bonae fidei judiciis, libera potestas permitti vidctur judici ex bono et aequo aestimandi, quantum actori restitui debeat. In quo et illud continetiir, ut, si quid invicem praestare actorem oporteat, eo compensato, in reliquum is, cum quo actum est, debeat condemnari. Sed et in stricti juris judiciis ex rescripto divi Marci, opposita doli mali exceptione, compensatio inducebatur. Sed nostra constitutio easdem compensationes, quae jure aperto nituntur, latins introduxit, tit actiones ipso jure minuant, sive in rem, sive in personam, sive alias qnascunquc; excepta sola depositi actione, cni, aliquid compensationis nomine opponi, sane iniquum esse credimus; ne, sub praetextu com
$ 30. In all actions of good faith a full power is given to the judge of calculating, according to the rules of justice and equity, how much ought to be restored to be plaintiff; and of course, when the plaintiff is found to be indebted to the defendant in a less sum, it is in the power of the judge to allow a compensation, and to condemn the defendant in the payment of the difference; and, even in actions of strict right, the emperor Marcus introduced a compensation by opposing an exception of fraud: but we have extended compensations much farther by our constitution, when the debt of the defendant is evident; so that actions of strict right, real, personal, or of whatever kind may be cumin
pensationis, depositarum rerum quis exactione defraudetur.
ishcd by compensation; except only an action of deposit, against which we have not judged it proper to permit any compensation to be alleged, lest the pretence of compensation should give color and encouragement ot fraud.
De actionibus arbitrariis.
$ XXXI. Praeterea, actiones quasdam arbitrarias, id est, ex arbitrio judicis pendentes, appellamus; in quibus nisi arbitrio judicis is, cum quo agitur, actori satisfaciat, veluti rem restituat, vel exhibe-' at, vel solvat, vel ex noxali causa servum dedat, condemnari debeat. Sed istoe actiones tam in rem, quam, in personam, inveniuntur; in rem; veluti Publiciana, Serviana de rebus coloni, quasi Serviana, quoe ctiam hypothecaria vocatur; in personam; veluti quibus de eo agitur, quod vi aut metus causa, ant dolo malo, factum est; item cum id, quod certo loco promissum est, pctitur: ad exhibendum quoque actio ex arbitrio judicis pcndet. In his enim actionibus, et cseteris similibus, permittitur judici ex bono et sequo, secundum cujiisque rei, de qua actum est, naturam, aestimare, quemadmodum actori satisfieri oporteat.
§ 31. Some actions moreover we call arbitrary, as depending upon the discretion of the judge: for, in these, if the party do not at the decree of the court, exhibit whatever is required, restore the thing in litigation, pay the value of it, or give up a slave in consequence of an action of mal-feasance, he ought to be condemned. Of these arbitrary actions some are real and some personal: real, as the action Publiciana, Serviana, and quasi Serviana, which is likewise called hypothecary: others are personal, as those, by which a suit is commenced on account of something done by force, fear or fraud; or on account of something, which was promised to be paid or restored in a certain place; and the action ad exhibendum, which was given to the intent, that something particular should be exhibited, is also of the same kind: in these and the like actions, the judge may determine, according to equity and the nature of the thing sued for, in what manner and proportion the plaintiff ought to receive satisfaction.
Quinta divisio, de inccrtso quantitatis pctitionc. $ XXXII. Curare autem debet $ 32. A judge ought, as much judex, ut omnino, quantum possi- as possible, so to frame his sentence,
bile ei sit, certae pecuniae vel rei sentenliam ferat; etiamsi de incerta quantitate apud eum actum est.
§ XXXIII. Si quis agens intentione sua plus complexus fuerit, quam ad eum pertineat, causa cadebat, id est, rem amittebat; nec facile in integrum restituebatur a. praetore, nisi minor erat xxv annis; huic enim, sicutin aliiscausis, causa cognita, succurrebatur, si lapsus juventute fuerat; ita et in hac causa succurri solitum erat. Sane, si tam magna causa justi erroris interveniebat, ut etiam constantissimus quisque labi posset, etiam major! xxv annis succurrebatur; veluti si quis totum legatum petierit, post deinde prolati fuerint codicilli, quibus aut pars legati adempta sit, aut quibusdam aliis legata data sint; quse efficiebant, ut plus petiisse videreiur petitor, quam dodrantem; atque ideo lege Falcidia legata minnebantur. Plus autem quatuor modis petitur ; re, tempore, loco, et causa. Re, vcluti si quis pro deccm aureis, quaj ei debebantur, viginti petierit; aut si is, cujus ex parte res est, totam eam, vel majorem partem, suam esse intenderit. Tempore, velnti si quis ante diem vel ante conditionem petierit: qua enim ratione qui tardius solvit, quam solvere deberet, minus solvere intelligitur, eadem ratione, qui prjematuri petit, plus petere vide
that it may be given for a thing or sum certain; although the claim, upon which the sentence is founded, may be for an incertain sum or quantity.
§ 33. Formerly, if a plaintiff claimed more than his due, he failed in his cause; that is, he lost his debt: nor was it easy for him to be reinstated by the praetor, unless he was under the age of 25 years: for in this, as well as in other cases, it was usual to aid minors, if it appeared that the error was owing to their youth; and if the error was such, that a skilful person might have been led into it, then even persons of full age might have been aided by the magistrate: for example, if a legatee had demanded his whole legacy, and codicils were afterwards (unexpectedly) produced. by which a part of it was revoked, or new legacies bequeathed tootherpersons, so that the plaintiff appeared to have demanded more than three fourths of his legacy; because it was subject to a diminution by the law falcidia; yet, in such case, the legatee would be relieved. A man may demand more than what is due to him in four several respects, viz. in respect to the thing itself; to time; to place; and to the cause. In respect to the thing; as when the plaintiff, instead of ten aurei, due to him, demands twenty: or if, when he owns but part of some particularthing, he claims the whole tur. Loco plus petitur, veluti cum quis id, quod certo loco sibi dari stipulatus est, alio loco petit siui commcmpxatione illius loci, in quo sibi dari stipulatus est; verba gratia, si is, qui ita stipulatus fuerit, Ephesi dare spondes; Romae puri intendat, sibi dari oportere. Ideo autem plus petere intelligitur, quia utilitatem, quamhaberet promissor, si Ephesi solveret, adimit ei pura intentione: propter quam causam alio loco petenti. arbitraria actio proponitur; iu qua scilicet ratio habetur utilitatis, quce promissori competitura fuisset, si illo loco solvoret, qua se soluturum spopoudit. Quae ulilitas plerumque in mercibus maxima iuvenitur: veluti vino, oleo, frumento, quae per singulas regiones diversa habent pretia. Sed et pecuniae nftmeratae non in omnibus regionibus sub iisdem usuris foenerantur. Si quis tamen Ephesi petaf, id est, eo loco petat, in quo, ut sibi detur, stipulatus est, pura actione recte agit: idque etiam praetor demonstrat; scilicet, quia utilitas solvendi, salva est promissori. Huic autem, qui loco plus petere intelligitur, proximusest, qui causa plus petit: ut ecce, si quis ita a te stipuletnr, hominem Stichum, out decem aureos, dare spondes ; deinde alterum petat, veluti hominem tantum, ant decem aureos tantum. Ideo autem plus petere intelligitur, quia in eo genere stipulationis prcmissoris est electio, utrum pecuniam, an hominem, solvere malit: qui igitur pecuniam tantum, vel ho
or a greater share than he is entitled to. In respect to time. as when the plaintiff makes his demand before the day of payment, or before the time of the performance of a condition; for, as he, who does not pay so soon as he ought, is always understood to pay less than he ought, so, by parity of reasoning, whoever sues prematurely demands more than his due. In respect to place; as when any person requires that something stipulated to be delivered at a certain place, should be delivered at some other place, without noticing the place originally stipulated; as if Titius, should stipulate in these words; do you promise to give such a particular thing at Ephesus? and should afierwards declare upon a contract to deliver at Rome; for Titius would thus be understood to demand more than his due, by endeavouring to deprive his debtor of the advantage he might have had in paying or delivering at Ephesus. It is on this account, that an arbitrary action is given to him, who would demand payment in a place different from that agreed upon; for, in that action, the advantage, which might have accrued to the debtor, by paying his debt in the place stipulated, is taken into consideration. This advantage is generally found the greatest in merchandise; as in wine, oil, corn, &c. which, in different places, bear different prices; and, indeed, money itself is not lent everywhere at the same interest. But, if a man would minem tantnm, sibi dari oportere intendit, cripit clcctionem advcrsario, ct eo modo suam quidcm conditionem mcliorcm facit, adversarii vero sui detcriorcm. Qua de causa talis in ea re prodita est actio, ut quis intendat homincm Stichum aut aureos decem sibi dari oportere, id est, ut eodein niodo peteret, quo stipulatus est. Praeterea, si quis generalitcr hominem stipulatus sit, et specialitcr Stichum petat: autgeneraliter vinum stipulatus sit, etspecialiter campanum petat; aut generalitcr purpurani stipulatus sit, deinde specialitcr Tyriam petat; plus petere intelligitur, quia electionem adversario tollit cui stipulationis jure liberum fuit aliud solvere, quam quod peteretur. Quiuetiam licet villisimum sit, quod quis petat; nihilominus plus petere intelligitur; quia sxpi accidit, ut promissori facilius sit allud solvere, quod majoris prctii est. Sed haec quidem antea in usu fuerant: postea vero lex Zenoniana, et nostra, rem conrctavit. Et, si quidem tempore plus fuerit petitum, quid statui oporteat, Zenonis divae memoriae loquitur constitutio. Sin autem quantitate, vel alio modo, plus fuerit petitum, in omne, si quod forte damnum ex hac causa accident ei, con
sue the performance of a stipulation at Ephesus, or at any other place, where it was agreed, that it should be performed, he may legally commence his suit by a pure action, that is without mentioning the place; and this the prator allows of, inasmuch as the debtor does not lose any advantage. Next to him, who demands more than his due, in regard to place, is he, who demands more than his due, in regard to the cause; as for instance, if Titius stipulate thus with you: do you promise to give either your slave Stichus or ten uurei ? and then demand either the slave specially, or the money specially; in this case Titius would be adjudged to have demanded more. than his due, the right of election being in you by whom the promise was made; and therefore, when Titius sues either for the money specially, or for the slave, he takes away your election, and betters his own condition, by making yours worse: and it is upon this account that an action has been given, by which the party agent or plaintiff may make his demand conformable to the stipulation, and claim either the slave or the money. And further, if a man should stipulate, generally, that wine, purple or a