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bebat, cum multis divisionibus, in actionem ex stipulatu, quæ de dotibus exigendis proponitur, transtulerimus, merito rei uxoria actione sublata, ex stipulatu actio, quæ pro ca introducta est, naturam bonæ fidei judicii tantum in exactione dotis meruit, ut bonæ fidei sit; sed et tacitam ei dedimus hypothecam. Præferri autem aliis creditoribus in hypothecis tunc censuimus, cum ipsa mulier de dote suâ experiatur, cujus solius providentiâ hoc induxi

mus.

tion to be more full and advantageous, we abrogated the action rei uxoria, and transferred all its effects, with the addition of many other powers, to the action of stipu lation given to recover marriage portions, we then not only thought, that this action of stipulation, as far as it related to marriage portions, deserved to be numbered with actions of good faith, but we also added to it by implication, the effect of a mortgage and we judged it proper, that women, in whose sole behalf we have thus ordained, should be preferred to all other creditors by mortgage, whenever they themselves sue for their marriage portions.

De potestate judicis in judicio bonæ fidei, et de compensationibus.

XXX. In bonæ fidei judiciis, $30. In all actions of good faith libera potestas permitti videtur ju- a full power is given to the judge of dici ex bono et æquo æstimandi, calculating, according to the rules quantum actori restitui debeat. In of justice and equity, how much quo et illud continetur, ut, si quid ought to be restored to be plaintiff'; invicem præstare actorem oporteat, and of course, when the plaintiff is eo compensato, in reliquum is, cum found to be indebted to the defendquo actum est, debeat condemnari. ant in a less sum, it is in the power Sed et in stricti juris judiciis ex of the judge to allow a compensarescripto divi Marci, opposita doli tion, and to condemn the defendant mali exceptione, compensatio indu- in the payment of the difference; and, even in actions of strict right, the emperor Marcus introduced a compensation by opposing an exception of fraud: but we have extended compensations much farther by our constitution, when the debt of the defendant is evident; so that actions of strict right, real, personal, or of whatever kind may be dimin

cebatur.

Sed nostra constitutio easdem compensationes, quæ jure aperto nituntur, latius introduxit, ut actiones ipso jure minuant, sivè in rem, sivè in personam, sivè alias quascunque; exceptâ solâ depositi actione, cui, aliquid compensationis nomine opponi, sanè iniquum esse credimus; ne, sub prætextu com

pensationis, depositarum rerum quis exactione defraudetur.

ished by compensation; except only an action of deposit, against which we have not judged it proper to permit any compensation to be alleged, lest the pretence of compensation should give color and encouragement ot fraud.

De actionibus arbitrariis.

XXXI. Præterea, actiones quasdam arbitrarias, id est, ex arbitrio judicis pendentes, appellamus; in quibus nisi arbitrio judicis is, cum quo agitur, actori satisfaciat, veluti rem restituat, vel exhibeat, vel solvat, vel ex noxali causâ servum dedat, condemnari debeat. Sed istæ actiones tam in rem, quam, in personam, inveniuntur; in rem; veluti Publiciana, Serviana de rebus coloni, quasi Serviana, quæ ctiam hypothecaria vocatur; in personam; veluti quibus de eo agitur, quod vi aut metus causâ, aut dolo malo, factum est; item cum id, quod certo loco promissum est, pctitur ad exhibendum quoque acto ex arbitrio judicis pendet. In his enim actionibus, et cæteris similibus, permittitur judici ex bono et æquo, secundùm cujusque rei, de quâ actum est, naturam, æstimare, quemadmodum actori satisfieri oporteat.

31. Some actions moreover we call arbitrary, as depending upon the discretion of the judge: for, in these, if the party do not at the decree of the court, exhibit whatever is required, restore the thing in litigation, pay the value of it, or give up a slave in consequence of an action of mal-feasance, he ought to be condemned. Of these arbitrary actions some are real and some personal: real, as the action Publiciana, Serviana, and quasi Serviana, which is likewise called hypothecary: others are personal, as those, by which a suit is commenced on account of something done by force, fear or fraud; or on account of something, which was promised to be paid or restored in a certain place; and the action ad exhibendum, which was given to the intent, that something particular should be exhibited, is also of the same kind: in these and the like actions, the judge may determine, according to equity and the nature of the thing sued for, in what manner and proportion the plaintiff ought to receive satisfaction.

Quinta divisio, de incertæ quantitatis petitionc.

XXXII. Curare autem debet 32. A judge ought, as much judex, ut omninò, quantum possi- as possible, so to frame his sentence,

bile ei sit, certæ pecuniæ vel rei sententiam ferat; etiamsi de incertâ quantitate apud eum actum est.

that it may be given for a thing or sum certain; although the claim, upon which the sentence is founded, may be for an incertain sum or quantity.

De pluris petitione.

§ XXXIII. Si quis agens intentione suâ plus complexus fuerit, quam ad eum pertineat, causâ cadebat, id est, rem amittebat; nec facilè in integrum restituebatur à prætore, nisi minor erat xxv annis; huic enim, sicut in aliis causis, causâ cognitâ, succurrebatur, si lapsus juventute fuerat; ita et in hac causâ succurri solitum erat. Sanè, si tam magna causa justi erroris interveniebat, ut etiam constantissimus quisque labi posset, etiam majori xxv annis succurrebatur; veluti si quis totum legatum petierit, post deinde prolati fuerint codicilli, quibus aut pars legati adempta sit, aut quibusdam aliis legata data. sint; quæ efficiebant, ut plus petiisse videretur petitor, quam dodrantem; atque ideò lege Falcidiâ legata minuebantur. Plus autem quatuor modis petitur; re, tempore, loco, et causâ. Re, veluti si quis pro decem aureis, quæ ei debebantur, viginti petierit; aut si is, cujus ex parte res est, totam eam, vel majorem partem, suam csse intenderit. Tempore, veluti si quis ante. diem vel ante conditionem petierit: qua enim ratione qui tardius solvit, quam solvere deberet, minus solvere intelligitur, eâdem ratione, qui præmaturè petit, plus petere vide

33. Formerly, if a plaintiff claimed more than his due, he failed in his cause; that is, he lost his debt: nor was it easy for him to be reinstated by the prætor, unless he was under the age of 25 years: for in this, as well as in other cases, it was usual to aid minors, if it appeared that the error was owing to their youth; and if the error was such, that a skilful person might have been led into it, then even persons of full age might have been aided by the magistrate: for example, if a legatee had demanded his whole. legacy, and codicils were afterwards (unexpectedly) produced, by which a part of it was revoked, or new legacies bequeathed to other persons, so that the plaintiff appeared to have demanded more than three fourths of his legacy; because it was subject to a diminution by the law falcidia; yet, in such case, the legatee would be relieved. A man may demand more than what is due to him in four several respects, viz. in respect to the thing itself; to time; to place; and to the cause. In respect to the thing; as when the plaintiff, instead of ten aurei, due to him, demands twenty or if, when he owns but part of some particular thing, he claims the whole

tur. Loco plus petitur, veluti cum quis id, quod certo loco sibi dari stipulatus est, alio loco petit sin commemoratione illius loci, in quo sibi dari stipulatus est; verba gratiâ, si is, qui ita stipulatus fuerit, Ephesi dare spondes; Romæ purè intendat, sibi dari oportere. Ideò autem plus petere intelligitur, quia utilitatem, quam haberet promissor, si Ephesi solveret, adimit ei pura intentione: propter quam causam alio loco petenti. arbitraria actio proponitur; in qua scilicet ratio habetur utilitatis, quæ promissori com. petitura fuisset, si illo loco solveret, qua se soluturum spopondit. Quæ ulilitas plerumque in mercibus maxima invenitur; veluti vino, oleo, frumento, quæ per singulas regiones diversa habent pretia. Sed et pecuniæ numeratæ non in omnibus regionibus sub iisdem usuris fœnerantur. Si quis tamen Ephesi petat, id est, eo loco petat, in quo, ut sibi detur, stipulatus est, purâ actione rectè agit: idque etiam prætor demonstrat; scilicet, quia utilitas solvendi, salva est promissori. Huic autem, qui loco plus petere intelligitur, proximus est, qui causâ plus petit: ut ecce, si quis ita à te stipuletur, hominem Stichum, aut decem aureos, dare spondes; deinde alterum petat, veluti hominem tantum, aut decem aureos tantum. Ideò autem plus petere intelligitur, quia in eo genere stipulationis promissoris est electio, utrum pecuniam, an hominem, solvere malit: qui igitur pecuniam tantum, vel ho

or a greater share than he is entitled to. In respect to time, as when the plaintiff makes his demand before the day of payment, or before the time of the performance of a condition; for, as he, who does not pay so soon as he ought, is always understood to pay less than he ought, so, by parity of reasoning, whoever sues prematurely demands more than his due. In respect to place; as when any person requires that something stipulated to be delivered at a certain place, should be delivered at some other place, without noticing the place originally stipulated; as if Titius, should stipulate in these words; do you promise to give such a particular thing at Ephesus? and should afterwards declare upon a contract to deliver at Rome; for Titius would thus be understood to demand more than his due, by endeavouring to deprive his debtor of the advantage he might have had in paying or delivering at Ephesus. It is on this account, that an arbitrary action is given to him, who would demand payment in a place different from that agreed upon; for, in that action, the advantage, which might have accrued to the debtor, by paying his debt in the place stipulated, is taken into consideration. This advantage is generally found the greatest in merchandise; as in wine, oil, corn, &c. which, in different places, bear different prices; and, indeed, money itself is not lent everywhere at the same interest. But, if a man would

minem tantum, sibi dari oportere intendit, eripit electionem adversario, et eo modo suam quidem conditionem meliorem facit, adversarii verò sui deteriorem. Quâ de causâ talis in eâ re prodita est actio, ut quis intendat hominem Stichum aut aureos decem sibi dari oportere, id est, ut eodem modo peteret, quo stipulatus est. Præterea, si quis generaliter hominem stipulatus sit, et specialiter Stichum petat: aut generaliter vinum stipulatus sit, et specialiter campanum petat; aut generaliter purpuram stipulatus sit, deinde specialiter Tyriam petat; plus petere intelligitur, quia electionem adversario tollit cui stipulationis jure liberum fuit aliud solvere, quam quod peteretur. Quinetiam licèt villisimum sit, quod quis petat; nihilominus plus petere intelligitur; quia sæpè accidit, ut promissori facilius sit allud solvere, quod majoris pretii est. Sed hæc quidem antea in usu fuerant: postea vero lex Zenoniana, et nostra, rem coarctavit. Et, si quidem tempore plus fuerit petitum, quid statui oporteat, Zenonis divæ memoriæ loquitur constitutio. Sin autem quantitate, vel alio modo, plus fuerit petitum, in omne, si quod fortè damnum ex hac causa acciderit ei, con

sue the performance of a stipulation at Ephesus, or at any other place, where it was agreed, that it should be performed, he may legally commence his suit by a pure action, that is without mentioning the place; and this the prætor allows of, inasmuch as the debtor does not lose any advantage. Next to him, who demands more than his due, in regard to place, is he, who demands more than his due, in regard to the cause; as for instance, if Titius stipulate thus with you: do you promise to give either your slave Stichus or ten aurei? and then demand either the slave specially, or the money specially; in this case Titius would be adjudged to have demanded more. than his due, the right of election. being in you by whom the promise was made; and therefore, when Titius sues either for the money specially, or for the slave, he takes away your election, and betters his own condition, by making yours worse and it is upon this account that an action has been given, by which the party agent or plaintiff may make his demand conformable to the stipulation, and claim either the slave or the money. And further, if a man should stipulate, generally, that wine, purple or a

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