tion against France, from an alliance with which power it was evident the emperor Alexander had not been able to detach Spain. Towards the end of February, a Danish vessel, which arrived at the Cape, brought English newspapers, giving an account of the fate of the Austrian army. sary for me again to urge to this hon. court, that on my leaving England, I sailed under the strongest conviction, that after having succeeded in taking the Cape, nothing would contribute so effectually to accomplish the views of those minis. ters, by whom I had been entrusted with the command,as to strike a blow in South America, before the Spaniards should be prepared against it. In fact, as there was a necessity for the squadron under my command to touch at St. Salvadore for water, on its passage from England to the Cape, it was naturally to be apprehended, from the constant communication between St. Salvadore and the Rio de la Plata, that every information respecting the naval and military force of the armament would be transmitted to the governors of Monte Video and Buenos Ayres. Therefore, under every view of the subject, it was most advisable not to defer the attack on the Spanish possessions. Urgent, however, as these considerations may appear, they were not sufficiently powerful to fix my attention altogether on the immediate exccution of the project referred to. Various circumstances remained to be weigh ed and examined, but none more particularly than the original cause of delay stated by Mr. Pitt, namely, the anxiety of the emperor of Russia to attach Spain to the coalition_what I conceived was the most like. forming on the continent of Europe at the time I sailed from England. Early in February 1806, 1 receiTed accounts of the termination of the war in India. In the course of the same mouth I also received the news of lord Nelson's glorious victory off Trafalgar, and the account of a general coali By the capture of the Volontaire French frigate, on the 4th of March, I learnt the defeat of the Russian army at Austerlitz; that Bonaparte was in possession of Vienna; and that when Willaumez's squadron sailed from Brest, he left in that port no more than six ships of war, of which three only were fit for ser. vice. From a German officer, who was taken prisoner in the Volon. taire, I also collected such presumptive evidence respecting the ulterior destination of Willaumez's squa. dron, as induced me to adopt the idea that, after cruizing a certain time on the banks of Languilles, he would put into the Brazils for water and refreshments, and thence proceed to the West Indies, more especially after he should have been informed that the Cape was actually taken by the British forces. Indeed, so strongly did this presumption operate on my mind, that I dis patched a small copper-bottomed transport brig to admiral Cochrane, at Barbadoes, to apprise him of ly course to be pursued by Willau. mez, as will appear by my letter to Mr. Marsden, dated I also dispatched the Protector gun-brig to sir Edward Pellew, in India, and the Rolla brig, to endea. vour to fall in with whatever British squadron might be employed in the blockade of the Mauritius. These These measures of precaution evince to the hon. court my extreme anxiety to communicate to the commander-in-chief of his majesty's naval forces in every quarter of the globe, and on every station liable to attack from the enemy's flying squadrons, such intelligence as might enable them to intercept those squadrons, or to act on the defensive, and to afford every protection in their power to the commerce of his majesty's subjects. I am charged too with having left the Cape exposed to attack and insult. On the contrary, I maintain that through the well-known zeal, ability, and judgment of lieutenantgeneral sir David Baird, the Cape of Good Hope was placed in a state of the most perfect security. Besides, at the time when I left the Cape, the winter season was about to commence, during which no ships can lie in Table Bay with safety. Independently of these circumstances, I would ask, how often has the Cape been without a single ship of war to assist in its defence during the time it was in possession of the British forces in the late war, and the flag of the naval commanding officer on the station left flying onboard of a small vessel, scarcely capable of making any resistance? Indeed, in the immediate expectation of the arrival at the Cape of some men of war from England, I left an order, dated the 18th of April, 1806, addressed to any naval officer who might arrive there, and be junior to myself; by which order he or they were at perfect liberty either to remain at the Cape, or to follow me to the Rio de la Plata, as should appear most for the benefit of his majesty's service, after a consultation with sir David Baird on the subject. If I am asked why I was so anxious to leave the Cape in such apparent haste, as not to wait for the arrival of the men of war from England? my answer is simply this; I was fearful that the delay in my depar ture from the Cape, added to the probable length of the passage from that promontory, to the east coast of South America, might defeat the object of the expedition, by retarding my arrival in the Rio de la Plata, until that season, which, from the information I was possessed of respecting the navigation of this river, might render it impossible to sail up high enough to attack either of the settlements of Monte Video or Buenos Ayres. Another point to which I am desirous to call the attention of this hon. court is this, that from the manner in which the secretary of the admiralty replies to my letter of the 9th of April, wherein I apprised that board of my intended departure for the Rio de la Plata, for the purpose of attacking the Spanish possessions, I had a just right to suppose that the admiralty board did not disapprove of my having sailed with the squadron on that service; for certainly it is rational to infer, that some expression of their displeasure would have been inserted in Mr. Marsden's letter, acknowledging the receipt of mine of the date before mentioned. Am I not, therefore, justified, sir, in construing the silence observed on this head, as at least a tacit acknowledgment on the part of that board which has now brought me to trial for having undertaken the expedition against Buenos Ayres, without orders, that it did not then excite their dissatisfaction? 巍 But, in truth, the importance which the admiralty now profess to attach to the Cape, seems extremely singular, when contrasted with the opinions, which, from Mr. Marsden's letter to me, acknow ledging the receipt of my account of its capture, they appeared to entertain of it; indeed, the tame, the cold terms of that letter, would naturally induce an idea either that the admiralty thought the Cape of little value in itself, or that it was of no consequence comparatively with the ultimate object of the expedition. Really estimating the Cape as it deserves, it would be reasonable to infer from the letter, that the admiralty were aware of, and highly prized, that ultimate object; but it is difficult to account for their conduct. When the acquisition was made, not one solitary expression of thanks was pronounced upon those to whom it was owing, and yet I am to be condemned for having exposed that acquisition even to imaginary hazard. The importance of the capture was passed over in silence when I might have been gratified; but it is loudly enhanced when the object is to depress me. Whence this difference, I lcave to your reflections, gentlemen; I leave it to the reflections of my country. My letter of the 9th of April was received by the admiralty-board in June last, and it was not till the end of August that admiral Stirling sailed to supersede me, with an order of recall. If my conduct in having engaged in this enterprise had been really disapproved of by his majesty's ministers, why, on their perusal of my dispatches, was not the admi. ralty-board directed to send out a fast-sailing vessel to signify to me their disapprobation of my conduct in having sailed to attack the enemy without specific orders to that effect, by which means also, the visionary exposure of the Cape would have been of near three months duration? No reason whatever can be assign. ed for their having kept me so long in such a state of anxious suspence, except, indeed, the uncertainty the British cabinet seems to have been in at the time respecting the con duct to be pursued in the event of my enterprise being crowned with success, on account of the negocia tion then pending at Paris.-In truth, sir, it is manifest, from every view of the conduct of the admiraltyboard, that at that time they had no intention whatever to arraign me for this successful exercise of the discre tionary power with which, I main. tain, every commanding officer, on a distant station, is vested, and which he has a right to exert for the good of his country. The supersession, I con. ceive, was meant as the extreme measure of punishment. Indeed, sir, were not our naval and military commanders, employed in foreign service, in distant quar ters, allowed a latitude for the exercise of their discretion, what ill consequences would often arise to his majesty's service? Amongst Numerous precedents exist which fully illustrate the truth of this position, some of which may probably occur to the recollection of the members of the court. others which present themselves to my memory at this moment, I shall beg leave to mention the coup-de-main which put the British crown in pos. session of Gibraltar. Sir George Rooke had no orders for undertaking that bold enterprise, nor was he arraigned by his superiors at home for having exercised his discretion on that occasion: on the contrary, his majesty did every houour to his enterprizing mind. in the American war, in 17—, sir Peter Parker, I believe, and ge. neral Dalling, the then naval and military commanders at Jamaica, concerted an expedition against the Spanish settlement of Omoah, which was to a certain degree successful, No blame, I understand, was attached to either of those officers, for having directed this attack without orders. At the beginning of the late war, in 1793, lord Hood entered Toulon, and afterwards attacked Corsica, without orders, and, I believe, against the opinion of the general, who would not co-operate with him. Yet that admiral was not brought before a court-martial for having so acted; nor was it ever known that his conduct was censured. In 1796, lord St. Vincent (then sir John Jervis sent the heroic lord Nelson to attack Teneriffe, in consequence of information which he received, that two ships had loaded their treasure there. Every person is acquainted with the issue of that expedition, which lost to the country so many brave men, on account of which, notwithstanding the disastrous result of this intended coup-de-main, which was incontestably undertaken without orders from any superior authority, it is certain that no public inquiry was ever instituted against lord St. Vincent; although, if an opinion were to be formed from the event only, without considering the motives of the enterprise, there would perhaps appear sufficient ground on which an accusation might have been expected and supported against that commander. But let the conrt par ticularly look at the letter recently published from that illustrious officer, lord Nelson, to sir Simon Taylor, of Jamaica, relative to his discretion in going from the Mediterranean to the West Indies. These precedents, sir, will clearly prove the existence and toleration of that discretionary power on which I have acted. I have said, sir, that when the admiralty learnt by my letter of the 9th of April, that I had sailed with the squadron under my orders for the Rio de la Plata, that board did not at first apparently disapprove of my conduct; and I think I am borne out in this conclusion by the tenor of Mr. Marsden's letter, acknowledging mine of the date last men. tioned. The letter in question is dated August 6, and is in the following terms: "Sir; I have received and com. municated to my lords commission. ers of the admiralty your letter of the 8th of April last, informing them of your intended proceedings with the squadron under your orders. "I am, &c. MARSDEN." WM. Now, sir, on comparing the preceding letter with a letter from Mr. Marsden, dated the 1st of March, 1806, in answer to one from me, conveying a piece of intelligence, which I cannot but suppose must have been gratifying, the two letters will prove to be written exactly in the same style. The letter of the 1st of March is as follows: "Sir; I have received and laid before my lords commissioners of the admiralty your letter of the 13th of January last, with the several papers therein referred to, telative to the capitulation capitulation of the town and cape of Good Hope. "I am, sir, yours, &c. "WM. MARSDEN." The conclusion which I think every unprejudiced man would draw from the perusal of these two let ters is, that if the admiralty-board did not judge proper to express to me any approbation, not merely of my own conduct, as commander of the naval force employed in the reduction of the Cape, but of that of the officers and seamen who contribated to this conquest, still the board could not well be displeased with it; and that by their secretary having left me also in the dark, or rather to my own conjectures, in his reply to my letter acquainting him of my having sailed with my squadron to the Rio de la Plata, it was equally presumable that the board did not then disapprove of my having proceeded on that expedition —that is, by the tone and character of the two letters, they looked upon the capture of the Cape, and the arrangement for the squadron's sail. ing to Rio de la Plata, precisely in the same point of view, or that one was as likely to meet their approbation, or to prove advantageous to the country, as the other. Sir Home Popham having conclu. ded his defence, which lasted above four hours, the deputy judge-advocate proceeded to call over the names of the witnesses who were summoned to appear at the courtmartial, to give their testimony as to their knowledge of the trans actions and orders, &c. given to sir Home Popham. The witnesses, having answered to their names, were directed to with draw, and wait until their respective @vidence were called for. Lord Melville sworn and examined by sir Home Popham. Q. Will your lordship have the goodness to relate to the court all the circumstances in your recollection, respecting the communications I held with Mr. Pitt and your lordship, collectively and individually, respecting the expedition to South America? A. Some time after I came to the head of the board of admiralty, I had occasion to learn, that the ad. ministration preceding that of which I formed a part, held communications with general Miranda, respecting some project he entertained relative to South America. I did not immediately give much attention to that subject, because, not being then at war with Spain, I did not think that,consistently with that consideration, this country could take any active part in the business. In the progress of the summer of the year 1804, and particularly towards the autumn of that year, I had little doubt, from the official situation I held at the head of the admiralty, and from communications with the heads of other public departments, that such a war would soon take place. I therefore thought it my duty, through sir Evan Nepean and others, who I had reason to think were acquainted with what passed under the former adminis tration, to inform myself more minutely relatively to the views of general Miranda. I likewise had more than one confidential com. munication with general Miranda himself; and the result of my opi nion was, that, although it might not be wise or expedient, or per haps within the means of this country at that time, to commit themselves to the full extent, it was |