of these suppositions, that the second was not realized: they on the contrary conceived some hope, and were encouraged in their re. sistance, by the relaxation of our fire, which was however resumed with so much vigour and effect on the night of the 4th, that the next morning a trumpeter appeared at the British out-posts with a letter from the commandant of the town, containing the proposal of a truce for twenty-four hours, to give time to negotiate a capitulation which he was willing to conclude on the basis of no British troops being admit. ted within the city of Copenhagen. It should seem, however, either that that basis was not at first considered as admissible, or that it was accom. panied by some other objectionable condition: for we find, that the capitulation was not signed until three days afterwards, viz. the 8th of September, when the British army took possession of the citadel, dock-yards, and batteries, depen. dent upon them. The British admiral immediately began rigging and fitting out the ships that filled the spacious basons where they were laid up in ordinary, and at the expiration of the term limited in the capitulation, they were all, together with the stores, timber, and every article of naval equipment, found in the arsenal, and storehouses, conveyed to England, where, with the exception of one line of battle ship, that grounded on the isle of Huen, and was destroyed, they all arrived safely in the last days of the month of October. It was understood that the capitulation was not altogether approved by his majesty's government, and it must be evident to every body, that the officers who concluded it, unless they did so in virtue of spe cific instructions, assumed powers that could belong to no commanders.-By stipulating to withdraw from Zealand in so short a time, they brought no small embarrassment upon their employers, if this expedition was to be considered not as a predatory attack upon an unoffending neutral, but as the first step of a great system of policy, calculated to thwart the views of France, and to maintain the just ascendency of Great Britain; because with a view to the latter pur. pose, the mere possession of the Danish fleet was insufficient to pro. tect the navigation of the English flag, to influence the wavering councils of Russia, and completely to disjoint the confederacy- that was apprehended, and upon the prospect of which, this enterprise was origi. nally undertaken, aud subsequently justified, it would have been neces, sary to keep possession of Zealand, We believe that proposals for so doing, even after the signature of the capitulation, and without vio, lating its conditions, were in agita, tion; but for some reasons that have never been explained, these propo. sals were not acted upon, and whatever was afterwards done, or attempted in that quarter, hore the appearance of a languor and irreso lution, and want of system, which seemed to indicate a change in the policy of our cabinet, or at cast a doubt as to the merits of that which they had hitherto pursued. So far from taking advantage of the con. quest thus easily made of all Zea. land, (the small castle of Cronenbourg alone excepted,) it seems to have been our object to hasten to leave the Danes at liberty to repair their losses, and to annoy us again SI оп on that element from which they seemed, for a time at least, to have been driven. In the capitulation, no notice whatever was taken of the large quantity of shipping and naval stores that were in the merchant's docks: the consequence of which neglect was, that we had scarcely left the waters of Copenhagen, be fore a considerable number of armed vessels was prepared to act against us, and we have been informed that they actually drew up in line of battle, in front of the port of Copenhagen, when admiral Gambier's flag-ship was still in sight of the town. The losses suffered by our commerce, from this newly-created species of Danish naval force, were very considerable, and they were the more sensibly felt, because, under the apprehension of the turn which might be given, during the ensuing winter, to the politics of the court of St. Petersburgh, large purchases of hemp, timber, and other naval stores, had been made; these were sent home in single ships, in the confident expectation of having no danger to fear till they cleared the Categat, or that they would obtain ample protection before they reach. ed the Sound; instead of which, they were for the most part captured by small privateers, from the isle of Bornholm, and those which escaped in that quarter, fell into the hands of the Danes, off Draco Point, where no adequate force had been sta tioned for their protection. It seems to have been the prevailing belief of our government, that they could as easily allay, as they had excited the animosity of the Danish court, and that it was therefore unnecessary to take any precaution to ward off the effects which that animosity might reason ably be expected to produce. We find that Mr. Jackson, as soon as the capitulation was concluded, presented himself at the Danish out-posts, on the isle of Funen, in order to renew a negotiation to which he probably thought that the prince royal might be more inclined by the progress that had been made toward the conquest of his domi. nions. In this, however, he was disappointed, as, although the object of his appearance off Nyeborg, was well known to the prince,' he was not allowed to land; and so strict was the determination of the Danes, to hold as little communica tion as possible with a British agent upon any subject whatever, that it was notified, about that time, to the officer commanding the squadron in the Belt, that he should not in future send his flags of truce within cannon-shot of the shore. Not. withstanding this rebuff, a fresh mission was afterwards sent to renew the attempt at negotiation, but with as little success. Mr. Merry, who was employed for this purpose, not having been able any more than his predecessor to draw the Danish government into any sort of intercourse with him. As soon as the effect of the operation of our forces was known in England, a declaration was publish ed by his majesty's government, setting forth the grounds on which the expedition was undertaken, and the sentiments which were still entertained towards Denmark, by his majesty. This declaration was af terwards laid before partiament, and became the ground-work of the defence set up by ministers when attacked, as they were most vigorously, on the policy of the whole undertaking. We refer our rea ders ders to the debates upon this sub. ject, which will be found in their proper place, where the sentiments and feelings of the different parties are sufficiently developed. As for ourselves, having thus far been satished with the narration of the historical facts, which we think worthy of being recorded, we shall, in conclusion of this chapter, submit the few following observations, which being divested of all party spirit, and personal bias of any descrip. tion, will, we think, be found applicable to the subject, and conduce to the transmitting it to posterity in its true light. It has always appeared to us, as we have before intimated, that in treating this subject, too much pains have been taken to prove the intention of Buonaparte to force Denmark, and, through that country and Russia, our ally Sweden, to enter into a grand Northern confe. deracy against England. More stress has perhaps been laid upon this point, because in the declaration issued by his majesty's ministers, it was asserted that specific information had been received to that effect, and it was probably thought by the opponents of ministers in parliament, that by calling upon them to produce this information, either an impression unfavourable to them might be made, if it was not forthcoming, or that some flaw might be found in it if it was, by which the policy of the undertaking might be invalidated. The information, although repeatedly called for, was not laid before parliament, from whence it was, as might be expected, inferred that none had been received that would appear satis. factory to the public. At other times it was urged in debate, that it was immaterial to ascertain the designs of the enemy; that they must be obvious, and must of ne cessity tend to whatever was detri. mental to the interests of Great Britain; but that on his means of executing them, must be determined the justice or injustice of our proceedings. Joining issue on this latter point, some of the friends of ministers admitted, that the notoriety of the case was sufficient, and that no argument or information need be produced to shew that Buonaparte would, if he could, enlist in his cause, even by force, if necessary, all the powers of Eu. rope who yet remained neutral. Now to us it seems, that these two different statements are by no means irreconcileable one with the other, and consequently that some little inconsistency is involved in the argument that is built upon one of them. If the notoriety of the enemy's intentions were such as to be considered, and that by no mean judges, as indisputable, and by some, even as a suficient ground for the whole proceeding, how could it by possibility happen that that notoriety should escape the notice of ministers, whose province it more especially is to keep a watchful eye to whatever affects the interests of the country? If this notoriety were so obvious, it could scarcely happen but that ministers would receive through some of their offi. cial and secret agents on the conti nent, specific information as to the time and mode of the enemy's car. rying his schemes into effect. It would indeed be no small imputation upon the activity and address of those agents to suppose that they had not been attentive to the state of affairs in the North, as described in seem even extraordinary if some such information as announced by ministers, had not been in fact received by them; and with the knowledge they possessed of the sentiments and feelings of the Danish government, that information could hardly be thought to be with. out sufficient foundation. As to the nature and extent of it, and the expediency of making it public, we can only say that that is a question which must of necessity be left to the decision of the executive government. Our own opinion, upon this point, leads us to add that we have to complain rather of too much than too little disposition on the part of ministers to communicate to parliament the details of their transactions with foreign powers. We believe that too much facility in this respect has been shewn on for. mer occasions; we are sure that an impression exists on the continent upon this subject, highly unfavour. able to that confidential intercourse which it must be our wish to cultivate with different courts of Eu. rope. We conceive then that the intention of Buonaparte, being in unison with his interest, pointed immedi. ately to the junction of the Danish forces to his own, in hostility to these kingdoms; and that, of the execution of this intention, there could be no other doubt than that which attended its practicability, of which, we shall presently say a few words. But if there could remain, in the mind of any politician, the smallest difficulty in acquiescing in this proposition, it surely must be removed by the overtures, that were made to the prince regent of Por tugal, and which he had the fairness to communicate to the British government. In these the adhesion of Denmark to the French system, was announced both as the means, and as a motive for obtaining that of Portugal, and to both countries it was notified that measures must be immediately taken to exclude the British flag and manufactures from their respective ports. These overtures were with equal good faith and propriety, made known by the Portuguese government to that of England, as soon as they were recei ved; and as there is strong reason to believe, that they were simulta neously made to the court of Denmark, the concealment of them, by that court, furnishes of itself no slight ground for suspecting that her disposition towards England, par. took of much of the hostility in which they originated. This we perceive has likewise been abun dantly manifested in the sundry overt acts specified at the beginning of this chapter: but with that class of our readers who might be dis posed to dissent from this opinion, it will be necessary to argue the question under another point of view. Admitting, say they, as a matter of course, the designs of Buonaparte, but denying that Denmark would have acquiesced in them, we maintain that he had not the means of perpetrating them against against their consent. Thus the matter is made to depend, not upon the more or less friendly disposition of Denmark, but upon the degree of strength or weakness by which she would, or would not have been able to defend her inde. pendence. Now, under this head, we consider it as most essential to a right and practical understanding of the subject, to make a distinction between the physical and the moral weakness that was likely to ac. tuate the prince royal. As to the Arst, we may adduce, if our infor. mation be not very incorrect, the admission of his royal highness himself, and of his minister count Bernstorff, that they were altoge. ther unable to prevent the French from gaining immediate possession of Holstein, Sleswig, and Jutland. Whether this would have led, as an immediate consequence, to the equally certain occupation by the demy of Funen and Zealand, may furuish matter of speculation to miitary men. From an inspection of the map of the peninsula, and from a consideration of the stations of the respective armies, and their distance from the chief points of enerkation, we are led to believe that the principa', if not the only obstacle which the French would have met with in such an attempt, would be the presence of the English squadrons in the Belt. They could certainly have ̧ reached, from the line which they occupied between Hamburg and Lubeck, the orts of Newstadt, Kiel, Flens. borg, and Apenrade, before the Danes; and as there was no military force whatever stationed in Funen, not even a garrison in the small fortress of Nyeborg, and very few, if any troops in Zealand, except the garrisons of Copenhagen, and Cronburg, they would have had possession of all the craft for their conveyance along the eastern coast of the peninsula, and could have met with no resistance when they reach. ed the opposite shores of Funen and Zealand. But we are inclined not to rely altogether upon this topic, because we consider the other included in the distinction abovementioned, as quite conclu sive. Whoever is in the least acquainted with the politics of the Danish court, must know the importance attached by the present government of that country, to its German provinces, and must also know how great an influence over its whole proceedings would accrue to any foreign power that had obtained possession of them. He must know how very little chance there would be, when the French were masters of those provinces, that the prince royal would hesitate to accede, for the sake of recovering them, to whatever measures of hostility against Great Britain might be required of him. We have a ready and a very striking elucidation of this point, in the fact that when he was himself stationed in those provinces, at the head of the flower of his army, he, in the vain hope of securing them from foreign occupation, gave up to certain con. quest every other part of his dominions, the commerce and the navi gation of his subjects, in short, all the known sources of their pro. sperity, and of the subsistence of a large portion of them This in fact was the consequence that forth. with ensued; and it cannot be doubted that if the policy which suggested the enterprise against Copenhagen had been continued as |