Although Denmark was the organ through which these remonstrances reached the British court, it is not to be doubted that they originated in French councils, and that they were advised by France, as a means of forcing England to recede from her public measures, or of embar. rassing her in the execution of them. Other steps soon after taken by Denmark, demonstrate beyond all possibility of doubt, the existence of such an iufluence. The official documents of the Danish government on the foregoing subject, had not been long received, when others were presented, upon a topick the very discussion of which would appear to be incom. patible with the continuance of a friendly intercourse between the two countries. The epistolary correspondence still carried on between Great Britain and Denmark, as between countries at peace, and between the former and other continental states, had long been an object of jealousy and dissatisfac. tion to Buonaparte. The British packet-boats still arrived at Tonningen, delivered there the London mails for Denmark, and for other parts of Europe; and English messengers were sent as far and as often as was thought requisite, in the same directions. Although the French bureau d'espionage may have occasionally benefited by this intercourse, yet the desire of cutting off all our communication with the continent was thought to overba. lance this advantage; and Denmark was instructed to propose, that our packet-boats should no longer resort to the ports of Holstein or Sleswig; and that we should, by acquiescing in their exclusion, have the appearance of enabling Den

mark to concede a point to Buona. parte, at which he was so much disposed to take umbrage. This was, at first, brought forward as a plan of amicable arrangement, by which Great Britain could, without injury or inconvenience to herself, disembarrass Denmark from the importunities and threats of the French government. The proposal was afterwards maintained with more or less animation, according as hopes were entertained of the British government acceding to it: it was, however, rejected by that government; and served only to shew the obsequiousness with which, in every even the minutest particular, the court of Denmark was disposed to further the desigus of France. There were not, however, wanting other co-existing indications of the malignity of those designs to wards Denmark herself; and the sort of infatuation with which they, as well as every other means of intimi dation employed against her, were overlooked, have convicted her government, if not of being wilful accomplices in Buonaparte's nefa. rious practices, at least of such weakness and submissiveness to his will, as must of necessity produce consequences equally pernicious to Denmark herself, and to the general welfare of Great Britain and her allies. The manner in which the French decree of the 21st of November was notified to the Danish court, conveyed a sufficient notice of the light in which that decree was to be regarded, and of the authoritative style in which it was meant to be enforced. The French chargé d'affaires at Copenhagen, not satisfied with the accustomary channels of official communication, repaired to Kiel, to make known

his master's will to the prince royal himself, or to his principal minister. With what other threats this intimation was accompanied, or how far the French agent was satisfied with the reception he and his proposal met with at Kiel, may be best collected from the terms in which his master soon after mentioned the subject. In one of the bulletins, published from his head-quarters, in giving an account of the intended operation of his decree, he says, "peut-être le blocus du Continent ne sera-t-il plus un vain mot." This surely was an indication that he had not been altogether unsuccessful in his application to the prince royal. If, however, this supposition be in any degree con. tradicted or discountenanced by the language he, about the same time, held at the head-quarters at Posen, we find in that language abundant motives to revert to the other alternative, viz. that Denmark was manifesting a very weak, if not a very wil. ling submission to his dictates. The town of Hamburg, where this same decree of the 21st of November appears to have been better under. stood, and to have excited conse. quently rather more apprehension, than at Copenhagen and Kiel, thought it advisable to send a de. putation of its senate to Buona. parte, in the faint and delusive hope of persuading him to withdraw a decree, which must be fatal to the commerce, and consequently to the independent existence of their town. These deputies were received (with what urbanity the world knows) at the French head-quarters, then established at Posen in West Prussia. Their having dared even to think of altering the resolves of the autocrat, had excited, in no small

degree, his displeasure, which was announced in gestures as well as expressions. Of granting their re. quest, he evidently did not enter. tain an idea; on the contrary, he avails himself of the occasion, as a fit one to frighten all other powers from hazarding a similar intervention, and in particular, he ad. dresses a direct and most intelligible menace to the prince royal of Denmark. It was, perhaps, diffi cult to speak to the deputies of the commercial intercourse of Ham. burg, without some allusion to the neighbouring towns of Altona and Gluckstadt, and to the commerce which Great Britain carried on in those, as well as other ports of the Danish provinces. He, therefore, specifically mentions the conducs of the prince royal, and, in a tone of the most despotic arrogance, adds

"Let that little prince take care of himself." The conclusion we should naturally draw from this expression, is, (in contradiction to his preceding oracular delivery,) that he was not yet satisfied with the conduct of Denmark; that he exacted still farther submission to his will than she had yet shewn; that nothing short of the absolute surrender of her independence would saturate his ambition. But if this be the interpretation which an impartial observer of events, which a wellwisher of the fair fame and political correctness of the Danish government would desire to put upon the transaction; if it is to be recorded, as the unbiassed historian would sincerely wish, that Denmark was not the accomplice, but the victim of his domineering ambition; in what manner, let us ask, can the government of that country justify to its injured sub

jects,

jects, the concealment from them of the abyss in which they were about to be precipitated?

We have related circumstances which indicate a willing mind in the obsequiousness of Denmark. The anecdote last-mentioned can be taken only in an opposite sense: in the sense most consonant to the professions of the Danish ministry. In adding to it the fact, which seems to form the climax of French treachery and audacity, as well as that of Danish weakness, we must admit that there is, upon the whole, more appearance of Denmark having been intimidated by Buonaparte into a conduct which good policy would disavow, than of her having become a willing instrument of his ambition. Upon a fair and impartial balance of the account, this, we say, is the impression that remains upon our minds. The following is the fact which has had a great effect in producing this impression, and we submit it accordingly to our readers.

Count Moerner, a Swedish officer of distinction, had been made prisoner at Travemunde, the sea-port of Lubeck, after and in consequence of the assault of that town by general Murat, and the surrender of the Prussian corps under general Blucher. No sooner were these events accomplished, than Murat made overtures to M. de Moerner, for the purpose of in veigling his Swedish majesty into a peace, and of detaching him by an offer of territorial aggrandisement from his allies. The bait employed on this occasion, was no less than the whole kingdom of Norway, a tempting one it must be acknowledged, if honour were a market. able commodity, and could be bar

The

tered for a few provinces. king of Sweden was, at all events. an unfit personage to whom to address such a proposal. The use he made of it, affords a worthy cha racteristic of his whole reign. He immediately communicated it to the court of Denmark, and made, at the same time, an offer of a corps of auxiliaries, to assist the Danish government in maintaining its independence, should that, in conse quence of its just resentment of this transaction, be threatened or encroached upon. Was not this a warning sufficiently awful and suf ficient to arouse the most inert ? Did Denmark take any precautions in consequence of it? And if she did not, is it not going to the uttermost verge of candor, to admit that she, with an unwilling mind, acted in obsequious subserviency to the views of Buonaparte?

Such a state of things led necessarily to feelings between the British and Danish governments, at times unfriendly, at times, also, to angry sensations. These had been foment. ed by the recollection of Denmark's conduct in 1805, when, at the moment of a coalition being formed against France, she openly threw what litt e weight of influence she then possessed, into the scale of that country. The French troops were withdrawn from the frontier of Holstein, to fight the Austrians on the Danube; there could be no other than the troops of the coalesced powers, of whom apprehensions could be said to be entertained, and yet the prince royal chose that moment for assembling his army on the borders of Lower Saxony.

In the many public discussions which this subject has undergone, too much time has, we think, been

employed

employed in proving the existence of Buonaparte's designs upon Denmark. What appears to us to be much more material to establish, is the inability or unwillingness of Denmark to resist them. Upon one of these points, we have the confession of the Danish govern. ment themselves, that they had not the means of resisting; that it would consequently have been folly to attempt it. We have, moreover, the facts notorious to every one, that no such attempt or preparation for it was ever made, even at the moment when the menaces of France were the most loud, and her means of executing them ac cumulated in the greatest and most impending force. But independently of these circumstances, which arose from the situation and con. duct of Denmark, there were others of a more extensive origin, which, however, converged all to the same point, and must have had a very decisive influence upon the ques. tion, which the British government found itself called upon to resolve.

Early in the present year, there had appeared symptoms of wavering and discontent on the part of the Russian cabinet. It is, indeed, true, that even subsequently to the period to which this observation applies, the personal conduct of the, emperor of Russia was such, as to weaken the distrust of him which those symptoms were calculated to suggest. He is even said to have committed himself spontaneously, and by the most solemn written assurances, to adhere faithfully to the cause in which he was engaged, and to allow no circumstances of distress, no reverse of fortune, to shake his resolution. Nevertheless, to an attentive and close observer,

there were fit subjects of uneasiness on this head. The principal amongst them, was the appointment of a minister for foreign affairs, in the person of count Romanzow, well known to be hostile to this country. The immediate conse quence of this appointment was, that the negotiation which had been some time pending between the two countries, for a renewal of the ex. pired commercial treaty, experienced unnecessary delays; the Bri. tish agents at the Russian court were treated with unaccustomed coolness and reserve; and frequent, although, at first, cautious communications were observed to pass be tween the commanders of the Rus sian and French armies, and soon afterwards between other agents of those governments. The battle of Friedland gave maturity to these beginnings of Russian secession from the common cause. It led to a treaty of peace, the offspring of consummate knavery and address on one side, and of the most puerile imbecility of a timid mind on the other. It produced the weak and insulting offer of mediation to Great Britain, which gave a character to the whole transaction, and shewed, beyond doubt, what other circumstances, and very authentic infor mation, went to establish, viz. that it was a question of nothing less than a combination of all the northern powers in one general league, to further the ambitious views of Buonaparte against the interests, the prosperity, and even the existence of Great Britain, as a great naval and commercial power. The character and conduct of the French agents and generals on the Danish frontier, added strength to this belief. The former openly announced

the

and the latter indicated a ready determination to carry those intentions into effect, by marching and countermarching their troops in the way and directions most calculated to excite alarm.

Such was the state of things, when the British government, ha ving kept an attentive eye upon the transactions which led to it, deter. mined to send to sea a powerful military and naval armament, consisting of about 20,000 men, and a fleet of 27 sail of the line, and vessels of all other descriptions, to the number of near ninety pendants. But such had been the secrecy at tending these preparations, that the whole force was nearly ready for ea, before the extent of it was known to the public, and it had actually left the ports of England many days before its destination was even suspected. A division of the fleet, under the immediate direction of commodore Keats, was detached to the Great Belt, with instructions to allow no military force whatever to enter Zealand. That enterprising and judicious officer led his line of battle ships through a little known and intricate navigation, without the smallest accident, and stationed his whole squadron in such a manner, as that, by the vessels being within telegraph distance of each other, nothing could attempt to pass them without a certainty of interception. The communication was entirely cut off between Zealand, the adja. cent isle of Funen, and the main land of Holstein, Sleswig, and Jut. land. No troops from any of the latter could pass into Zealand, which was thus placed, as to any military succour, in a complete VOL. XLIX.

humane precaution, calculated at once to ensure the success of our enterprise, and to render it as bloodless as possible, if it should be ultimately necessary to have recourse to arms. The British army accompanied the main body of the fleet to the Sound, where it was reinforced by the troops that had been for some time employed at Stralsund and the isle of Rügen, as auxiliaries to the king of Sweden. Lord Cathcart, who was with those troops, was appointed to the chief command of the whole land force. Admiral Gambier, one of the lords of the admiralty, commanded the fleet.

Hitherto the warlike preparations of our government appear as the most prominent feature of this undertaking. Much of its success was indeed expected to be derived from them; but it was, at the same time, understood, that with the exception of the abovementioned eventual and precautionary order, to obstruct the passage of any troops across the Belt, the whole of our armament was to remain, in the first instance, inactive. No offen sive operations were to be undertaken, until the result of a nego tiation was known, which was, at the same time, to be opened with the court of Denmark, in order to obtain, without hostility, and by an arrangement equally advantageous to both countries, the object which was considered of paramount importance to Great Britain.

To conduct this negotiation, his majesty's ministers selected Mr. Jackson, who had, for several preceding years, resided at the court of Berlin, as envoy from this coun try, and who was supposed to have.