port in both Houses, by their weight, their talents, and their suffrages, whatever their duty to their country, or to their immediate constituents, might seem to require.

But the most seducing topic with the vulgar, and with some also in Ireland of a higher class, who possess a stronger sense than understanding of national dignity and honour, has been the independence of their country. This is represented as so inseparably connected with the parliament they now enjoy, that when the mode of their legislation shall be changed, and they shall cease to have this parliament exclusively their own, they imagine the nation must cease to be independent, and that they will become a debased and degraded people. Sir, when such a change as is proposed is considered as a degradation and debasement, it certainly must arise from some confusion in the ideas annexed to those words. If Ireland and its parliament shall be incorporated with the British nation and parliament, they will undoubtedly lose their distinctness, and identity. They will no longer have a separate political existence; they will become, but so will Great Britain and her parliament, parts only of the united whole; and in as far as a part cannot be said to be independent of the other parts, Ireland will, in that sense, become dependent on Great Britain, but so will Great Britain on Ireland. If after this it shall be contended that the lesser part is more dependent than the greater the argument will be found to resolve itself into what we have already discussed, namely the effects of the disproportion of numbers between the Irish and British members of the common parliament.

May I, however, be permitted to ask whether the Irish parliament, even since the boasted revolution or constitution of 1782, is, or ever can, in its separate, yet connected state, be totally independent? I know, Sir, that this may be reckoned delicate ground, but it has been resorted to by the enemies of a union, and I but follow them in entering upon it: and besides, I feel too strongly the ties of duty and affection by which I hold myself to be connected with that country as well as this, to avoid any part of the argument, which has been rendered necessary to a sound decision, merely because if ill understood, what I may say upon it may prove unpopular in the neighbouring kingdom. In such circumstances "ma

luerim veris offendere quam placere adulando." Is, then, a parliament independent, whose proceedings cannot receive the force of law without the act of persons not members of that parliament in any of its branches, and who, in acting or refusing to act in that respect, are themselves responsible to another parliament? Yet that this is the very condi tion and state of the Irish parliament is clear from the statute book of Ireland; and, indeed, its being so, is fondly considered by some of the most able opposers of a union, as essential to the happy connexion of that country with this. "The statute [Irish St. 20. & 22. Geo. 3rd, c. 47.] enacts, that no bill shall pass into a law in Ireland, unless it be returned under the great seal of Great Britain; thus not leaving the connexion of the two kingdoms a bare junction under one sovereign, but securing the continuance of that connexion, by making the British minister answerable to the British nation.

if any law should receive the royal assent in Ireland which could in any way injure the empire, be incompatible with its imperial interests, or tend to separate Ireland from it." [Mr. Foster's speech, p. 24].

To analyse this matter more in detail. The great seal of Great Britain cannot be put to an Irish bill but by the chancellor or lord keeper of that seal, who will seldom execute this duty of his office without the concurrence of those other ministers of state, members of the British council, who constitute what is called the cabinet. Every act so done, though under the command of the king, is an executive, not a legislative act, which the minister advises and performs at his peril, liable to be called to account for it by im-, peachment in this parliament. His majesty's personal expression of his assent to an Irish statute is perhaps as purely legislative as that by which he assents to a British law; but every public act done by a subject, except his speaking and voting in parliament, is in its nature executive, and that for which he is responsible. In the sentence I just now repeated, there seems to be implied some suggestion that the responsibility of the British ministers is confined to the case of Irish statutes affecting the empire at large, or tending to a separation of the two kingdoms. The Irish act referred to, says no such thing. It is indeed very common to hear a dis tinction made between acts of the Irish

parliament, concerning the local policy and interests of that kingdom, and those whose objects are imperial. In a popular sense, and in extreme cases such a distinction no doubt exists. A road or estate bill in Ireland can hardly, by any possibility, concern the empire at large; and it might be folly in a British chancellor or cabinet to exercise any judgment, or apprehend any responsibility, in regard to it. But the law draws no line, and in every Irish statute of any considerable moment, the empire must be more or less concerned. Who is to judge of the degree in which it is so, or of the propriety and safety of advising his majesty to receive or reject any such statute? who but the minister or ministers who may be questioned for giving that advice and carrying it into effect. Does not this prove that there still remains a real and substantial subordination or dependence of the Irish on the British parliament; a dependence or subordination inherent in the very nature of the present mode of connexion between the two countries. With regard to the executive government, its subordination is still more obvious. The king's solemn commands, to be executed in Ireland, are either communicated to the lord lieutenant when he enters upon his office, by his commission and general instructions under the seals of Great Britain, or by king's letters, transmitted from time to time, and countersigned by one of the secretaries of state, or, in revenue matters, by the lord treasurer, or three of the lords of the Treasury. What is the consequence of all this? Ireland is still jealous of her independency. We are told by many, that she conquered that independency, and will maintain it by the sword; she therefore revolts at the practical exercise of powers constitutionally vested in the parliament and ministers of this country. The government here, partly from the fear of renewing former or exciting new animosities, partly from other causes, are supposed in general cases to leave matters to the Irish parliament, and the ministers of that country. From time to time, however, points will occur where there may appear cogent reasons for their exercising their own discretion, and this perhaps in a manner contrary to the sentiments prevailing with the servants of the crown in Ireland. In such cases the difficulty may often be surmounted by the prudence of confidential intercourse, and the adoption

of some middle way, suggested by good temper and good sense, so as not to alarm the dignity of Ireland, or commit the imperial authority resident here. But more than once, even since I have had my attention directed to Irish affairs, situations have arisen in which the English ministry have thought it their duty to exercise, without such a temperature, an immediate controlling authority in Ireland. Now, Sir, whenever this has happened, they have incurred more than the hazard of rousing the jealousy, and affronting the high spirit of some of those persons in that kingdom who had been accustomed to a leading share in the measures of her government, and may think they are conscious to themselves of a superior knowledge of her affairs. Here, then, is a dilemma which has already occasioned many difficulties, and which, unless some remedy can be applied, will, I fear, be the source of growing embarrassment to both governments, and much ill blood between the two countries; nor can I see the possibility of any alteration which can have the effect of a remedy whilst the present system remains. His majesty, in order to exercise his legislative and executive functions, must either go to Ireland; or he must exercise them through the medium of servants, responsible and impeachable here; or Ireland, by its representatives, must come to England. The first of these plans would only remove the difficulty as to Ireland by throwing it upon Great Britain; and besides. the residence of the king of the British dominions any where but in Great Britain will hardly be proposed. The second we have shown to be incompatible with the real independency of Irish legislative and executive government. The third, therefore, only remains; i. e. such a legislative union and incorporation, as that the Irish nation shall be represented in this country by an adequate number of lords and commoners, returned to serve at Westminster in a common or united parliament. Then, indeed, it will be no longer true of Ireland, that she "must tamely follow Great Britain with submission and subserviency;" then she will be no longer "gens quæ juxta, jacet, dubiæ libertatis;" the country and its legislation will then, by their identification with this, be truly independent. They never can be so otherwise, unless Ireland will separate herself from Great Britain, and can trust to her own strength and means in re

sisting, or to the liberality of our enemies in not attempting to impose upon her the yoke of a government really foreign. Having said so much on the topics of general policy, in respect to legislation and executive government, I will now examine this question of union, as it may affect the interests of Ireland in her trade, manufactures, and agriculture; interests which, when rightly understood, mutually assist each other, and which may be considered together, being liable in most instances to be improved or injured by the same causes. The advocates against a union have used much subtilty, though, in general, little method or order, in arguing this part of the subject. They seem to contend, that Ireland is now in a most flourishing situation, and in a state of progressive improvement; that she owes this, in the first place, to a compact under which her linen trade has been cultivated with the most happy success; and in the next, to that more solemn compact with Great Britain," the glorious constitution of 1782," which enabled her to legislate for herself, and secure, protect, and cherish by her own vigilant attention to the great objects of her prosperity, that trade, and all the other branches of her commerce, her manufactures, and her agriculture. These compacts they treat as binding and complete. They cannot be departed from, and nothing farther is wanting to the growing prosperity and safety of Ireland. But a union would annul them, would shake or destroy every security which they have established, and would substitute in their place, the capricious, selfish, and despotic will of an unjust, narrow-minded, and rapacious rival. These, perhaps, are not the words, but I think they express, and do not exaggerate the meaning of what has been frequently and very recently insisted

upon.

Let us, therefore, a little inquire, how these different allegations stand in point of fact. And first, as to the supposed compact concerning the linen trade. It is admitted that Great Britain is the great customer of Ireland for that her staple commodity that we receive it for our home consumption free of all duty; and encourage its re-exportation from hence to foreign parts by the same bounties which we bestow on our own manufacture. This, I say, is admitted; but, it is stated, "That this encouragement to the Irish linen trade is the effect of a special con

tract, by which, for a valuable consider ation, England became bound to grant and maintain it. The valuable consider ation was, the relinquishment by Ireland of her woollen export trade, in which she had or might have become a dangerous rival. England had grown jealous of this rivality; her manufactures and her par liament had urged king William to check it; he had consented, and had expressed that consent in terms justly offensive to Ireland; a negotiation ensued, and acts of each of the two parliaments passed, by which Ireland engaged to withdraw from all competition as to woollen goods, on the condition that England would give that preference and assistance which she does to the linen manufactory of Ireland; in consequence of this treaty, the woollen fabrics, of which she at that time exported to the amount of 110,000l. a year, were abandoned; they cannot be resumed; and therefore Great Britain cannot recall or cancel that obligation by which she engaged herself to promote, in the man. ner alleged, the linen trade of that country." Such is in substance the statement made.

It is extraordinary, but true, that since these debates began, many persons, not ill informed in matters of this sort, have avowed their ignorance, and unsucessful endeavours to obtain the knowledge of the documents and acts in which this sup posed compact is contained, of its date, particular clauses and provisions, and of the sanctions, whether of a statutable or diplomatic nature, by which it was guarded. But what I have to add, is still more extraordinary, and equally true, namely, that, such as it was, it no longer exists, but was totally and entirely repealed and made void, many years ago, at the instance of Ireland herself; and that the advantages which Great Britain still confers on the linen trade of Ireland, are, on her part, at the present hour, merely gratuitous, whatever may be the motives of generosity, policy, or selfinterest, which induce her to continue them. For my own part, I know of no satisfactory evidence of agreements or compacts between nations, except what are to be found in their diplomatic or legislative records. I have accordingly endeavoured to trace the history of the business I am now discussing, in those sure, and only sure, repositories of the national transactions of both countries with each other-their respective statute