competency. What I then said has been misunderstood. I have been supposed not only to have asserted what I have just mentioned, and (which I also admit I did) that Mr. Foster and sir John Parnell had avoided giving their sanction to the contrary doctrine, but to have added, with some exultation, that there had nobody been found to maintain it but M'Nevin and Lewins. Sir, that is not what I stated. I did perhaps discover the satisfaction I felt from the consideration that the distinguished characters I have mentioned had supported that side of the question which I thought was necessarily connected both with the general principles of government and those of the British constitution; but I never said, or meant to say, that no opinion had been delivered of an opposite sort by any body in Ireland, except M.Nevin and Lewins. It was therefore unnecessary to question me, whether I did not know in particular that three considerable lawyers, and members of the Irish parliament, had denied this competency; and whether I doubted of their legal learning and abilities? I dare say they have denied it. I have indeed read, in a printed letter, to which the name of one of those gentlemen is subscribed, "That the parliament of Ireland, true to itself, and honest to its country, will never assume a power extrinsic of its delegation." (Mr. Barring ton's letter to Mr. Saurin, dated 20th January, 1799.) Similar sentiments may have been delivered by the other two, and by others in the sister parliament; and as to the legal abilities and acquirements of those gentlemen, far be it from me to express or entertain any opinion to their disparagement. But, Sir, I am persuaded those gentlemen themselves would not think it implied any disrespect to them, as members of the profession to which I once had the honour to belong, if I were now to say, that the opinions of barristers, however able or eminent, are not, in point of authority, to be put in the balance, on a great constitutional point, with those of the heads of his majesty's supreme tribunals, the fathers and oracles of the law; especially when those great judicial stations are so filled as they at present are. But is it true that, with a disproportion of members, such as it may be supposed will be settled between the two countries, Ireland would only give, and Great Britain only acquire? I speak now of legis lative authority. In my judgment quite otherwise. There would be a reciprocal, and, having regard to the respective weight of each in the scale of empire, an equal communication of power. The Lords and Commons of Great Britain would indeed acquire a direct share in the legisla tion of Ireland, but so would the Lords and Commons of Ireland in that of Great Britain. Mutually they would relinquish, or, if gentlemen like a more exceptionable word better, would surrender, the exclusive jurisdiction over their respective countries; but each would obtain a share, commensurate with its relative importance in the united state, of the supreme domi nion over the whole; and, therefore, as to the distinction attempted on the question of right, how can it be contended that the British parliament may lawfully receive within its bosom, say 80, 100, or 120 strangers, vesting them individually with the same authority as its original members individually possessed, if the Irish parliament cannot, on the condition of participating, according to due propor tion, in the government of Great Britain and the empire, lawfully admit the legis lators of this island and of the empire to a share, adjusted by the same rule of proportion, in the local government of Ireland? The idea that inequality of numbers would vitiate the transaction on the side of the weakest country, leads to this, that there could never be a lawful union, unless the numbers in the united legisla ture were made arithmetically equal on both sides. If so, had England agreed to the unreasonable demand, during the last century, on the part of Scotland (in 1660) of joining the two parliaments according to their then existing numbers, or were Great Britain now to receive into her House of Commons all the 300 representatives of Ireland, and to unite together the two Houses of Peers as they now stand, the transaction would still have no legal solidity; the Scotch parliament formerly, and the Irish parliament now, would still have betrayed their trusts. But this junction of the parliaments, this identification or incorporation of the two Houses of each, in analogy to the identity which already exists as to the third estate, is treated as an utter annihilation of the constitution of Ireland. The same terms were misapplied in Scotland to the union of that country with this; for, ingenious and inventive in arguments on most subjects as some of our opponents are, on many of the points of this question they appear to me mere plagiarists, to a degree of servility, not only of the topics, but even of the very language and expressions which were then employed. Of this any man may convince himself by comparing the late debates here and elsewhere, with the History of De Foe, and the Memoirs of Lockhart. In the case of Scotland and England, the misapplication was not so great. In that case, the third branch of each legislature, though for the time it centered in the same person, was so far from being inseparably mixed, so as to form one indivisible whole, that a law actually existed, by which its separation, at no distant period, into two distinct sovereignties, was expressly established. It were to be wished, that gentlemen would explain what that essential part of the constitution of Ireland is, which the incorporation of its Lords and Commons with ours will annihilate. It has always appeared to me, that in two principles is comprehended the essence of ours and of the Irish constitution, which, with the exception of certain abuses, real or imputed, of different sorts to be found in each kingdom, is one and the same. How often have I heard gentlemen in the Irish parliament boast that they enjoyed, how often read in the published harangues and essays of Irish politicians, their exultation in the possession of the British constitution! I say, I have always conceived, that the most essential principles of that constitution are two: 1. That it is composed of three independent estates or branches, forming checks, each upon the other two. 2. That no law can pass, affecting the life, the liberty, or property of the subject, without the concurrence of a representative body, chosen from among the people, in a mode formed on the consideration of property and franchise, and consisting of an adequate number of persons; and of such a mixed description, as to bring to the legislative assemblies com petent knowledge, both of general and local concerns, and a sympathy of inte. rest in regard to every thing that can affect their constituents and the nation at large. Now, Sir, if this description is in any degree true, how can it be said, that the combining into one supreme imperial The Scotch act of Anne, called the Act of Security, 1st parliament of queen Ange, 2nd ses. c. 3. | council a just number of the representatives of both nations for one House, and of the peers for the other, will be the annihilation of the constitution ? The legislature of the empire may, in one point of view, be considered as one great political machine; consisting of one and the same supreme head, both executive and legislative; to which are attached, or linked and knit, two separate members, while each of those two is subdivided again into two analogous parts: the one member, the Lords and Commons of Great Britain, empowered to prepare for the sovereign's deliberation, sanction, or rejection, whatever may seem necessary for Great Britain, and for the empire at large; the other, the Lords and Commons of Ireland, possessing only, but exclusively---as far as such exclusion is consistent with the idea of a unity of empire, either on the present or any other possible frame of such a machine the same power as to the kingdom of Ireland. Let me ask, whether this machine, considered theoretically at least, would not be simplified, its structure improved, and the two essential objects I have pointed out, better secured, by blending and incorporating, in a fit proportion, the two separate members into one. But, Sir, after making the best stand they can on this quicksand of incompetency, the gentlemen proceed to the real merits of the question, and expressly deny that Ireland will reap any benefit from the measure; meaning, I suppose, also to deny, that it will prove beneficial to this country, or to the empire at large. I suppose they mean this, because I think that no man of good sense, or who is a real friend to Ireland, can disjoin her interests from those of this kingdom, and of the other parts of the British dominions, or contend that any great arrangement is unadvisable and unjust, which shall tend to the general advantage of those other branches of the empire, merely because no particular advantage may accrue to Ireland, provided that country is not thereby exposed to some detriment or danger. Let us, therefore, examine a few of the most prominent circumstances of advantage which may be reasonably expected to flow from a union, in the first place, to Great Britain, and to the rest of his majesty's dominions; but, secondly, to Ireland; considering the subject in a general view of legislative and executive government, of commerce, manufactures, and agriculture, of internal peace, civilization, and prosperity; under which heads we may also discuss some of the principal objections which have been relied on, either here or in the sister country. With regard to this country, its legislative and executive councils would no longer be liable to be perplexed in consequence of the distinct machinery of a separate Irish parliament, nor the general government continue in constant danger of misapprehension and disputes, and subject to the inconveniences which inevitably arise from circuity of communication, and the impediments and embarrassing modifications to which jealousy or ignorance on the one side or the other will so often give occasion (while things remain as they are) in many of the most important concerns of the empire. In other respects it may be difficult to foresee any immediate advantage to Great Britain; to her manufactures, her agriculture, her trade, or general prosperity. Some people, indeed, rather apprehend danger to British com merce and manufactures; and that supposed migration of capital and skill to a cheaper country, to a country possessing a superiority of situation as to many branches of business which has been often the subject of public discussion, is argued upon as a too probable consequence of a union. (Mr. Peel's speech). To this it might be a sufficient answer for the states man to say, that if what one part of the united kingdom shall lose another will gain, there will be no public detriment to the whole. But that answer, I own, sounds harsh to my ears. I think you ought not, on such general considerations of policy, to overlook the feelings and ..interests of the numerous individuals and classes of men, who have, as it were, localized their ingenuity, their industry, their wealth, and their habits of life, under the countenance and implied faith of preexisting laws and institutions. There is a better answer, I believe, in the fact, that capital and industry so localized are not easily influenced at once to change their situation, by such temptations. The attempts which have been made, at various times, to transfer, by some sudden effort of speculation and enterprise, English money and credit, and English art and skill, to cheaper and more eligible places in Scotland, Wales, and even Ireland, have rarely been successful, or persevered in; and it is no inconsiderable illustration and proof of this position, that even with regard to external trade, which is certainly more locomotive than manufactures, those towns and ports where accident at first, and a long series of causes afterwards, have operated to establish it, are seldom or never out-rivalled, or their commerce drawn off, by any exertions, however powerful, in favour of situations better adapted by nature for carrying it on. Gradually, however, after a union, Ireland will undoubtedly attract much wealth, capital, and credit from this country, not only by the circumstances of advantage to which I have alluded, but also, more especially, because a uniformity of laws and legislature will give greater confidence to those who may be disposed to embark in enterprises of speculation, or place their money on commercial or landed securities in that kingdom. This, one should think, would be a strong and reasonable argument for Ireland (of which afterwards); but such gradual benefit to be reaped by her, will not affect the interests of indivi duals now engaged in business here, and will unquestionably, from the known principles and history of public wealth, tend in its progress, by multiplying intercourse, and the returns of profit in and between both countries, to increase the riches of both, and of the whole empire. Let us now give a moment's consideration to the effects of the proposed union on that empire, as an aggregate of which, Great Britain and Ireland form the two chief and preponderating members. And here, Sir, it will be enough just to observe, what no man, I think, can deny, that in all cases where it is practicable, one general, superintending, and controlling legislature, is the best fitted for the steady, consistent, and rational government of all the parts of that combination of indivi duals and territories which constitute what is denominated a state. To endeavour to enforce this position by a long train of argument, indisputable as I conceive it to be, would be an unwarrantable waste of time and words. It has, indeed, been said, in answer to those who have pointed out the obvious inconvenience which might arise from a difference of opinion on any great imperial question, as of peace and war, between two distinct parliaments, that equal inconvenience would follow from a difference of a like sort between the several branches of the same parliament; but that such differences, though they may be suggested by theory, have not been found to happen in practice. [Mr. Foster's speech, p. 54, 55.] They certainly sometimes have happened, both between the two Houses, and between those Houses and the sovereign, in the British parliament, and with the hazard, at least, of considerable detriment to the state. But there are material distinctions between the two cases. The identity of interest between the several branches of the legislative and executive government of the same country, is much more direct and sensible, and therefore, on discussion, much less apt to be mistaken by either, than what exists between two kingdoms, though forming parts of the same empire; besides, there is a facility of discussion and explanation, by conference, address, remonstrance, &c. between the respective branches of the same parliament, which cannot take place between two distinct legislatures. of distance (there may be others) are sometimes such as to render so desirable an object as one common imperial legislature impracticable. Such I take to have been the case with regard to our colonies in North America. I believe all sober men of all parties, would have agreed, that, could it have been done, the admission into the British parliament of an adequate number of representatives from thence, would have been the happiest method of reconciling the disputes and removing the difficulties which terminated in a civil war, and the separation of that country from the empire. Dr. Adam Smith, and many others, recommended the experiment. The immense distance, and the uncertainty of regular, periodical, frequent, and early communication between American representatives in Great Britain and their constituents in America, seem to me to have opposed insurmountable obstacles to such a plan. But that no valid objection of a like nature exists in the case of Ireland, is abundantly manifest. Some gentlemen, indeed, of that country, have expressed, in very strong language, their ideas of the inconvenience which would attend what they quaintly term a transmarine parliament; and one learned barrister, at the celebrated meeting of the profession which took place early in Dublin, is stated to have pronounced, It is also said, that the checks which the proceedings of the three branches of the same parliament produce, furnish a principle to which our constitution owes its stability, and that similar checks exist between the two sister parliaments. [Mr. Foster's speech, p. 55]. No doubt this is true to a certain extent; but it would be easy to show, that in the case of the two parliaments such checks exist in a very imperfect degree, without any foundation in their formal and legal constitutions,* and with little more force or effi-"That a British minister shall not, and cacy than those which prevail in the relations of different states, having common interests, but no link or connexion in their governments. Such checks between the different nations of our part of the globe, contributed for a time to maintain what used to be called the balance of Europe; but although those of a more substantial and operative kind, in concurrence with other causes, have to this day preserved, and, I trust, if perpetuity can belong to human institutions, will ever preserve our frame of government, the other and inferior sort has not been found of equal power in giving permanency to that balance. I admit that circumstances *This is not inconsistent with what is afterwards said of the jurisdiction the British parliament may exercise over the executive ministers who advise the king in assenting to, or rejecting Irish bills. That jurisdiction is without power to stop such assent or rejection; and, therefore, forms no immediate or absolute check, though it may afterwards punish those who have advised the crown to give or refuse its assent. [VOL. XXXIV.] cannot, plant another Sicily in the bosom of the Atlantic, and that God and nature never intended that Ireland should be a province."* If by this is meant, that the intervening channel is, in the nature of things, an insuperable difficulty in the way of a legislative union; I answer, that in principle (however widely the cases differ in importance) the reason would equally apply to the islands of Orkney and Shetland, and would have applied, in former times, to the town of Calais. As to the idea, that Ireland, by a union, will become a province, in any other sense than that according to which she and Great Britain are now provinces of the general empire, I deny it. Ireland, indeed, will no longer be a distinct kingdom; but neither will Great Britain; they will both become, as it were, aliquot parts of one incorporated realm, instead of remaining separate integral parts of the empire. It is true, that the interposition of * Debates of the Irish Bar, 9th December 1798, p. 47. [31] the sea forms a geographical separation [ the Mediterranean, or even of those in between them, which did not exist in the her own immediate neighbourhood, in St. case of England and Scotland; but, on George's Channel, or on the western the other hand, Dublin is nearer to Lon-coast of France. Is any one so ignorant don than Edinburgh is; and the journey, as not to perceive how materially such renotwithstanding the sea passage, is, I be- gulations may affect the commercial and lieve, in general, performed in a shorter political interests of Ireland? On the time; Cork, Limerick, and Londonderry, admission of her representatives among are nearer to it than several of the princi- those of this island, she will immediately pal towns in the north of Scotland; and acquire her proportionate share in all no part of Ireland is so far removed from those great concerns; a voice in the legis this city as the counties of Sutherland and lative government of Great Britain, and Caithness; not to mention again the Ork- of every part of the British dominions. ney and the Shetland islands. Besides, This is not all; Ireland will not only have it is to be observed. that Great Britain is this share of general legislation through the only neighbour of Ireland, and that, the influence and suffrages of her own while the eastern coast of Scotland is open immediate representatives: she will also be to a near and easy intercourse with other represented and entitled to speak through countries, Great Britain intercepts almost the influence and suffrages of every one of entirely all direct communcation between the 513 members chosen in this island. ! Ireland and the continent of Europe, This was ably pointed out in a former dewhile the immense expanse of the Atlantic bate, by a gentleman (Mr. Peel), who, divides that island from all other parts of on that occasion, discovered the most enthe globe. If we add to these considera-larged and liberal views of general policy, tions the many and important facilities, or rather invitations, to a more thorough incorporation of England and Ireland and which now must comprehend Scotland -that did not exist in the former case; the same system of laws, civil and commercial; the same rules of property; similar tribunals; corresponding forms of legislature; a common origin; extensive consanguinity, and intermarriages; the great number of those who, by succession or acquisition, are daily becoming owners of land in both kingdoms; the same established religion; the same course of education, &c. &c.;-if we consider all these circumstances, that of absolute territorial contiguity seems to be infinitely outweighed, and, as it were, totally to vanish from our sight. Having incidentally cleared away, as I, flatter myself I have, this objection of the want of immediate juxta-position, I shall not, for the present, revert to any farther examination of more general, or, as they are often called, imperial considerations: but will now proceed to take a view of some of the peculiar benefits which I think Ireland would derive from the proposed arrangement. At present, she has no share whatever in the legislation of Great Britain, nor in that of the empire. Her parliament can take no part in the regulations necessary for the government and administration of our foreign possessions in the East and West Indies, in Asia, Africa, or America, of those in united to the soundest speculative as well as practical knowledge of commerce and manufactures. And here we may perceive the gross fallacy of the idea which so often mixes itself in these debates, and has, as we have seen, been founded on in the argument of incompetency, viz. that the concerns of Ireland will be solely and exclu sively attended to, and this too on a prin ciple of opposition and hostility, by the smaller number of members which she will have to choose. It will, on the contrary, be then the duty, and on all great points will, I am satisfied be the desire and the true interest of those elected here, to give their due weight to the interests, general or local, of Ireland, in their deliberations and in their votes; and in cases where they do not, I am apt to believe, what respects Ireland will be wholly left to the decision of the Irish members, as I have already observed to have happened so generally in regard to the Scotch members of the British parliament, when the subject before the legislature has merely related to Scotland. Natural and fair reasons for this, and equally applicable to Ireland, might easily be stated; but it is enough here to appeal to the fact, which has been so notorious, that when my right hon. friend asked in a former debate, whether Scotland had, in consequence of her comparatively small number of forty-five members, been oppressed or taxed beyond her proportion |