I fear that they do not belong exclusively to the French. When the right hon. gentleman speaks of the extraordinary successes of the last campaign, he does not mention the horrors by which some of those successes were accompanied. Naples, for instance, has been, among others, what is called "delivered;" and yet, if I am rightly informed, it has been stained and polluted by murders so ferocious, and by cruelties of every kind so abhorrent, that the heart shudders at the recital. It has been said, not only that the miserable victims of the rage and brutality of the fanatics were savagely murdered, but that, in many instances, their flesh was eaten and devoured by the cannibals, who are the advocates and the instruments of social order! Nay, England is not totally exempt from reproach, if the rumours which are circulated be true. I will mention a fact, to give ministers the opportunity, if it be false, of wiping away the stain that it must otherwise fix on the British name. It is said, that a party of the republican inhabitants of Naples took shelter in the fortress of the Castel de Uova. They were besieged by a detachment from the royal army, to whom they refused to surrender; but demanded that a British officer should be brought forward, and to him they capitulated. They made terms with him under the sanction of the British name. It was agreed, that their persons and property should be safe, and that they should be conveyed to Toulon. They were accordingly put on board a vessel; but before they sailed, their property was confiscated, numbers of them taken out, thrown into dungeons, and some of them I understand, notwithstanding the British guarantee actually executed.

rally attach to it its proper appendages! Sir, I wish the atrocities of which we of bastiles, lettres de cachet, gabelle, &c. | hear so much, and which I abhor as much And the noblesse, for whom this procla- as any man, were, indeed, unexampled. mation was peculiarly conceived, would also naturally feel, that if the monarch was to be restored to all his privileges, they surely were to be reinstated in their estates without a compensation to the purchasers. Is this likely to make the people wish for a restoration of royalty? 1 have no doubt but there may be a number of Chouans in France, though I am persuaded that little dependence is to be placed on their efforts. There may be a number of people dispersed over France, and particularly in certain provinces, who may retain a degree of attachment to royalty and how the government will contrive to compromise with that spirit, I know not. I suspect, however, that Buonaparte will try his efforts have been turned to that object; and, if we may be lieve report, he has succeeded to a considerable degree. He will naturally call to his recollection the precedent which the history of France itself will furnish. The once formidable insurrection of the Hugonots was completely stifled, and the party conciliated, by the policy of Henry 4th, who gave them such privileges and raised them so high in the government, as to make some persons apprehend danger therefrom to the unity of the empire. Nor will the French be likely to forget the revocation of the edict one of the memorable acts of the house of Bourbon an act which was never surpassed in atrocity, injustice, and impolicy, by any thing that has disgraced Jacobinism. If Buonaparte shall attempt some similar arrangement to that of Henry 4th with the Chouans, who will say that he is likely to fail? He will meet with no great obstacle to success from the influence which our ministers have established with the chiefs, or in the attachment and dependence which they have on our protection; for what has the right hon. gentleman told him, in stating the contingencies in which he will treat with Buonaparté? He will excite a rebellion in France-he will give support to the Chouans, if they can stand their ground; but he will not make common cause with them: for unless they can depose Buonaparté, send him into banishment, or execute him, he will abandon the Chouans, and treat with this very man, whom he describes as holding the reins and wielding the powers of France for purposes of unexampled barbarity. [VOL. XXXIV.]

Where then, Sir, is this war, which on every side is pregnant with such horrors, to be carried? Where is it to stop? Not till you establish the house of Bourbon! And this you cherish the hope of doing, because you have had a successful campaign. Why, Sir, before this you have had a successful campaign. The situation of the allies, with all they have gained, is surely not to be com pared now to what it was when you had taken Valenciennes, Quesnoy, Condé, &c. which induced some gentlemen in this House to prepare themselves [4 U]

for a march to Paris.

Debate on the Overture of Peace

have gained, you surely will not say that With all that you the prospect is brighter now than it was then. What have you gained but the recovery of a part of what you before lost? One campaign is successful to you-another to them; and in this way, animated by the vindictive passions of revenge, ha. tred, and rancour, which are infinitely more flagitious, even, than those of ambition and the thirst of power, you may go on for ever; as, with such black incentives, I see no end to human misery. And all this without an intelligible motive, all this because you may gain a better peace a year or two hence! So that we are called upon to go on merely as a speculation-We must keep Buonaparté for some time longer at war, as a state of probation. Gracious God, Sir, is war a state of probation? Is peace a rash system? Is it dangerous for nations to live in amity with each other? Is your vigilance, your policy, your common powers of observation, to be extinguished by putting an end to the horrors of war? Cannot this state of probation be as well undergone without adding to the cataJogue of human sufferings? "But we must pause!" What! must the bowels of Great Britain be torn out-her best blood be spilt her treasure wasted-that you may make an experiment? Put yourselves-oh! that you would put yourselves in the field of battle, and learn to judge of the sort of horrors that you excite. In former wars a man might at least, have some feeling, some interest, that served to balance in his mind the impressions which a scene of carnage and of death must inflict. If a man had been present at the battle of Blenheim, for instance, and had inquired the motive of the battle, there was not a soldier engaged who could not have satisfied his curiosity, and even, perhaps, allayed his feelings they were fighting to repress the uncontrolled ambition of the grand monarque. But, if a man were present now at a field of slaughter, and were to inquire for what they were fighting" Fighting!" would be the answer; "they are not fighting, they are pausing." "Why is that man expiring? Why is that other writhing with agony? What means this implacable fury?" The answer must be, are quite wrong, Sir, you deceive your "You self They are not fighting-Do not dis turb them-they are merely pausing!— this man is not expiring with agony

[1396

Lord help you, Sir! they are not angry that man is not dead-he is only pausing! with one another; they have now no that there should be a pause. All that cause of quarrel-but their country thinks you see, Sir, is nothing like fightingthere is no harm, nor cruelty, nor blood. shed in it whatever-it is nothing more than a political pause!—it is merely to try parté will not behave himself better than an experiment-to see whether Buonaheretofore; and in the mean time we have agreed to a pause, in pure friendship!" And is this the way, Sir, that you are to show yourselves the advocates of order? You take up a system calculated to uncion religion, to stifle in the heart, not merely vilize the world, to destroy order, to trample the generosity of noble sentiment, bu the prosecution of this system, you the affections of social nature; and in spread terror and devastation all around you.

opinion. I think you ought to have given Sir, I have done. I have told you my overture which was fairly and handsomely a civil, clear, and explicit answer to the made you. If you were desirous that the allies, as the means of bringing about a negotiation should have included all your general peace, you should have told Buonaparté so; but I believe you were afraid of his agreeing to the proposal. You took that method before. you say, "the people were anxious for peace in 1797." I say they are friends to Aye, but," peace now; and I am confident that you will one day own it. Believe me, they are friends to peace; although, by the laws which you have made, restraining the expression of the sense of the people, public opinion cannot now be heard as loudly and unequivocally as heretofore. But I will not go into the internal state of this country. It is too afflicting to the heart to see the strides which have been made, by means of, and under the miserable pretext of this war, against liberty of every kind, both of speech and of writing; and approaches to that military despotism to observe in another kingdom the rapid which we affect to make an argument against peace. I know, Sir, that public opinion, if it could be collected, would be for peace, as much now as in 1797, and I not by a sense of their duty-not by the know that it is only by public opinioninclination of their minds-that ministers. I conclude, Sir, with repeating what, will be brought, if ever, to give us peace.

taining these sentiments, I can as little approve the mode in which the Dutch fleet was gained, as I can enter into the views of those who represent the acquisition as of so much importance. Take into consideration the whole of the case; weigh what you have lost and what you have gained, and you will find that there is a fearful balance against you. The result of the late expedition has thrown discredit on your councils, and dishonour on your operations. You cannot again attempt to restore the house of Orange; you have left the pretensions of that family more desperate than ever. The con

hopes of their partizans are overthrown. After this review, I confess I cannot conceive how any man can contend, that the result of the expedition has in any degree repaid our sacrifices, or realized our expectations.

pedition of discovery, and not altogether unsuccessful in that view. We have, in the first place, discovered, that there is no reliance to be placed in the chancellor of the exchequer's knowledge of human nature;-2ndly, that Holland is a country intersected by dykes, ditches, and canals; and Srdly, that the weather there is not so good in October as it is in June! Information, however, may be purchased too dear. If we consider the number of lives which have been lost; and reflect, that the tenth of every man's income has been squandered, and all by the misconduct of ministers, we shall have little reason to boast of our discoveries. We took pos-fidence of their enemies is confirmed; the session of the Dutch ships in the name of the stadtholder. Are they to be manned with the mutinous crews who surrendered them, and employed in the name of the stadtholder? If so, they are no addition to our navy. When I reflect upon the mode in which this acquisition was gained, I consider it as of the most perilous example. I tremble to see a deliberating navy in the face of the naval force of England; a navy deciding upon the cause of their country, instead of fighting its battles. I do not like to see mutiny recommended to our sailors by any example or any approbation. I hope there is nothing in the temper of our navy to catch the infection. I wish to see the spirit of Blake prevail, who told his sailors, that it was their duty to fight for their country, in whatever hands the government might be. If ministers promoted a spirit of mutiny amongst the Dutch sailors they ill understood the interests of their own country. They departed from a great principle to serve a particular purpose. To gain a partial advantage, they introduced a most dangerous precedent. Suppose admiral Story had resisted the spirit of mutiny and disobedience; suppose he had done what De Ruyter would have done in his situation-endeavoured to maintain his authority and perished in the attempt-would you have permitted your seamen to welcome the Dutch sailors besmeared with the blood of their admiral and officers? Would you have sanctioned such a deed? Would you have applauded the doers? Would you have allowed your seamen to become their allics and associates? Yet was it only the want of vigour in the officers that prevented this catastrophie; the example is the same; and we all know how dangerous such a violation is to the principle of discipline. Enter

As to the object of the expedition, in so far as it aimed at the rescue of Holland from the dominion of France, and the restoration of the house of Orange, I most readily agree, that it was a legiti mate British object. In proportion, however, as the object was wise and good, must be the criminality of those to whose misconduct its failure is to be attributed. If, by their gross negligence, their ignorance, and their presumption, we have failed in an undertaking so dear to every British heart, the value of the prize for which we contended only augments the mortification of our disappointment. That the house of Orange has strong claims upon the gratitude, nay, upon the justice of Great Britain, I do not deny. They well deserved that hospitable asylum which they enjoy in this country. Their expulsion from their hereditary authority in Holland, is in a great measure to be ascribed to their deference to British councils, perhaps their devotion to the views of British ministers. The restoration of that family was, therefore, in itself an honourable motive for our interference. At the same time I cannot agree in the opinion, that we had any particular claim to the attachment of the Dutch. It is long since any cordiality prevailed between the two countries. The French faction had been increasing, and possessed a very powerful interest in the United Provinces. In this situation, grounds of dispute have arisen at no very remote period. In the American war, the Dutch complained bitterly of our aggressions.

under their ancient government; but it says not a word of the Cape of Good Hope, of Ceylon, of Trincomalee. We address the Dutch, a people cold, considerate, phlegmatic, as if they were a nation of religious fanatics or chivalrous warriors. Religion is dragged in upon all occasions; but why it is so I cannot understand. The French did not interfere with the religion of the Dutch. They do not seem, indeed, to have prevented religious worship in any country where their arms have prevailed; but least of all, had they any temptation to interfere with the poverty and simplicity of the religious institutions of the Dutch. What influence, then, could such topics produce in Holland? Every thing that could have no effect was urged-every thing that might engage them in our favour was omitted. We tell the Dutch to "forget and forgive the past." But, how will they understand this advice? Will they not consider it as a recommendation to forget that they ever had colonies, and to forgive us for taking them? The minister seems to have understood very little of Dutch human nature, if he expected such proclamations could have any success among them. If, instead of all the fine reflections upon religion, social order, and their former government, he had said, We will give you back all your colonies, the argument would have been understood, and the effect might have been favourable. Instead of this, what did we tell them, in other terms?-Be a nation without trade; take back your old government; be a province dependent upon England through the stadtholder. These are the blessings which we promise you, and which you must co-operate with us to obtain.

In answer to their complaints, we repre- | sented them in speeches and proclamations as a dull and stupid people. A noble lord, then in administration, used the extraordinary expression, that the Dutch must be "stunned into their senses." By such treatment the influence of France was increased in Holland. Perhaps too, the Dutch, in the mere view of promoting their own interests, might conceive a connexion with France more beneficial to them than one with England. At the breaking out of the present war, the Dutch, against their own wishes, were compelled to abandon their neutrality, and to take a share in the war. They were engaged in the contest by our influence, but we were not able to protect them in the moment of difficulty. From being our allies they became our enemies. But, previous to this change, what were the symptoms of cordiality and good understanding when we were endeavouring to defend Holland? Did not our troops leave that country complaining of the people, and irritated by their reproaches? After the success of the French invasion, was our conduct calculated to increase the number of our friends? Was it right, after the stadtholder had taken refuge in this country to consider him sovereign of Holland (which he never was), and to require his consent to the seizure of so much Dutch property? Were such measures conciliatory? Did they tend to promote the interest of the stadtholder? In the negotiation at Lisle, what was the conduct of ministers? The negotiation was broken off, because the French refused to allow us to retain the conquests we had made at the expense of the Dutch who had been involved in the quarrel by our obstinacy and violence. Must not the Dutch have considered us as gross hypocrites, when we lately affected such a zeal for their interests, which, in the instances alluded to, we had rendered completely subservient to our own? These are circumstances which could not fail to produce a powerful impression upon the cool and calculating Dutchman. But on entering upon the expedition for the deli-nation in the expense of such an armaverance of Holland, what means did we employ to efface the prejudice that must have existed against our disinterestedness? Look at the proclamations which were issued on our landing in Holland. Read that distributed by sir Ralph Aber cromby: it holds out to the Dutch, to be sure, delightful visions of future happiness

These considerations I have adduced, to show that ministers had not truly calculated the temper and views of the people of Holland; that they had no reason to flatter themselves with the support of that country; and that they did not pursue the course by which it was to be obtained. It was, to the last degree, arrogant and presumptuous to involve this

ment as was employed in the late expedition, upon vain speculations. The right hon. gentleman should not have put his theories of human nature to such a costly experiment. He ought to have acted, in matters of such high moment, upon authentic information and upon practical. grounds.