dence and steadiness saved the count [one? try, which would inevitably have been -rained, had the opposition been allowed b to carry into execution their impolitic 1projects. He only wished that they Would not shift the responsibility which they themselves were so able to bear, upon others who must necessarily be incompe tent judges. Was not the direct contrary the case? Had not every thing of a destruc tive tendency been abandoned? It was clear then, that the objection was not against the revolutionary principle of the new government. Was its ambition, then, so dangerous now? That the conduct of France had been detestable on different occasions, he did not dispute: but it was Lord Holland said, that one great point said, the republic had broken every treaty was ascertained by the correspondence, it had concluded. The noble lord, on which materially changed the relative this point, perhaps, might have left more situation of the two powers. We could strength to his argument if he had omitted no longer say, that the continuance of certain treaties in the enumeration; for the war was to be ascribed to the avowed instance, it was by no means clear that animosity of the enemy. What, then, the French had violated the treaty with were the arguments by which this step Prussia. There was no proof that any of was justified? What are the objections the various governments of France had now urged to any negotiation with the acted upon the principle, of the treaties present government of France? There of one government not being binding on was one circumstance of which he could that which succeeded it.As, to the amnot help taking notice, because it seemed bition, which characterized the present to proceed on an objection which had not government, that was a consideration that been openly acknowledged, and which he might have weight in the arrangement of hoped did not exist; but it was remark- terms; it was not a preliminary objection able, that in the title of the correspon- preclusive of all treaty. It was said, that dence, there was a studied anxiety to Buonaparté. might be insincere. Cases avoid giving Buonaparté the title which might be supposed, in which strong belonged to him as chief consul of the grounds to suspect the sincerity of an 2. French republic. He was styled general overture might justify a refusal to nego Buonaparté. This appeared to proceed tiate, especially if negotiation might lead from a wish not to recognize him in the to danger. Nothing like this was the case eharacter which he claimed. and the here. There were no good reasons to French republic was never named, but imagine that the French government was only the country of France. Certainly, insincere. On the contrary, every day however, a negotiation with a govern- tended to demonstrate its sincerity. It ment did not sanction that government. had done all that depended on itself to It was merely a recognition of power, evince that disposition. What else could and nothing more. But the recency of be expected from Buonaparte? Was it the late revolution in France was one of reasonable to suppose that he should the principal objections insisted upon. admit that the guilt of the original agOn former occasions, ministers had not gression lay with France? This was a considered such a circumstance as afford-point, which ought not to have come into ing any objection to negotiate, as of itself it could be none. When the late constitution of the French republic was estasblished, ministers, by a message on the 8th of December 1795, admitted that a crisis was approaching that might lead to the termination of the contest. On that occasion, six weeks had been suffiicient to determine their minds. What greater objection, then, could apply to the present government of France. Was there any greater appearance of instability in this government, than in that which had satisfied ministers on so short a trial? Would any man contend that more danger was to be apprehended from the present government of France, than any former [VOL. XXXIV.] 4 discussion. He was happy here to find that against the noble secretary's present arguments, he could produce his own authority: in an official correspondence during a former negotiation, the noble lord, in a note to the French government, expressly stated that there was no reason to go into the question who was right or wrong, in a preceding negotiation; the object was, to negotiate upon the actual circumstances of relative situation, and upon the real grounds in dispute. After dwelling upon the objections to peace, the noble secretary did not say how it was to be obtained. The note in answer to Buonaparte's communication hinted at a mode, indeed; but what was [4K] that? Suppose that Buonaparté, desirous to obtain peace by every means, should sit down to consider how he could succeed in the object of his wishes; what did the note allow him to do? He would find, that the restoration of the hereditary line of kings was the only case in which a speedy peace was admitted to be possible: his own government must be proved by experience, and the evidence of fact, before it was admitted to negotiate. But what was this experience and evidence of facts? Formerly, six weeks were judged sufficient; now, the probation required was neither ascertained by its duration, nor by the mode in which it was to be conducted. In fact, therefore, the restoration of the hereditary line of kings was the only alternative in which immediate negotiation was admitted by ministers. But surely, if the ambition of the French Republic was so formidable, we could not forget this ground of apprehension, and this source of danger, when we talked of restoring the House of Bourbon. Had we forgotten the recorded charges of the parliament of this country against the ambition of the French monarchs of that House, at various periods? Had we for gotten their almost proverbial ambition? And was their restoration the remedy for evils arising from such a source? Every Frenchman, however, suspected, that the restoration of the ancient family would be so clogged as to render France insignificant. Frenchmen, therefore, could not be supposed to enter into our views in that respect. As to that event, if it were likely to take place, to him it did not seem so desirable as some imagined. He did not look upon it as affording the prospect either of security to this country, or of much tranquillity and happiness to France. It was said, in the note in reply to the first communication from the French government, that the most natural pledge they could give of sounder principles, was the restoration of that family which had maintained France in "prosperity at home, and in respect and consideration abroad." It was, indeed, a singular circumstance, to observe so much anxiety in ministers for the prosperity of France. But what respect and consideration was here alluded to? Was it the respect of justice, of moderation, of wisdom? No; it was the respect arising from the power of France, and was founded on no better claims. To promote the internal prosperity, and the external respect and renown of the French monarchs, surely could not be considered as British objects. We complained in the note of the recency of the revolution as precluding immediate negotiation; and we recom mended to France, in the same breath, to make another, as the speediest means of restoring peace. We talked of the ambition and insincerity of the republic as objections, and then mentioned as a remedy a government and family prover bially insincere and ambitious. We ap prehended instability, and then expressed a hope that, for the sake of peace, they would adopt a form of government which, in the present circumstances, must be unstable and precarious. France, however, by the decision of ministers, was to be put in a state of probation, if she refused the alternative of the restoration of royalty, till she had renounced all the principles complained of, or till she was ready to acknowledge the guilt of original aggres sion. But how were we to be satisfied that these changes had taken place, unless we agreed to negociate? The noble lord had stated with much pomp and solemnity, that the second letter of Talleyrand contained a principle more detestable than any at the very worst periods of the revo lution. On hearing this assertion, he had perused the letter with additional attention; but he could discover in it nothing of this dreadful description. The French minister did not defend every act of every preceding government. He stated, that the perseverance of this country had driven France into excesses; but if the avowal of this principle was atrocious, what was the practice of it? And, unfor tunately, it was too true that the example of this country might give to France an apology for some part of her violence. What had been our conduct to neutral powers? Had we not violated the neutra lity of the grand duke of Tuscany, in spite of the most solemn treaties ? Had we not violated the neutrality of Genoa} What was the conduct of our allies? Did not Russia violate the neutrality of other states? When we saw such unjustifiable proceedings on the side of those who made the crimes of France the cause of the war, it proved that this was nothing but a pretext. Ambition was objected to France; but was France the only ambi tious power in Europe? It was said, that interest alone induced France to keep well with Prussia; but might not the same interest prompt her to observe faithfully the engagements of treaties? Buonaparte to any overtures; and if it should afterhad given every proof of his sincerity. wards clearly appear that Buonaparté had Much was said of the character of Buona- been sincere, how would their lordships parté. He could not perceive that any ad- reconcile it to their consciences to have vantage could arise to us from blackening given their implicit sanction to measures the character of an individual. It was that prolong the calamities of war, withnot dignified; it was not politic. We had out any motive of honour, interest, or senow taken up the principle so much ob- curity? He therefore gave his decided jected to the Jacobins, of distinguishing support to the amendment. between a people and their government. What, on the contrary, was the conduct of the French? In his letter to the king, Buonaparté distinctly renounces this principle, and acknowledges the title and character of his majesty's government. On our part, the note of ministers was a manifesto to the royalists, and framed for that purpose. It spoke of the miseries of France; but the miseries of France were not the cause of the war. They might interest our humanity, but they were not fit to be noticed in diplomatic papers. As little had we to do with the internal miseries of the republic, as Talleyrand would have to retaliate, by reproaching us with the Test act, the want of parliamentary reform, the Income tax, or any other public measure that might be considered as a grievance. There was, indeed, one argument against a negotiation, and it was the only one that had made any impression at all on his mind. This was the apprehension of sacrificing the Chouans, with whom we might have engagements, and whom he feared we had incited to their present imprudence by our money and intrigues. This argument the noble secretary had not urged; and he did not blame him for suppressing it, as it was a delicate subject, under all circumstances, for a minister to talk of; but there could be no impropriety in his saying a few words on the subject. He would be as averse as any man to sacrifice those whom we had incited; but was it not possible, if peace, in a spirit of conciliation, was concluded, that we might render these Chouans a service greater than we did by furnishing them with assistance? Was it not possible, he had almost said, was it not certain, that, by continuing the war, we were dooming them to destruction? It was a dreadful thing to reflect, that by the obstinacy of ministers, we might be condemned to carry on the war for years, without gaining any advantage which we might not receive from negotiation at the present moment. He was convinced that the people at large disapproved of their abrupt refusal to listen The Earl of Carnarvon said:-I do not quite like the present question, as it stands on the proposed address, much less on the amendment: I should rather have approved that the address had contained simply thanks to his majesty for his communication, and left the conduct and undiminished responsibility to ministers. The present question had been debated upon a wrong ground; it has been treated, as if we were to decide by the vote of tonight, whether this country should be plunged into a long and ruinous war, or make an immediate peace; this is very far from being the true state of the question. His majesty has been pleased to communicate to us proposals of peace, from a government which has just made its appearance in France, together with the answers made by the noble secretary of state; we have to give our approbation or disapprobation of those answers. I have no difficulty in saying, that they appear to me well calculated to meet all the possible intricacies of our situation with our allies. In declining negotiation, the noble secretary does not reject distinct propositions, which may be considered by our allies, and evidenced by speedy ratification and immediate execution. In every point of view I approve the answer, it marks with dignity and spirit, that we shall not, through our sincere wish for peace, be the dupes of artifice; that it is not the nature of the government, but its sincerity and faith, of which we have so many reasons to doubt, which alone impedes peace; that we shall not quit our advantageous situation on the first song of peace, nor betray our security and that of our allies, to the known and experienced perfidy of an insidious enemy, without something more than mere professions. I understand by what the noble secretary has said this night, that he means only to justify a pause necessary to understand the situa. tion of this new ruling power, its force, stability, and interests, not that he rejects peace. He has detailed, ir strong colours, the numberless perfidies of the several revolutionary governments which have succeeded each other in France; he | ternal misconduct, by the superior inhas likewise detailed the individual re- terests arising from war; but this policy proaches due to the character of its pre- is by no means applicable to the position sent ruler; nothing certainly can be more of the present ruler of France. He is disgraceful than his conduct; but the called out of Egypt that his military repucharacter of the ruling sovereign has tation may be the key-stone to power, never been the sole reason for rejecting a raised by the intrigues of others, out of peace with any nation, nor repeated breach the ruins of an expiring republic. The of national faith the sole reason for con- reign of attornies and mountebanks, continuing a war. Breaches of faith as enor- trolling generals and armies, from the mous and disgraceful, are imputable to capitol, is at an end; the reign of generals the ancient legitimate government of is commenced; Buonaparte is the first France. Where can be found in the whose military reputation has placed him history of mankind, a more atrocious in- in the seat of power; he has all the dan stance of insidious treachery, or more per- gers of newly-acquired power, without fidious breach of faith, than that which having gradually advanced to it by his took place on the treaty of peace which own intrigues, they are dangers equally preceded, and was disturbed by the cap- to be apprehended from his present ture of Falkland's island? At the very friends, and from all those who envy his moment that Spain and France signed exaltation; he must maintain himself by peace with this country, an order was his own intrigues against even his creasigned by the minister of Spain, in con- tors; he cannot therefore quit the capital, cert with the duke de Choiseul, to attack and command in person the armies of the Falkland's island, on a given date some state; he must trust his armies to the years after, in order to produce a rupture, ablest generals, their failure or their suc resolved on at the very instant of exe- cess are equally fatal to him, and equally cuting a treaty, professing perpetual ami- tend to undermine the foundation of his ty; at the time when this sealed order power. The first advances a Bourbon to was opened and put in execution, it suited the throne; the last raises a formidable the interest and views of neither court, rival, with equal claims to his own, and and produced equal astonishment in both. furnishes him with the means of asserting M. d'Ossun, then ambassador from France it. I cannot doubt, therefore, that it is to the court of Spain, from whom I heard the personal interest of the present ruler this anecdote, was directed to remon to obtain peace, and preserve it; his sta strate against this act of aggression, which bility is the only doubt I entertain; even embarrassed the court of Paris; he found peace may not be able to confirm his equal surprise at Madrid, for the order power; there can, however, be no great was forgotten by both, nor was recollected difficulty about the terms of peace, as be till the attack was defended by the pro- tween France and this country; and if duction of the order. Is any act of the there was, should Buonaparté feel that revolutionary governments more indefen. peace is necessary for his private interest, sible than the interference in our Ame- he will not scruple to sacrifice the interest rican embarrassments, by the late unfor- of France to acquire it. I am not, there tunate monarch of France, then in a strict fore, without hopes that the horrors of alliance with us, and professing amity? war may shortly cease, either by the over History is full of disgraceful proofs of na- throw, or the confirmation of the present tional want of faith. Peace must always power in France, but I do not think nego be made when the interests of both parties tiation and suspension of arms necessarily require it, and will seldom last longer. I the shortest road to peace. I am deci own that I cannot agree with the noble dedly against interference with ministers secretary, that peace is not consistent in this critical time, being persuaded they with the interests of Buonaparte. The wish peace as sincerely as I do. I shall noble secretary says, that military govern- therefore concur with the address as it ments in their nature lean to war, and that stands. a sovereign with feeble title, will divert the people from attention to his title, by the alarms and dangers of war; this policy seems to me to apply more to old and established governments, who wish to divert the attention of the public from in The Earl of Liverpool said, he was sa tisfied, from every view of the situation of the two countries, that it was highly prudent to pause before ministers entered into a negotiation for peace with Buonaparté. Let their lordships shortly com "Dissentient, "Because the Address adopted by the House directly approves of the rejection of an overture for peace, when that invaluable blessing might very probably be attained with honour and security, by opening a negotiation with the French republic, and indirectly approves of the language in which the rejection of the offer was conveyed to the French government; a language which, in my opinion, can only tend to widen the breach between the two countries, to exasperate the enemy, and prolong the calamities of war. (Signed) " HOLLAND." Debate in the Commons on the King's Message respecting Overtures of Peace from the Consular Government of France.] Feb. 3. The order of the day being read, for taking into consideration his Majesty's Message, and the Papers relating thereto, Mr. Secretary Dundas said :-Sir; accustomed as I am to take part in the internal transactions of his majesty's go pare the two situations. France had lost her marine, had lost her commerce, had lost her trade; she had not a single merchant ship in any of her ports, for every one of them had been converted into petty, pilfering privateers, sent out to prey upon our commerce. Her revenue was adequate to her expense in no way whatsoever. On the other hand, our revenue was increasing; our commerce had prospered beyond all example. In fact we might almost be said to have the commerce of the whole world in our hands. Ought we then to consent, by a rash and premature negotiation, to open the ports of France, to let them share our commerce, to enable the republic to revive their drooping manufactures? Much had been said of the sincerity of Buonaparte; but would any man versed in state affairs, manifest so little judgment as to rely upon the mere professions of sincerity of an individual who had shown so little sincerity in his military transactions during the war? The famous resolution of the 19th November, 1792, declaring the intention of the re-vernment, it will not be thought extraorpublic of France to use their endeavours to overthrow the government of every other state in Europe, stood as yet unrepealed: no mention was made of a design to rescind it in Buonaparte's letter to his majesty, nor had they seen any steps taken in Paris to rescind it. In like manner, had they renounced their unheard-of practice during a war, of annexing for ever to the French republic every state and territory that they subdued by their arms, and declaring that they were not to be made the subject of future negotiation? Would it not be in the highest point disadvantageous for this country to agree to an armistice? Under such an armistice, during negotiation, France would have every thing to gain, and this country every thing to lose. By the answer given to Buonaparté and M. Talleyrand, it was not declared that this country would not treat, or wished to wage eternal war. It, on the contrary, declared the express wish of his majesty to treat for peace, when he could do it with security. The House then divided:-Contents, 79; Proxies, 13. Not-Contents, 6; Proxy, O. Majority, 86. The minority were, the duke of Bedford, the earl of Albemarle, lords Ponsonby, Holland, King, and Camelford. Protest against the Address.] The following Protest was entered on the Journals: dinary if I should move an address approving of that correspondence which has been just read, so far as it respects the administration of this country. Sir, on this subject I shall trouble the House with a few observations: it is a subject which it is impossible for us to consider properly, without adverting to the circumstances and situation in which we are placed, as decisive of the conduct which we ought to pursue. We are not now at a stage of the business to be at liberty to bring forward opinion, and conclude from theory and speculation. Experience has decided the question, and, thanks to it, we are to dispute on the merits of the French revolution, whether it be that glorious work, which some have fondly imagined it, or whether it be a transaction that has produced more mischief, horror, and devastation, than the political history of the world affords example of. Sir, in considering the question before us, I must call the attention of the House to the leading principles of that revolution, whatever form or shape it may assume. I do not, however, mean to enter into a detail of circumstances on this point. Experience has saved me the trouble; for I state it as an undeniable fact, that the leading feature of the French revolution, illustrated by the uniform tenor of its conduct to foreign states, is a total disregard for all treaties and obligations, and a sovereign |