the supposition, that the efficacy of moral means does not essentially depend on a previous disposition of the heart. Moral means are objective considerations presented to the mind, in the way of persuasion or dissuasion; and the effect as either good or bad, in a moral sense, will be according to the manner in which the free-will stands affected towards them. The same moral means affect different free volitions in a manner directly opposite; but this could not take place without some essential difference in the persons themselves. The will in both cases is equally free, and as a faculty it uniformly seeks apparent good. Consequently if there were not some principle in the mind more radical than free-will, moral means would affect every mind in the same manner. Now what can this principle be but the disposition of the heart, as either good or bad, light or dark, according to which the moral means appear either eligible or ineligible? A depraved state of mind sees nothing practically eligible in a holy life, though the person has no convincing argument against it; nay, though many arguments in its favour may be confessed by him to be unanswerable. On the other hand, a virtuous or gracious state of mind, styled in scripture "a good and honest heart," sees a holy life practically eligible; and the free-will chooses

accordingly. In both cases, the moral obligation is the same, though the results are diametrically opposite.

§ 6. Nearly similar to this is another perplexing prejudice, that an influence, or an efficiency, securing the certain result of moral actions, is incompatible with liberty: but this prejudice is occasioned by mistaken apprehensions of the true nature of liberty. A principle of grace, ameliorating and enlightening the mind, has no more tendency to diminish freedom, than had the spotless purity and superior unction of Jesus Christ to diminish his liberty. It was in consequence of confused notions of liberty, and its incompatibility with preventing grace, that some of the Fathers, (when duty was out of the question) advanced this crude sentiment, that the beginning must be from ourselves. If indeed they had confmed this notion to the obligation of beginning from our selves, it might well be admitted; for a defect of principle, as before shewn, does not alter the ground of obligation. A depraved descendant of Adam is as much obliged to love God, and to live in righteousness and true holiness, as Adam himself was in a state of integrity. The reason is, that both alike have the same ground of moral obligation-physical powers, moral means, and freedom. Take away any one

of these, and moral obligation ceases; but while these continue, the obligation remains unimpaired. The design of divine influence, therefore, is not to weaken, or in any way to alter the obligation, but to enable the subject to discharge it.

§ 7. Another prejudice that pervades the "Refutation" is, that if the event be certain, exhortations and other moral means are superfluous. One might think that the whole system of prophecy is a sufficient exposure of this false notion. If prophetic events were not certain, how could they be certainly predicted? and yet we find that they are constantly accomplished by the use of moral means. In fact, these means are an essential requisite for moral determinations. If the law or the gospel were not made known to free agents, how could they love or hate them, and how could prophecies of these results be certainly accomplished? God foreknows not only the free-will of the agent, but also the principle according to which he will view moral means; and therefore what will be his determinations in given circumstances, with infinite precision. He knows what a free-agent left to his own principle, will do or will not do; and what the same or another agent, still equally free, when endowed with another principle in different degrees,

according to divinely wise and sovereign pleasure, will determine, or will not determine. If the depraved were not exhorted, how could a non-compliance be foretold? And if the better principled were not exhorted, how could their compliance be recorded as futurely certain?

§ 8. Having noticed some of the false grounds of moral obligation, it may be proper to subjoin a few remarks on its nature. In order to ascertain this, it is in vain that we look to what mankind actually do, or to observe the operations of the human mind, on the plan of inductive philosophy. On the present subject, to know by the most accurate observation the matter of fact, will never teach us the matter of right. From what is done by a free agent, we cannot infer what ought to be done. We must therefore have recourse to the essential eharacters of God and man respectively, and the consequent subsisting relations. Through the medium of divine revelation, which fully approves itself to right reason, we learn, that God is the only independent and self-sufficient being -that he is the objective chief good-holy in his nature-equitable in his proceedings-and sovereignly beneficent. The essential character of man, as a subject of moral government, is, that he is absolutely dependent upon God-is possessed of intellect, will, and freedom-and is capable of enjoying the chief good.

§ 9. Hence we see the relation subsisting between the Governor and the governed. There can be no happiness but in harmony with his will, which is ever conformable to the absolute rectitude of his nature. A voluntary harmony with his will, is real virtue; and the want of it,

moral agents, is real vice. A moral agent who, in his determinations, opposes God's holy will, at the same time opposes his holy nature. Now, to suppose that a voluntary determination of the agent, in contrariety to the will and nature of the governor, is not opposed by equity, would be a contradiction; would be to suppose God to be adverse to evil, and yet not adverse to it; to be unchangeable in his aversion to what is wrong, and yet changeable. Hence to be opposed by equity, is to be obliged to endure the consequence of not enjoying the chief good; and when a capacity for happiness is not gratified, the necessary effect is misery. Consequently, he that will not be virtuous, must be, is, obliged to be miserable, from the nature of things, that is, from the nature of the Governor and the governed.

§ 10. Were this point properly considered, we should have fewer controversies about original sin, free-will, divine operations on the mind, faith, good works, the nature and extent of the price of redemption, election and predestination to life. We should also perceive