from the brute creation, and by which we are physically capacitated to enjoy happiness in God. By "morál means" I understand objec tive inducements, or considerations presented to our physical powers. And by "freedom" I mean exemption from constraint to evil, and restraint from good, in our elections. Beside these requisites, however, the advocates for selfdetermination of the will, imagine that some occult quality, an undefined and undefinable something behind the scene, which, however, they denominate active power, &c., but of which they do not profess to form any precise idea— is needful to constitute moral obligation, or tỏ render us accountable agents.

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§ 2. Thus his Lordship often asserts that man has the power of obeying,' is capable of obeying;' that. God gives to every man — á power to perform the conditions of the gospel;' that to deny this power to any individual, would 'be inconsistent with the attributes of God.' Sometimes this power is termed 'baptismal grace,' and sometimes we are told, “that every man is enabled to attain salvation through the ' merits of Christ; that all who were to par'take of Adam's corrupt nature were to partakė ' also of the appointed remedy;' that the second Adam restored all to life,' that the Jews had ́ a power of understanding and believing;' that

it is in the power of every one to attain eternal happiness; that 'God has enabled every man 'born into the world, to work out his own sal

vation;' that Christ died to enable every 'individual descendant of Adam to obtain 'eternal happiness;' that if mankind had not the power, by free-will, to avoid what is disgraceful, and to choose what is good, they would not be responsible for their actions.' Again, God determined to make men and angels with full power to act justly.' God created angels and men to do whatever he gave them strength to be able to do.' We 'have produced wickedness; but those who ' have produced it, have it in their power again 'to renounce it.' Man has power over him'self.' Men will receive the just judgment of "God, because they have not worked good when they had it in their power to work it.' • Man is in his own power with respect to faithin his own free-will and power.' The wicked Jews were able to act justly. Neither praise ! nor dispraise, nor honours, nor punishments, would be just, if the soul had not the power of desiring or rejecting.'

free sovereign power.'

God has given us a 'That thing is in our

' own power, of which we are equally masters, as of its opposite.'. 'God pardons what is past, but every one has the future in his own power?' 'Every one has the power of choosing good, and

' of choosing evil.' When he gives other com'mandments, he shews that it is in our power to 'keep them.' It is the will of God that man 'should obey the understanding, and he has ' received power to subject himself. Sometimes, again, this inward power is expressed in very different language. 'No one is born without 'Christ' and no one is born without having in himself the seeds of wisdom, and of justice, and of the other virtues.' What would be more unjust, than that those should be punished, 'who are not able to do what ought to be done?' 'Grace is poured upon all, excepting neither Jew 'nor Greek-nor old nor young; but coming to 'all equally.'

§ 3. These passages, and many more of the same tendeney, are evidently designed to shew, that mankind possess a 'power' or 'strength' which is the ground of responsibility. If the meaning be, that man has physical powers, moral means, and freedom; why are they produced against Calvinists, who admit this in the fullest extent? But if something more be intended, as is probably the case in several expressions and phrases, what is it? If it admit of no description or explanation, may not its existence readily be doubted? Is it baptismal grace? Then but a small part are under moral obligation! Is it a portion of the grace of Christ, afforded to

every child of Adam? Two considerations offer themselves against the doctrine: first, it wants evidence to support it; and, secondly, the sup-. position that internal grace is a requisite ground of moral obligation, is subversive of the very nature of moral government. Even supposing that every descendant of Adam has, from his birth, a portion of the grace of Christ, this would not alter the case. As the very notion of moral government implies a possible deviation from rectitude and a loss of the divine favour; if the ground of the obligation did not continue unalterably the same, through all vicissitudes and bereavements, the greater the moral impotence, in other words the depravity of the subject, the more free from obligation! If this be not utterly subversive of moral government, it is difficult to say what is. On this principle, our first father Adam, by his delinquency, must have removed himself from obligation to the Supreme Governor, because destitute of an essential requisite: and, for the same reason, the fallen angels are under no obligation to love their Maker, but must have removed themselves from his government, and have a ground of accusation against him, because his claims continue, and yet they have no inward grace, as a requisite of moral obligation.

$4. Another ground of inconsistency, and

of much confusion, is the notion, that the Liberty which is essential to moral obligation, is a physical power. It is more than probable, that this idea was affixed to several of the words and phrases above quoted. Without doubt, however, this is a very common idea with the advocates of a self-determining power, The word 'Liberty' and the epithet 'free' prefixed to will,' being positive terms, by the use of which the mind is too apt to be influenced in forming ideas; we are in danger of being betrayed into the notion that some positive idea is intended to be conveyed by them, and therefore that they express some physical power. But if we substitute negative terms conveying the very same ideas, the fallacy may be more easily detected. What is free-will, but unrestrained, unconstrained, unbound, or unforced will? Whatever terms are employed to express it, the idea is decidedly negative, as denoting a denial or exemption. Who can deseribe, who can conceive any thing more as implied in the idea of liberty or freedom? The will indeed is a physical faculty by which power is exerted, but its freedom is a negation of all foreign interference in its exercise.

5. As another ground of embarrassment, in reference to moral obligation, we may notice