import. JUSTIN MARTYR: ""Neither do we say, that men act or suffer according to fate, 'but that every one does rightly, or sins, "according to his choice."'* His choice, beyond doubt, is the immediate cause of the quality of his actions: but this does not imply that the choice itself had no adequate cause; or that it was not foreknown as a future certainty. CHRYSOSTOM: "Christ says 'It must needs 'be that offences come;' not weakening the freedom of choice, nor imposing any necessity or force upon our conduct; but foretelling ' what would certainly happen from the wicked disposition of men, which was about to happen, ' not because of his prediction, but because of 'the disposition of those who would admit of no remedy. For those things did not happen because he foretold them; but because they would ' certainly happen, therefore he foretold them.Ӡ What can be plainer than this quotation in favour our of hypothetical necessity? We are suffi ciently persuaded, and so was CHRYSOSTOM, that the will of man is free; and yet there was a sufficient cause of the event, as a ground of certainty. What kind of necessity CHRYSOSTOM does oppose, is explained by himself, when he contrasts it with "freedom of choice," and explains it by the term "force;" an explanation in which we fully coincide. To the same effect

* Refut. p. 297. Ibid. p. 497.

is IRENEUS's remark: ""All these things shew 'the free-will of man, and the counsel of God, 'exhorting against disobedience, but not forcing < our wills."'* Also CLEMENT of Alexandria : ""Neither praise, nor dispraise, nor honours, nor punishments, would be just, if the soul had not the power of desiring and reject'ing, and if vice were involuntary."† We hold no necessity that implies "forcing our wills," and which renders our actions "involuntary."

6

§ 21. TERTULLIAN very properly observes: "Every one has a right belonging to man, and a natural power to worship that which he thinks right; nor is any one injured or benefited by 'the religion of another. Nor is it any part of

religion to force religion, which ought to be 'taken up spontaneously, not by force." As the Bishop, in order to be consistent with his profession, must hold, that the established church is allied to, and inseparably connected with the state; and as he asserts that his church

is not Calvinistic;" he must, in self-consistenoy, exonerate the Calvinists from the public enforcing "act of uniformity." Why, then, it is natural to ask, does he produce this entire

* Refut. P. 305.
Ib. p. 318.

+ Ib.

p. 312.

Ib. p. 590.

quotation from TERTULLIAN against us? Do we not maintain that "every one has a right to worship as he thinks right?" Or does he suppose that with us it is a 66 part of religion to force religion?" Or does he imagine that we have some enchanting chains with which we are able to drag

by force” an audience έκων αέκοντιγε θυμω Were we to judge merely from the tendency of the quotation, we might suppose it to have been introduced to overthrow acts of uniformity, or to encourage the separatist to stand firm to his principles in opposition to civil "force” in matters of religion. But whatever might be his Lordship's real motive for transcribing the passage, he has most effectually concealed it from vulgar scrutiny.

§ 22. We have in the "Refutation" several' quotations from the Fathers which treat of freewill and power, as if they stood opposed to the "tenets of Calvinism but which, in their genuine import, are perfectly consistent with those tenets. Thus, for instance, TERTULLIAN: "A law would not have been imposed on a person who had not in his power [i. e. at his option] the obedience due to the law; nor again would transgression have been threatened 'with death, if the contempt also of the law ' were not placed to the account of free-willHe who should be found good or bad by

necessity and not voluntarily, could not with 'justice receive the retribution of either good ' or evil.-Morcover, if you ask whence that will comes, by which we will any thing contrary to the will of God, I will tell you: It comes from

ourselves."**

The whole connexion shews that

the author meant by the phrase " in his power' the same idea as is expressed by "at his option," in opposition to that which destroys liberty. In the last sentence, TERTULLIAN advances a very important sentiment, though it is more than probable that he was not aware of all the truth which the expressions are well adapted to convey. The sinfulness of a choice, "comes from ourselves." He was fully aware that the physical power of willing and choosing comes from God; what he therefore intends is the source of its "contrariety to the will of God," and which, in the strictest and fullest sense, "comes from ourselves" exclusively. This is that negative principle of defectibility which God has not in himself, and cannot possibly impart to the creature, because it is no object of power: I will add, that it is the only principle by which we can possibly account, in a satisfactory manner, for an endless number of phenomena in the moral world. Were it better understood by inquisitive minds, it would ex

clude a thousand perplexities, shew the folly of many past controversies, and exhibit in the most amiable light the true character of the blessed God.

§ 23. ORIGEN very well observes, (why his Lordship has quoted the passage against the Calvinists, is best known to himself): "The 'soul is endowed with free-will, and is at liberty * to incline either way; and therefore the judgement of God is just, because the human soul, 'of its own accord, obeys either good or bad 'advisers."'* The same introductory remark is applicable to the following observation of EUSEBIUS: "So that it must be altogether acknowledged, that we have liberty, and the 'free-will of a rational and intelligent nature." Does his Lordship know any Calvinist, or can he produce any Calvinistic author, who does not accord with EUSEBIUS's remark? Again, AUGUSTINE says: ""Every one is author of his ' own sin. Whence, if you doubt, attend to 'what is said above, that sins are avenged by the justice of God; for they would not be 'justly avenged unless they were committed. 'with the will.-It follows that nothing

'makes the mind a companion of lust, except 'its own free-will." Who doubts it?