they are full of reason, and of the power of him who acts. We men will to do most things ' with counsel; but effect by no means follows 'the will. But no one can resist Him, to pre'vent his doing whatever he wills. But he 'wills those things which are full of reason and counsel:' He wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.' But because no one is saved without his own will, (for we have free-will) he wills us to will 'that which is good, that when we have willed 'it, he himself also may will to fulfil his own 'counsel in us.' "'* Here JEROME very explicitly declares his mind, that whatever God does, he does it "according to predestination and purpose." But as he proceeds to reconcile the irresistible will of God, with the free-will of man, by stating, that "he wills us to will that which is good," I am constrained to admire his ingenuity in the mode of expressing a general truth, when apparently unacquainted with the real and scientific principle of reconciliation.

§ 15. JEROME says, "He wills us to will that which is good." He very properly rejects the idea of God willing any "wicked things," and confines the predestinating purpose and efficiency to what is good. When therefore any one "wills

*Refut. p. 406.

that which is good," he ascribes it to the will of God" according to his predestination and purpose." Thus far the learned Father is clear and satisfactory. But a mind intent upon scientific evidence enquires, upon what principle are we authorised to say that "God wills us to will," when at the same time our will is free? How is this conceivable? Here are two wills,--one irresistible, the other free; what is it less than a plain contradiction, to suppose that the former operates upon the latter, according to a settled predestinating purpose, in order that it may "will that which is good." Thus we may reason and object, object and reason, in a circle and without end. Without a true principle, all such debates are but "vain jangling," and " position of science, falsely so called." But if we regard the will, both of God and the creature, not as the source, but as the medium of active power, the source of power being the nature of the agent, the difficulty vanishes. God's infinitely active nature, under the direction of unfathomable wisdom, exerts his power by the medium of his will. His knowledge is infinite, and therefore his purposes are infinitely wise; his power is omnipotent, and therefore the medium of that power, his will, never fails to be effectual. In every creature there is a principle of defectibility, else he would be identified with the Creator, who alone is without “ varia

op

bleness." And this principle, which is only a relative defect, though not the will of the creature, is yet a source of the manner of willing; otherwise the volitions would not be according to the nature of the agent,-a supposition to the last degree absurd: since if the agent do not will according to his nature, we might reasonably conclude that the divine volitions may be weak, unwise, or unholy! Now, seeing that the will operates according to the nature of which it is the medium, nothing remains but the existence of a good nature in order t secure a good will. As an effective will follows an effective nature, so a defective will follows a defective nature. All men, however, have, in themselves considered, a defective nature, and, as fallen, a corrupted nature, ever "inclined to evil:" At the same time the will remains free. What then is requisite to secure a good will in a free agent? An influence from God, I answer, the source of all good, on man's nature, or heart, as the scriptures often express the idea, while the will, the medium of his power and nature, remains perfectly free, or exempt from compulsion and restraint. Here we have a satisfactory principle to reconcile certainty on the part of God, and freedom on the part of man; a principle, I will venture to affirm, against which no argument can be brought, no denial asserted, which may not be fairly met by

a reductio ad absurdum. As I am conscious of having no object in view but truth,—the establishment of true primary important principles in theology and moral science, I hope it will not be thought unsuitably presuming, if as a private individual I solicit the attention of thinking men to this point, and, if they are so disposed, to bring it to the test of clear and rational objection. Pure gold need not fear the heat of the furnace; and what honest man would wish to give circulation to base coin?

§ 14. We now advert to what the Fathers, quoted by the Bishop, say regarding Perseverance. There is one passage from AMBROSE, which though already produced for another purpose, must not be omitted in this place. " "Perseverance is not of the man who willeth, or of him who 'runneth; for it is not in the power of man: 'but it is of God, who pitieth, that you may be

able to complete what you have begun." What AMBROSE evidently designs to inculcate is this; that, though it is our incumbent duty to will and to run, that is, to use our utmost exertion in the way of holy obedience, the source of our perseverance is "God, who pitieth." If they who have begun well in the race of spiritual and holy obedience, obtain the prize of perfection,

*Refut. p. 381.

this completion is "of God." I believe the modern Calvinists will be very well satisfied with this conclusion, viz. That all those who finally attain the perfection of glory, by perseverance in holiness, attain it by the " power and grace of God." For my own part, I consider all other points, related to the subject, of comparatively little moment. This point is of practical utility, as tending to draw the heart to GOD every moment of time and every step of our progress; to him from whom our strength is derived, and who alone can crown our efforts with success. But the discussion of the question a priori, Who shall persevere, is apt to degenerate into useless speculations, greatly resembling another question, "Are there few that be saved?" The answer of incarnate wisdom was not to gratify speculative curiosity, but to rouse to holy solicitude and suitable exertion, “Strive to enter in at the straight gate."

$15.

AUGUSTINE makes these remarks: "The thief was justified, who, when all his limbs were fixed upon the cross, and having these two things at liberty, with his heart he 'believed unto righteousness, with his mouth 'confessed unto salvation, and immediately ' merited [obtained] this assurance, "To-day 'shalt thou be with me in Paradise." For his good * works would have followed, if he had lived any