created universe is from the will and consequently the decree or purpose of God; because good effects can have no other adequate cause. 4. That no evil in the universe is decreed by a Being of infinite goodness and benevolence; because this would be to oppose himself. 5: That the laws of physical nature, the moral law, and the operations of justice, are in' themselves good, though the innocent occasions of evil to individuals. 6. That all holiness and happiness in creatures are foreseen, because the effects of divine energy and purpose, inasmuch as whatever God effects, he designs, and what he designs he must needs foresee. 7. That evil which is unworthy of God to effect, and consequently to purpose, is foreseen in its negative principle, which is not from God, though related to creatures and their actions which it is worthy of him to create and support. 8. That the real origin of moral evil is a negative principle as related to a positive and active being, viz. a free agent in search of. happiness. 9. That the divine sovereign power could prevent moral evil in every instance, or remove its effects, but that such a prevention and removal are not, in all cases, consistent with God's infinite wisdom, and with the glory of his perfections, a position which is abundantly confirmed from scripture testimony and plain facts. 10. That the doctrine of Election, as before stated, is founded on two

principles, first, the foreseen insufficiency of sinful creatures to secure their own happiness, and, secondly, the sovereign mercy of God, under the direction of supreme wisdom,-inscrutable by creatures, of whatever order, and in whatever state,-resolving to effect that for its objects, which his infinite knowledge foresaw they would not effect of themselves, however suitable the means offered them, or strong the objective inducements. 11. The final inference is, that the Predestination or Election here maintained and which I consider as precisely the same with what is expressed in the 17th Article -is infinitely worthy of the divine character and perfections.

22. It is now time to advert to his Lordship's assertion, That we cannot reconcile prescience with other divine attributes and with free agency. His words are, We are utterly incapable of comprehending how God's pre⚫ science consists with the other attributes of 'the Deity and with the free agency of man.'* It is the part of Christian humility to acknow `ledge that there are innumerable things which we cannot comprehend; and the remark might be extended to the most exalted of created intelligences. There are, however, many things

* Refut. p. 252.

which we may sufficiently apprehend for the purposes of piety and useful practice; and it becomes us to be cautious how we fix our own capacity or incapacity as the standard for all others, or even for ourselves. What we know not now we may know hereafter, even in this life, if divinely taught. God is the fountain of wisdom; and "Who teacheth like him?" He can not only present the objects (the utmost that other teachers can do) but bestow the capacity to learn; and where he does this, it is not humility but ingratitude to disown it.

§ 23. God is infinitely wise and therefore knowing; but what attribute of the Deity has even the appearance of being inconsistent with this acknowledged fact? It is acknowledged that Prescience is included in infinite knowledge; I ask again, what attribute even appears to be inconsistent with it? Is it goodness, or holiness, or justice, or mercy? But is it not most apparently consistent, that an infinitely good and holy, just and merciful Being, should have a perfect knowledge of all beings and events, which we call past, present, and future? It seems to me an undeniable truth, for which evidence has been produced, that all the good in the created universe, of every description, is the effect of God's will and purpose, his

power and energy. How consistent then with all his attributes, that he should foreknow every thing he effects? Again, all evil, properly so called, results from a negative principle, which neither is nor can be the object of will, or of divine causation, though related to what is so. Now is there any appearance of inconsistency between a divine attribute, as justice, mercy, &c. and the prescience of events in their adequate. causes? What can be more consistent with the attributes of Deity, than that he should perfectly foreknow, what his creatures ought to do, according to the capacities, powers, means and opportunities which he would give them; and what they would not do in some circumstances, as well as what they would do in others?

§ 24. But, it may be said, the chief difficulty consists in comprehending the consistency between the divine prescience, and the free agency of man. Granted. But it does not appear to be an insurmountable difficulty, except when the solution is attempted on false principles. Adopt the true, and the difficulty vanishes. We all agree in the idea of agency, in general; but probably not in the idea of freedom. The last term, in my conception, is properly and consistently expressive of a negative idea-not a power, nor a faculty, but

exemption related to the will. But, as in the view of infinite intelligence nothing can be fortuitous or contingent, though many things are so to limited knowledge; and as all knowledge implies a ground of it; and as every event has for its ground either an efficient or deficient cause; and as all causes, both efficient and deficient, are equally clear to the divine mind;—what appearance of inconsistency is there between prescience and free agency? If indeed we adopt the false principle of free will having no cause of its determination, either efficient or deficient, the difficulty of reconciliation will be insurmountable, and it may be justly said, 'We are incapable of comprehending it.' Who is capable of comprehending the truth of a false principle, or the harmony of error with divine verity? But if all the good determinations of free will proceed from a good principle of which God is the author; and all evil determinations from a negative principle related to what is good, as the human will is, in itself considered; the consequence is conclusive, that it would be unworthy of every divine attribute, and especially prescience, to suppose that any determination of the free agent is not foreseen. True principles may give us a knowledge that is clear and decisive, if the fault be not in ourselves; but erroneous principles never can. With the latter we may perplex ourselves and

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