the equity of many awful judgments. But is this any sufficient proof that their heart is right with God, or that they have the root of sincere piety? They may be still under condemnation as practical unbelievers, and destitute of that holiness without which no man shall see the Lord: though perceiving, and in some respects approving of better things, they may be the slaves of sin, totally averse from the yoke of Christ, and prevailingly actuated by " the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life:" they may habitually be making "the pleasures of sin" their chief good; and, being thus in the flesh, they cannot please God, though possessed of physical powers, opportunities, and sufficient inducements.

§ 18. The scriptural account we have of Cain and Abel, affords no good evidence that either of them possessed a native moral ability to please God. Saint Paul explains the passage, and assures us, that "by faith Abel offered a more excellent sacrifice than Cain." But that faith was not "of himself, it was the gift of God," for why should we suppose that it flowed from a source different from that of Christian faith? And again, what Calvinist

would say, that Cain would not have been accepted, if he came to God with right ends. and motives? They both had physical power,

a favourable opportunity, and a sufficient inducement for offering an acceptable service. The fault of Cain, therefore, was all his own; but it does not thence follow that the faith of Abel had no higher source than his own native power, or that God by his grace did no more for Abel than for Cain. Should any one be disposed to think that God was bound in justice to do as much for the one as for the other, let him calmly reflect, first, that it is degrading to the divine freedom, to suppose that he is obliged to do all the good that he can; secondly, that it is a reflection on the character of God, since it is evident in fact that he does more for some of his rational creatures in the matter of salvation than for others; and, thirdly, that to suppose God is bound in justice to exercise mercy, is a contradiction in terms: for what is mercy, what can it be, but a favour beyond the claims of justice?

$19. When the article declares that man of his own nature "inclineth to evil," it expresses that very impotence which Calvinists ascribe to man in his fallen state. And that this is their meaning, is plain from their constant avowal, that a spiritual change confers upon the soul no new physical power, but only a different inclination towards God and holiness. The influence it receives may be called "the spirit of power,"

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whereby the mind is invigorated for holy obcdience. That an inclination to evil may be conquered, is plain from the fact that in many happy instances it is conquered. But is it ever conquered without divine assistance? If the aid of grace be necessary, why should it be ascribed to man's native goodness of heart? If not necessary, why should we be exhorted to pray for it with importunity? And if Saint Paul testified that he was not " of himself" sufficient to think a good thought, with what propriety can it be asserted that an unconverted man, who “ of his own nature inclineth to evil,” is" of himself capable" of understanding, savingly, that Jesus is "the Christ, the Son of God?" Our Lord tells Peter that such knowledge was revealed to him by his heavenly Father. And Saint John affirms, that no man can say, that is, to saving purpose, "that Jesus is the Christ, but by the Holy Ghost." The apostle could not mean that no man, without the Holy Ghost, could say this in a cursory manner, or maintain it as a doctrinal truth, because the contrary is a plain fact. He must therefore intend to inculcate, that a just knowledge and cordial approbation of Jesus as the Christ, is from the Holy Spirit.

$20. When his Lordship asserts, that God 'gives to every man, through the means of

'his grace, a power to perform the conditions of 'the gospel,' the Calvinists have no controversy with him, except about the meaning of the term. Taking the word "power" for opportunity, or for a sufficient inducement, they admit the assertion as an important truth. But to suppose that every man, through the means of grace, has a prevailing inclination to perform the condition of the gospel, is contrary to indisputable fact: since the means of grace are to great numbers, through their own fault, "a savour of death unto death." In short, what we maintain is, that the power which man has lost, through original sin, is-an effectual or prevailing inclination to good.

SECT. II.

The Bishop's acowed Sentiments on FREE-WILL, examined.

§ 2.

§ 1. Sources of ambiguity in discussions about Free-Will. Wherein the freedom of the will consists. §3. The idea of will, and that of its freedom, of different kinds. § 4. The Bishop's opinion stated.

5. The sentiment that impressions made upon the mind depend on reason and Free-Will, examined. § 6. The Calvinistic sentiment stated and defended. § 7. God is under no obligation in justice to change any sinner's heart.

§8. That conversion is owing to the exercise of our natural powers, examined. 9. The Calvinistic notion of conversion, stated and defended.

§ 1. MUCH of the ambiguity which attends

discussions about Free-Will, arises from the want of precision in the use of this term. It would afford but little interest to enumerate the different acceptations in which it has been taken by controversial writers. What can be rationally meant by it, but the will in a state of freedom? When, therefore, it is said that man has free-will, it is the same as affirming that his will is free. But free from what? It is not free from divine energy supporting it in existence. It is not free from a perpetual tendency to apparent good; for in this must consist its glory and perfection; nor is it free from aversion to apparent evil, without which