of credence, the directory announced to him their haughty determination "not to receive another minister plenipotentiary from the United States, until after the redress of grievances demanded of the American govern. ment, which the French republic had a right to expect from it." This message was succeeded, first by indecorous verbal communications, calculated to force the American minister out of France, and afterwards, by a written mandate to quit the territories of the republic.

This act of hostility was accompanied with another which would explain the motives for this conduct, if previous measures had not rendered all further explanation unnecessary.

On giving to the recalled minister his audience of leave, the president of the directory addressed a speech to him, in which terms of outrage to the government, were mingled with expressions of affection for the people of the United States; and the expectation of ruling the former, by their influence over the latter, was too clearly manifested not to be understood. To complete this system of hostility, American vessels were captured wherever found; and, under the pretext of their wanting a document, with which the treaty of commerce had been uniformly understood to dispense, they were condemned as prize.

This serious state of things demanded a solemn consideration. On receiving from General Pinckney the despatches which communicated it, the President issued his proclamation requiring congress to meet on the 15th day of May. The firm and dignified speech delivered by the chief magistrate at the commencement of the session, exhibited that sensibility which a high minded and real American might be expected to feel, while representing to the national legislature the great and unprovoked outrages of a foreign government. Adverting to the audience of leave given by the executive directory to Colonel Monroe, he said, "the speech of the president discloses sentiments more alarming than the refusal of a minister, because more dangerous to our independence and union; and, at the same time, studiously marked with indignities towards the government of the United States. It evinces a disposition to separate the people from their government; to persuade them that they have different affections, principles, and interests from those of their fellow citizens whom they themselves have chosen to manage their common concerns; and thus to produce divisions fatal to our peace. Such attempts ought to be repelled with a decision which shai convince France, and the world, that we are not a degraded people, humiliated under a colonia! spirit of fear, and sense of inferiority, fitted to be the miserable instru ments of foreign influence, and regardless of national honour, character, and interest."

"Retaining still the desire which had uniformly been manifested by the American government to preserve peace and friendship with all nations, and believing that neither the honour nor the interest of the United States absolutely forbade the repetition of advances for securing these desirable objects with France, he should," he said, " institute a fresh attempt at negotiation, and should not fail to promote and accelerate an accommodation on terms compatible with the rights, duties, interests, and honour of the nation." But while he should be making these endeavours to adjust all differences with the French republic by amicable negotiation, he earnestly recommended it to congress to provide effectual measures of defence.

To carry into effect the pacific dispositions avowed in the speech, three envoys extraordinary were appointed, at the head of whom General Pinckney was placed. Their instructions conformed to the public language of the President. Peace and reconciliation were to be pursued by all means, compatible with the honour and the faith of the United States; but no national engagements were to be impaired; no innovation to be permitted upon those internal regulations for the preservation of peace which had been deliberately and uprightly established; nor were the rights of the government to be surrendered.

The debates in the house of representatives, on the answer to the speech, were long and earnest. To expressions approving the conduct of the executive with regard to foreign nations, the opposition was ardent, but unsuccessful. On the third of June, an answer was agreed to which contained sentiments worthy of an American legislature, and for which several of the leaders of the opposition voted.

The speech of the President was well adapted to the occasion, and to the times. It was calculated to rouse those indignant feelings which a high spirited people, insulted and injured by a foreign power, can never fail to display, if their judgment be not blinded, or their sensibility to external wrongs blunted, by invincible prejudices. He relied principally on the manifestation of these feelings for the success of the negotiation; and on their real existence, for the defence of the national rights, should negotiation fail. His endeavours were not absolutely unsuccessful. Some impression was made on the mass of the people; but it was toc slight to be productive of the advantages expected from it. The conduct of France was still openly defended; and the opinion, that the measures which had been adopted by the executive of the United States furnished that republic with just cause of war, was still publicly maintained, and indefatigably circulated. According to these opinions, America could entitle herself to peace, only by retracing the steps she had taken, and

yielding to the demands of her justly offended but generous and magna. nimous ally.

events.

Still jealous for the honour, as well as confident of the importance, of his country, and retaining that full conviction respecting the propriety of its measures which had induced their adoption, General Washington could not repress the solicitude with which he contemplated passing His confidential letters disclose the strong feelings of his own bosom, but betray no apprehensions that the French government would press its present system to extremities. He firmly believed that the hostile attitude it had assumed was to be, exclusively, ascribed to the conduct of those Americans who had been the uniform advocates of all the pretensions of France, and who were said to be supported by a real majority of the people; and confidently expected that, under the old pretext of magnanimous forbearance, the executive directory would, slowly, and gradually, recede from its present system, so soon as the error in which it originated should become manifest. The opinion he had always entertained of the good sense and patriotism of his fellow citizens, silenced every doubt respecting the manner in which they would act, when their real situation should be perceived by themselves.

For a considerable length of time, no certain intelligence reached the United States respecting the negotiation at Paris. At length, in the winter of 1798, letters were received from the American envoys, indicating an unfavourable state of things; and, in the spring, despatches arrived which announced the total failure of the mission.

History will scarcely furnish the example of a nation, not absolutely degraded, which has received from a foreign power such open contumely, and undisguised insult, as were, on this occasion, suffered by the United States in the persons of their ministers.

It was insinuated that their being taken from the party* which had supported the measures of their own government furnished just cause of umbrage; and, under slight pretexts, the executive directory delayed to accredit them as the representatives of an independent nation. In this situation, they were assailed by persons, not indeed invested with formal authority, but exhibiting sufficient evidence of the source from which their powers were derived, who, in direct and explicit terms, demanded money from the United States as the condition which must precede, not only the reconciliation of America to France, but any negotiation on the differences between the two countries.

That an advance of money by a neutral to a belligerent power would

* Two of them were of the party denominated federal; the third was arranged with the opposition.

be an obvious departure from neutrality, though an insuperable objection to this demand, did not constitute the most operative reason for repelling it. Such were the circumstances under which it was made, that it could not be acceded to without a surrender of the real independence of the United States; nor without being, in fact, the commencement of a system, the end of which it was impossible to foresee.

A decided negative was therefore given to the preliminary required by these inofficial agents; but they returned to the charge with wonderful perseverance, and used unwearied arts to work upon the fears of the American ministers for their country, and for themselves. The immense power of France was painted in glowing colours, the humiliation of the house of Austria was stated, and the conquest of Britain was confidently anticipated. In the friendship of France alone, it was said, could America look for safety; and the fate of Venice was held up to warn her of the danger which awaited those who incurred the displeasure of the great republic. The ministers were assured that, if they believed their conduct would be approved in t'e United States, they were mistaken. The means which the Directory possessed, in that country, to excite odium against them, were great, and would unquestionably be employed.

This degrading intercourse was at length interrupted by the positive refusal of the envoys to hold any further communication with the persons employed in it.

Meanwhile, they urged the object of their mission with persevering but unavailing solicitude. The Directory still refused to acknowledge them in their public character; and the secretary of exterior relations, at unofficial visits which they made him, renewed the demand which his agents had unsuccessfully pressed.

Finding the objections to their reception in their official character in. surmountable, the American ministers made a last effort to execute the duties assigned to them. In a letter addressed to the secretary of exterior relations, they entered at large into the explanations committed to them by their government, and illustrated, by a variety of facts, the uniform friendliness of its conduct to France.* Notwithstanding the failure of this effort, and their perfect conviction that all further attempts would be equally unavailing, they continued, with a passiveness which must search for its apology in their solicitude to demonstrate to the American people the real views of the French republic, to employ the only means

• It is a remarkable fact, that the answer of the French minister to this letter, an answer which criminated the American government in bitter terms, was in the possession of a printer in Philadelphia who had uniformly supported the pretensions of that republic, before it reached the American government.

in their power to avert the rupture which was threatened, and which appeared to be inevitable.

During these transactions, occasion was repeatedly taken to insult the American government; open war was continued to be waged by the cruisers of France on American commerce; and the flag of the United States was a sufficient justification for the capture and condemnation of any vessel over which it waved.

At length, when the demonstration became complete, that the resolution of the American envoys was not less fixed, than their conduct had been guarded and temperate, various attempts were made to induce tw of them, voluntarily, to relinquish their station; on the failure of which they were ordered to quit the territories of the republic. As if to aggra vate this national insult, the third, who had been selected from that party which was said to be friendly to France, was permitted to remain, and was invited to resume the discussions which had been interrupted.

The despatches communicating these events were laid before congress, and were afterwards published. The indignation which they excited was warm and extensive. The attempt to degrade the United States into a tributary nation was too obvious to be concealed; and the resentment produced, as well by this attempt as by the threats whi accompanied it, was not confined to the federalists. For the moment, a spirit was roused on which an American may reflect with pride, and which he may consider as a sure protection from external danger. In every part of the continent, the favourite sentiment was "millions for defence, not a cent for tribute."

The disposition still existed to justify France, by criminating the American government, by contending that her intentions were not really hostile, that her conduct was misrepresented by men under British influence, who wished for war, or had been deceived by unauthorized intriguers; that, admitting it to be otherwise, she only demanded those marks of friendship which, at a critical moment, she had herself afforded; that the real interests of the United States required a compliance with this demand; that it would cost more money to resist than to yield to it; that the resistance would infallibly be ineffectual; and that national honour was never secured by national defeat. Neither these sentiments, nor the arguments which were founded on them, accorded with the general feeling; and it required the co-operation of other causes to establish the influence of those who urged them.

In congress, vigorous measures were adopted for retaliating injuries which had been sustained, and for repelling those which were threatened. Amongst these was a regular army. A regiment of artillerists