THE WAR FOR THE UNION.

The month of May, 1862, found the great armies of the Union threatening the forces of the rebellion at all points. A firm determination filled every northern bosom. Many a glorious battle field had taught the soldiers on both sides how to fight and how to endure. Unbounded heroism filled the whole nation. Never on this earth had so broad and glorious a country groaned under a harvest of iron. The defeat of Bull Run, instead of disheartening the people, fired them with new courage and that unconquerable resolution, which is the best part of National heroism.

New Orleans had been captured by the invincible Farragut, by a series of brilliant naval victories. He was then a commodore, but has since been raised by these really wonderful exploits to the highest rank in the

navy.

The sea coast had been blockaded from Fortress Monroe to the Rio Grande. Generals Butler and Burnside had carried their fleets in safety to Hatteras Inlet, and had set up the old flag upon the shores of the Carolinas. General Hunter had established himself in Florida. The Army of the West, moving southward along the banks of the Mississippi, aided by the gunboat flotilla of Commodore Foote, had captured Island Number Ten, fought and won the great battle of Pittsburg Landing, and led by General Halleck, had invested Corinth. In the East, General McClellan, at the head of the Army of the Potomac, was moving up the Peninsula, in the advance upon Richmond. The whole nation watched his movements with anxious hopefulness, inspired by his successes in the West, backed by General Scott's high recommendation. This history has already recorded the siege and capture of Yorktown, and the victory of Williamsburg, and has touched upon the engagement of West Point. The latter took place on the 7th of May, and was but one of the many lesser battles, which formed a stormy prelude to the terrible Seven

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Days' Fights, among the swamps before the city of Richmond. Its purpose was the establishment of the Union arms at West Point, which would necessarily force the Rebels to abandon all their works on the Peninsula, between Yorktown and that place. Its success crowned the triumph that had meanwhile been achieved at Williamsburgh. It lasted from about ten o'clock in the morning, till about three o'clock in the afternoon, and ended in the repulse of the Rebels, who were thus, at all points, retiring before the gallant soldiers of the Union. The losses at the battle of West Point, as reported by General Franklin, were fortynine killed, one hundred and four wounded, and forty-one missing.

THE MARCH TO WHITE HOUSE.

The narrative, terminating at the close of the first volume of this history, with the battle of West Point, now concerns itself with the onward march of the Army of the Potomac. On the 9th of May, General McClellan effected a junction with the forces under the command of General Franklin, at West Point; and hence, partly by land and partly by water, the whole army moved up the Pamunkey river towards a place called White House, twelve miles distant. The roads at this time were in a bad condition for travel, owing to heavy rains; and therefore the advance was made but slowly. It was not until the 16th inst., that General McClellan established his head-quarters at White House, where he organized a permanent depot for supplies. These coming up the York river by water, could be landed at West Point and brought hence by railroad. From White House the march continued toward the Chickahominy river. No material opposition was anywhere encountered. Tho rebels were massing their forces beyond the Chickahominy, in front of Richmond, and preparing for the desperate, decisive struggle.

On the 20th of May the left wing of the Union Army reached the Chickahominy, at a point called Bottom's Bridge. The bridge had been destroyed by the enemy, but the stream was immediately forded by General Casey's troops, and the bridge was rebuilt. In the mean while the centre and the right wing were advanced to the river above, driving the rebels out of the village of Mechanicsville. The lincs now extended from Mechanicsville, on the right, to Seven Pines, on the left, the latter being a strong position on the Bottom's Bridge road, on the further side of the Chickahominy.

GENERAL M'CLELLAN AND THE GOVERNMENT.

Here the advance was stayed. As early as the 10th of May, General McClellan, well assured of the strength of his foe, and of the nature and place of the opposition that would be made by the rebels, had represented to the War Department the comparative numerical weakness of his army, and the necessity for its reinforcement. Much correspondence now eusned, between him and the President, on this subject. It was General McClellan's desire to rest his army on the James river, to receive his reinforcements by that channel, and to move on Richmond from that quarter. On the other hand, it was the opinion of the President, and the Secretary-of-War, that his army ought to rest upon the Pamunkey, receive reinforcements by land, if at all, and move on Richmond by means of bridges across the Chickahominy. General McDowell, at the head of between 35,000 and 40,000 men, was, at this time, in the neighborhood of Fredericksburg. The proper disposition of this force was also a point in controversy between General McClellan and the authorities at the capital. The former requested that McDowell's troops might be sent to him, and sent by water. The latter dreaded to send them, lest, by so doing, they might uncover the City of Washington, and expose it to a rebel raid. On the part of General McClellan it was urged that no such apprehension need be entertained; that the bulk of the enemy's forces were massed for the defence of Richmond; that to conquer the rebels there, would be the surest method of securing the safety of Washington; that the presence of McDowell's corps would so strengthen his hands as to make victory certain; that, should the rebels attempt a raid on Washington, their route would be by way of Gordonsville and Manassas, on which they could readily be checked; and, finally, that the coming of McDowell's troops by land would render their timely arrival less certain than it would be in the event of their coming by water, while it would equally render them unavailable for the defense of Washington. The opinion of the Government, however, prevailed; and, in the end, the plan of General McClellan's campaign was materially changed. He had designed to approach Richmond by the east and south. Resting on the Pamunkey, his purpose was now to approach it by the north. This change in the plan of the campaign necessitated the division of his army by the Chickahominy river, and the bridging of that river in many places. On the 18th of May the Secretary-of-War notified him that General McDowell's corps would be sent forward by land from Fredericksburg, to form a junction with the right wing of the Army of the Potomac. Awaiting this reinforcement, General McClellan

employed himself in strengthening his position, and in building the necessary bridges across the Chickahominy. On the 24th of May he was notified that the critical position of General Banks' troops, consequent upon a sudden raid, by Stonewall Jackson, up the Valley of the Suchandoah river, had occasioned the recall of General McDowell, and that the Army of the Potomac must proceed without reinforcements.

General McClellan has been bitterly censured for his alleged slothfulness and hesitation, at this juncture; nor can it be denied that his advance towards Richmond was made slowly and with extreme caution. It must be remembered, however, that to march through sloughs of mire, in the face of a powerful and well intrenched foe, is far less easy than to advance on paper, and conquer enemies with printers' ink. This is not a partisan history-its design is simply to record facts and to do justice. Subsequent events have shed much light upon General McClellan's Peninsular Campaign. That he had not over-estimated the power of the rebel forces, was conclusively shown in the bloody and terrible seven. days' battles. That he was obliged to deviate from his own chosen plan is evident, and is not denied: yet that plan was the same which was ultimately adopted by General Grant, in the final campaign of the war. Richmond when finally taken, was approached from the east and south, and not from the north. General McClellan may have been overcautious; but his tactics were wise, and his patriotism stainless.

The following is the language of General McClellan's Report, as to several essential points: "The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction; and as the order for General McDowell's march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of my campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by water, I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body, instead of being necessarily divided by that

stream.

"In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy, and the liability of its bottom land to sudden inundations, it became neces sary to construct between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville, eleven new bridges, all new and difficult, with extensive by-way approaches.

The entire army could, probably, have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated upon the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing