suffered to have his own will, the process of education is much retarded. The beginning having been made by parental control, no different procedure intervenes to establish self-restraint. Intellectual associations revive pains and discomforts connected with a given action, and when the motive to that action rises there rise also the counter-emotions suggested thereby. As the reach of association is widened, remote consequences and connections are apprehended, and the force of motives is enhanced until there comes the large range of thought and admirable self-command of the highly-cultured man. Between this and the uncontrolled nature of the infant, the profligate, or the savage, are all degrees.

§ 17. It must be observed that this control of emotion implies not merely suppression, but also the evoking of feeling. This may be accomplished in two general ways, the one to act out the external manifestations, and the other to direct the thoughts as exclusively as possible to the end desired. The latter course involves the assumption that the thoughts themselves are under control, and its consideration may well be deferred till the matter of control of thoughts is referred to. Upon the former it may be remarked for raising emotions there seems to be some efficacy in 'going through with the motions.' If we draw down the features, indulge in sighs and lugubrious moans, we may actually induce grief; if we attempt to look cheerful, we may really become cheerful. So a fit of anger may be excited by violent movements; it is possible for us in these ways to summon up the blood.' Precipitate motion may create fear. But when an actor represents feelings, there may be an absence of the effect just commented upon from the fact that the actor is aiming at effect upon others rather than on himself. In the best acting, however, when the actor loses himself in his subject,' we have real feeling evoked.

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§ 18. In closing this topic, we may observe that the measure of control of the emotions is very largely the measure of restraint of the outward manifestations. He who can control his features can control his feelings. Self-control and self-restraint mean little more than control over the various modes of action. He who can hold the tongue' is a man of self-control.

GENERAL CONTROL OF THOUGHTS.

§ 19. The control of feelings implies the control of thoughts, and the education of the feelings is an education of the thoughts;

but there are some ways in which the thoughts exercise a reactive control over the feelings, and some ways in which voluntary action seems to have power of control over the thoughts. The mind can arrest the current of association, can dwell upon particular topics, can exclude or lightly pass over others, and thus exercise a general, though not unlimited, restraint over its intellectual operations. The activity of the mind in association is not a strictly voluntary activity; that is to say, there is no balance of active forces in obedience to the behest of pleasure and pain; association takes place automatically. There is, however, a voluntary interference at which the opposition of motives is observable and a conscious preponderance of one set over another. This voluntary control does not appear to be direct. It operates by concentrating the mind upon a given point; that is, by inducing a flow of strong feeling toward that point. This feeling may be pleasurable or painful; in any event, if the feeling be strong, the attention will be detained. As it is detained there will be a greater stimulus to all the associations connected with the topic upon which there is detention. Each one of these will bring with it divergent impulses strong enough to create the consciousness of an opposition, and to require an effort to maintain attention in a given direction. If the motive to particular attention is strong enough, it will control; if a divergent force is more powerful, it will draw away the attention. Attention is arrested not only by pleasurable and painful feelings, but also by indifferent ones. Sensations, irrespective of their quality, secure the attention oftentimes; some emotions are neither pleasurable nor painful, and yet absorb attention. This is not the kind of operation which secures voluntary control over the thoughts. There must be a play of motives, the results of experience, in order to produce the most highly complex and perfect exercises of volition. These motives are no different from all other motives that affect voluntary action. They take their rise in pleasure and pain, and the connections between the given action and associated pleasure or pain may be direct or remote. "The intellectual basis of a selective attention is known to be the process of identification of the present with the past. We think of the round form of a shilling when the shilling recalls the collective past impression of round things. On this ground the occurrence of some other round things along with the shilling, as a ring and a circular stamp upon the table, would make us tend to think rather of the roundness of the shilling than of its colour or its

weight. This is a purely intellectual determination; yet it is often the cause of our attending to one quality rather than to another for the time being. Short of this effect of an identity with the past, we do not make any property an object of attention. When a voluntary preference induces attention, it induces this effect of reviving by similarity the past accumulated impressions; roundness with accumulated round figures; silvery whiteness, with the accumulated visible effects of the same whiteness, and so on. Thus, on the one hand, an intellectual suggestion may be the proximate cause of the selective attention; and, on the other hand, a volitional impulse under the attraction of a feeling may be the cause. Now we have the power to overbear all these commanding attractions-pleasure, intensity, pain, intellectual coincidence-in favour of some property that has nothing in itself to force it upon our notice. This power, however, means nothing but the existence of other motives still, having a superior degree of force; for example, the motive of some great utility, as when we are looking at a signal-post, and attending to nothing but the characteristic movement that conveys the message.' 'When we are freely venting random impulses, being under no specialising motives, the course seems to be this: there is a complex solicitation of the sense or senses; some one effect, however, is more agreeable than the rest, and, by the primary law of our voluntary framework, will attract our attention to the neglect of the others.

'After a time sensibility is exhausted or enfeebled, and the act of attending ceases; the other effects now rise into prominence, and some circumstance gives a superior impressiveness to one of these.' (Bain.)

§ 20. It is not an easy matter to trace the operation of the will in the control of ideas to and through the muscular movements. The effect is in many cases so minute that it cannot be observed; but so far as observation has gone there is here also confirmation of the general truth that the voluntary activity is an activity which chiefly concerns the muscular system. It is sufficiently evident that when an impression is made upon the mind. through the epi-periphery, the mind meets the impression and apprehends the sensation through the muscular system. Now our ideas or cognitions are but representations of our presentative knowledge, and there is no mode of explaining the effects of the presence of those representations except by the fact that the representations occupy exactly the same channels and cover exactly

the same ground as in the original case, though in fainter degree of intensity. If this be so the muscular effects will be present, though less intense. The ideal rose is a restoration of the currents which, were the rose present, would lead to its circumscription by the eye, or to the adjustment of the eye to the object; the movements, however, are only incipient; they stop short of the actual movements and adjustments. In thinking of the colour, there is a restraint of the incipient movements that would adjust the eye to the shape. In passing to think of its odour, there would be a change to the incipient movements of snuffing the air through the nose and closing the mouth. And similarly with other ideal apprehensions and changes from one train of thought to another.

§ 21. It will now be seen how potent an aid is introduced to control of the feelings in a control of the thoughts. There being once established a power to direct the thoughts, and reproduced thoughts carrying with them reproduced feelings, it is a great help to the subjugation of any emotion to be able to direct the thoughts to some topics unconnected or remotely connected therewith. There is an outburst of grief over the death of a child, for instance; it being painful, there is a movement toward avoidance, a desire, a motive, to get rid of it. By the pressure of the motive to avoid grief as associations connected with the lost one rush into and through my mind, by voluntary effort I arrest the attention perhaps on a story-book possessed by the child. Detaining my attention persistently upon that book, associations pertaining to the book, to story-books, and to books in general are raised up until I pass into a train of thought which introduces entirely different emotions from those of grief; the latter are stilled, and my mind relieved. In similar manner emotions desired may be evoked. Thus by the high development of control over feelings and thoughts through the mutual influence of each upon the other, the highest and most thorough self-command is attained and the voluntary powers reach their greatest perfection.'

INVOLUNTARY AND VOLUNTARY REDINTEGRATION.

§ 22. The foregoing exposition enables us to perceive very clearly the difference between that redintegration which proceeds with machine-like certainty and directness and that which is con

1 Up to this point the exposition of the course of acquiring volitional control is largely a condensation from Prof. Bain's Emotions and Will, which the reader is recommended to examine in this connection.

sciously determined by selective volition. We have seen, also, in former chapters, how we control redintegration by detaining the attention. This was illustrated very remarkably in our notice of the operation of trying to remember anything. The conclusions which are apparent are that involuntary redintegration is organised and voluntary is partially-organised redintegration. That is to say, the former expresses habits of mental action fixed and organised by heredity or individual experience, or both; the latter indicates the uncompleted organisation of such habits. The former is controlled, as we say, by habit; the latter, by present pleasure and pain, according to the laws hitherto mentioned.

§ 23. That there must frequently be a conflict between the forces of habit and present inclinations is as obviously a deduction from these premises of fact as it is itself a fact of universal experience. And this conflict, it need not be repeated, gives rise to those states of balancing motives which exhibit our power of choice. It is, however, none the less true that ultimately the strongest motives prevail. While the state of hesitation lasts we are conscious of volitional movements and power. After the fiat has gone forth we are conscious only of results in action.

§ 24. That redintegration is governed by the impact of forces from without, furnishing new material for its action, is not to be forgotten. So far as such forces determine the redintegrating activities, irrespective of the reactions, the result is involuntary redintegration. Similarly the aggregations of feeling, which through the reacting powers are developed in associations and representations, frequently produce a persistence of ideas which is involuntary and opposed to the inclinations of selective volition. The attention is held through quantity of feeling aroused, and attempts to expel the representative object only bring up its strongest associations, and then the same object again, so that it persists spite of our efforts. We have thus what has been called the Fixed Idea,' which operates apparently in opposition to the law of pleasure and pain. Its effect is explicable, however, in just the same way as the effect of a strong impact from the external environment generating quantity of feeling. The attention is held, spite of the movements of voluntary redintegration in opposite directions. In the case of the fixed idea, the quantity of feeling is aroused through automatic reactive movements, which are themselves determined by the laws of association and representation. The mental power is concentrated for the time upon the