JUDICIAL Committee of the Privy Council. Before the Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne, Sir James Colvile, the Lord Chief Baron, Lord Justice James, Sir Robert Phillimore, Sir Montague Smith, Sir Robert Collier, Sir W. B. Brett, Sir R. P. Amphlett; as Assessors-the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishops of Chichester, St. Asaph, Ely, and St. David's.

Sir James Stephen, Q.C., Mr. Arthur Charles, Mr. Francis H. Jeune, and Dr. Walter Phillimore were counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ridsdale ; Dr. Stephens, Q.C., and Mr. Benjamin Shaw for the respondents.

This was an appeal from part of a judgment or decree pronounced by Lord Penzance, as judge of the Arches Court of Chancery, in the matter of the representation of three parishioners of St. Peter's, Folkestone, made in pursuance of the provisions of the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, in which the Rev. C. J. Ridsdale, M.A., the incumbent of St. Peter's, was the person complained of.

The representation of the parishioners to Lord Penzance alleged that Mr. Ridsdale had offended against the statutes, laws, and canons of the Church of England, in respect of the following practices and acts, namely:

1. The use of lighted candles during the celebration of the Holy Communion, when not wanted for the purpose of giving light.

2. The wearing in the Communion Service, and in the administration of the Communion, of certain unlawful ecclesiastical vestments, other than and beside and instead of those appointed and allowed by law, to wit, vestments known as an alb and a chasuble.

3. The mixing water with the Sacramental wine used and administered in the Communion.

4. The use in the Communion Service, and in the administration of the Communion to communicants, of bread and flour made in the form of circular wafers, instead of bread such as is usual to be eaten.

5. The standing, while saying the prayer of consecration in the Communion Service, at the middle of the west side of the communion table (such table then standing against the east wall, with its shorter side towards the north and south), in such wise, that, during the whole time of his saying the prayer, Mr. Ridsdale was between the people and the table, with his back to the people, so that the people could not see him break the bread, or take the cup into his hand.

6. The kneeling, or bending the knee while saying the prayer of consecration.

7. The causing the "Agnus Dei" to be sung immediately after the prayer of consecration.

8. The celebration of the Lord's Supper when only one person communicated with the celebrant.

9 and 10. The use of processions round the church, with banners and a cross, and various dresses and vestments.

11. The having set up, and placed, without lawful authority and unlawfully, and since the consecration of the church, upon the top of the screen separating the chancel from the nave, and still unlawfully retaining there, a crucifix and 24 metal candlesticks with candles, which said candles were lighted when not needed to give light.

12. The having set up, and placed without lawful authority, and unlawfully, and since the consecration of the church, and still retaining in his church, certain figures in coloured relief, purporting to represent scenes of the Passion, and forming what are called Stations of the Cross and Passion, some of which relate to legendary scenes, and which, as a whole, tend to encourage ideas and devotions of a superstitious kind.

Lord Penzance gave judgment against Mr. Ridsdale on all points, except the latter part of charge 11. From this judgment, but only on the 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 11th charges, Mr. Ridsdale now appealed.

The trial was commenced on Tuesday, January 23.

Sir James Stephen, Q.C., opened the case on behalf of the appellant. His address lasted three days. He was followed by Mr. Arthur Charles on the same side.

On Saturday, January 27, Dr. Stephens, Q.C., commenced his argument for the respondent; Mr. Benjamin Shaw followed, and, on February 1, after hearing Sir J. Stephens, Q.C., in reply, the Lord Chancellor said that their Lordships would consider their judgment.

On Monday, May 12, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council met to give judgment. The lords present were-The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lord Chancellor, the Duke of Richmond and Gordon, Lord Selborne, Lord Justice Brett, Sir J. Colvile, Sir M. Smith, Sir W. James, and Sir R. Collier.

The Lord Chancellor read the judgment. He said the appeal was brought in respect of four matters only. First, the wearing during the service of the Holy Communion the vestments known as an alb and a chasuble; secondly, saying the prayer of consecration in the Communion service whilst standing at the middle of the west side of the Communion table in such wise that the people could not see the appellant breaking the bread or taking the cup into his hand; thirdly, the use in the Communion service of wafer bread or wafers; fourthly, the placing an unlawful crucifix on the top of the screen separating the chancel from the nave of the church. The Lord Chancellor said:-First, as to the charge of wearing an alb and a chasuble, their lordships did not propose to express any opinion on the vestments proper to be worn by bishops; and in referring to the dresses of parochial clergy they would use the term vestments to denote the alb and chasuble as distinguished from the surplice. The appellant's argument was that the ornaments rubric in the revised Prayer Book of 1662 was now the only law as to the vesture of the clergy. His further argument would be correct if this first proposition was correct. Their lordships, however, were unable to accept the proposition. They were of opinion that it was a misapprehension to suppose that

the rubric note of 1662 as to ornaments was intended to have, or did have, the effect of repealing the law as it previously stood, and of substituting for the previous law another and a different law, formulated in the words of the rubric note, and of thus making the year 1662 a new point of departure in the legislation on this subject. What was the state of the law before the Act of Uniformity of 1662, and what alteration, if any, was made by the Act? The ornaments rubric was not, when originally introduced, and was not meant to be, an enactment at all. It ended with a reference to the statute 1st Elizabeth, c. 2, in terms which showed that the rubric claimed no intrinsic authority of itself. Their lordships were clearly of opinion that the advertisements (which was the word used for admonitions or injunctions) of Elizabeth, issued in 1556, were of full authority, and the Archbishop, in putting them in force, stated that they were issued by the Queen's authority. They could not admit that the recognition of their authority could be controlled by expressions found in correspondence of the character of the Parker correspondence, but even from that correspondence their lordships had drawn a conclusion opposite to that in support of which it was referred to on behalf of the appellant. The book of advertisements was promulgated in the form imposed on the Archbishop by the Royal will; and the correspondence contained distinct evidence that Archbishop Parker considered them an exercise of the statutory power. The advertisements prescribed the vestments in cathedrals, and expressly appointed the surplice to be worn, and it was not seriously contended that albs or chasubles could, in any practical sense, be worn concurrently with the surplice. If, therefore, the use of the surplice at the Communion was rendered lawful and obligatory by the advertisements, the use of albs or chasubles at the administration was thereby rendered unlawful. The authority of the advertisements continuously up to the time of the Restoration (except during the Great Rebellion) was complete, and in many existing documents written by archbishops, and bishops, and canons of Convocation, the authority of the advertisements was fully recognised. The surplice was consistently treated as the vestment required by law expressly in the administration of the sacraments. Their lordships had, on a review of all the evidence, arrived at the opinion that the conclusion drawn by the Judicial Committee in "Hibbert v. Purchas" that the advertisements had all the force of law, appeared to be not only warranted, but irresistible. The question then came: Was it the intention and effect of the alteration in the ornaments rubric of 1662 to repeal the 25th section of the statute of Elizabeth, and to set up a new and self-contained law on the subject of ornaments? The history of the revision of the Prayer Book was strongly opposed to such a conclusion. In the revised book the statute of 1st Elizabeth, cap. 2, was reprinted at the beginning of the book as an unrepealed and effective law, and it was transcribed in the MS. copy approved by the two Convocations. Their lordships could not, therefore, look upon this rubric as being otherwise than what it was before—namely, a memorandum or note of reference to the earlier law. The only change was, that into the words of the old rubric with regard to the vestments were interpolated the words, "at all times other ministration," as if to direct special attention to the fact that in the then state of the law the use of the same vestures by the minister at all times of his ministration was the ordinary and the general rule. That was the only explanation which was in harmony with the list of alterations in the book now in the library of the House of

Lords, out of which was fairly written the Book of Common Prayer, subscribed in 1661 by the two Convocations. That original book contained the record of all alterations and additions made by Convocation. At the beginning was a tabular list of the material alterations set out in parallel columns, among which no mention of the rubric in question occurred, and a note stated that these were all the material alterations, the rest being only verbal. Accordingly, it was found that the bishops in the visitations down to 1686 were accustomed to ask, "have you a comely large surplice for the minister to wear at all times of his public ministrations in the church?” Among the alterations proposed by the Commissioners in 1669 to meet the views of Dissenters, in the rubric proposed by them occur these words— "Whereas the surplice is appointed to be used by all ministers in performing Divine offices, it is hereby declared that it is continued only as by an ancient and decent habit." The practice of wearing the surplice was thus found to be uniform, open, continuous, and under authoritative sanction. What, then, was the weight in law of such contemporaneous and continual usage? The answer might be taken from the words of the learned judges in previous cases, that their lordships would not be justified in differing from the construction put upon the law by contemporaneous and long-continued usage; there would be no safety for property or liberty if it could be successfully contended that all lawyers and statesmen had been mistaken for centuries as to the practical meaning of an old Act of Parliament. Their lordships had entered at great length into this subject, out of respect for the elaborate arguments addressed to them, and not from any hesitation as to what their decision ought to be. They decided, therefore, that the decision of the learned Judge of the Court of Arches as to the vestments worn by the appellant following that of the Judicial Committee in "Hibbert v. Purchas," was correct, and ought to be affirmed. The second point was the position of the celebrant at the Communion table during the prayer of consecration. The rule by which the position of the minister must be determined must be found in the rubrical directions of the Communion office in the Prayer Book, there being nothing in any statute to control or supplement those directions. The rubrics must be construed to meet either hypothesis-of the table being fixed against the east wall or standing in the body of the church. The term east" or "eastward" nowhere occurred in the Prayer Book. Wherever the table stood it was the duty of the minister to stand at the side of the table, which, supposing the church to be built with the ordinary eastward position, would be next the north, whether that was the longer or the shorter side of the table. The direction was absolute, and had reference to one of the points of the compass fixed by nature. Their lordships thought the words "before the table," in connection with the manual acts, were meant to be equivalent to "in the sight of the people." The minister must stand so that he might in good faith enable the communicants present, or the bulk of them, being properly placed, to see if there be the breaking of bread, and the performance of the other manual acts mentioned. He must not interpose his body, so as intentionally to defeat the object of the rubric, and prevent this result. Applying these principles to the present case, their lordships were not satisfied that the evidence proved an intention to prevent the people seeing him break the bread; and they would recommend an alteration to be made in the decree in this respect. Coming to the third charge-the use of wafer bread-the charge was consistent with the possi

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bility that bread such as is usually to be eaten, but circular and very thin, was what was used; if that was what was used, their lordships did not think it could be pronounced illegal. The object in the rubric on this matter was to take away occasion of dissension and superstition. If it had been proved that the wafer properly so called had been used by the appellant, it would have been illegal; but as the averment and proof were insufficient, their lordships would advise an alteration of the decree in this respect. The fourth charge was the erection of a crucifix on the top of a screen separating the chancel from the nave, with twenty-four metal candlesticks on either side with lighted candles. In connection with this charge there were others of a procession and kneeling at certain points, and the affixing to the walls of the church of raised pictures representing scenes from our Lord's Passion. It was clear that no faculty had been obtained for the erection of a crucifix, and in the absence of such faculty it was unlawful. In some cases it might be desirable to give leave to an appellant to apply for a faculty for something done inadvertently without one; in this case their lordships were of opinion that under the circumstances the ordinary ought not to grant a faculty for the crucifix. The words in which the learned judge of the Court below condemned the crucifix, on the ground of its liability to be used in a superstitious manner, commended themselves to their lordships. They were prepared, under the circumstances of this case, to affirm the decision directing the removal of the crucifix; while they desired to say they thought it important to maintain, in respect to the representation of sacred persons and objects in the Church, the liberty established in "Philpotts v. Boyd," subject to the power and duty of the ordinary so to exercise his judicial discretion in granting or refusing faculties as to guard against their being likely to be abused for purposes of superstition. In conclusion, his lordship said : On the whole, their lordships have resolved to recommend her Majesty to confirm the decree of the Court of Arches, except as regards the position of the minister and the use of wafer bread or wafers, and as to these they will advise her Majesty that, inasmuch as it is not established to their satisfaction that the appellant, while saying the Prayer of Consecration, so stood that the people could not see him break the bread or take the cup into his hands, as alleged in the representation: and inasmuch as it is not alleged or proved that what was used in the administration of the Holy Communion was other than bread, such as is usual to be eaten, the decree of the Court of Arches should be in these respects reversed; and they would further humbly advise her Majesty that, in respect to the charges as to which the decree has reference, the costs in the Court of Arches should be paid by the respondents to the appellant, and, further, that there should be no costs in this appeal.