PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.-Privileged communications. The plaintiffs, who were assignees of a bankrupt firm at Teneriffe, filed their bill against the defendants, three brothers, one of whom managed the business of the Teneriffe firm, for an account of certain remittances forwarded by the manager of the Teneriffe firm to his brother, as agent in London. The defendant, the London agent, set up as a defence certain proceedings in the Lord Mayor's Court, instituted by the third defendant as executor of his father, under which the money in the hands of the agent of the Teneriffe firm were attached for a debt alleged to be due to the estate of the father. Upon motion for production of documents, it was held, that letters which had passed between the London agent and his solicitors with reference to the litigation in this suit were privileged; that letters which had passed between such solicitors and the attorney acting in the proceedings in the Lord Mayor's Court were also privileged; but that the letters from the defendant, the manager of the Teneriffe firm, to the co-defendant, the agent in London, for the purpose of being communicated to his solicitors, with a view to the litigation in this suit, were not privileged. Goodall v. Little, 20 Law J. (N. S.) Chanc. 132.

PUBLIC COMPANY.-Property in the possession of a receiver appointed by the court in a suit, was in two instances seized by the sheriff under writs of fi. fa. issued by judgment creditors of the defendant: Held, that the sheriff was not warranted in making the seizures. On motions in the suit to commit the sheriff: Held, that the sheriff could not justify the seizures by questioning the propriety of the order under which the receiver was appointed; and on the submission of the sheriff an order was made in each case for him to withdraw from possession and to pay the costs, the court considering this order as sufficient under the circumstances for the maintenance of its jurisdiction; the court at the same time protected the sheriff against proceedings by the judgment creditor in one of the cases where the judgment creditor had been served with notice and appeared on the motion, but refused to make this addition to the order in the other case where the judgment creditor had not been served and was not present. It is an established rule, that it is not open to a party to question any order or process of the court by disobedience, and it is not inconsistent with this general rule, that the court, in administering punishment for disobedience to an order, will attend to all the facts of the case, and, amongst others, to the circumstances under which the order was made. Russell v. East Anglian Railway Company, 3 M. & G. 104.

RAILWAY.-Lands Clauses Consolidation Act.-Some property was mortgaged to the plaintiffs, who were not bound to receive their money until a future day. A railway company, with knowledge, treated with the mortgagor alone, and, not agreeing, paid into court, to the credit of the mortgagor, the amount of compensation, but made no provision for the compensation to the mortgagees under

the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, s. 114. The company then took possession and commenced pulling down the building; the court restrained the company from proceeding until the value of the mortgagee's interest had been ascertained and paid or secured. Rankeen v. East and West India Docks and Birmingham Junction Railway Company, 12 Beav. 298.

RECEIVER AGAINST PARTY IN POSSESSION.- After a verdict upon an issue devisavit vel non, the court appointed a receiver against the party to whom possession of estates had been given by the trustees of the legal estate under an order of this court, though an order nisi had been obtained for a new trial. Bainbrigge v. Bainbrigge, 20 Law J. (N. S.) Chanc. 139.

STAYING SECOND SUIT UNTIL PAYMENT OF COSTS OF FIRST.- Motion to stay proceedings in a second suit until payment by the plaintiff of the costs in the first, which had been dismissed, refused, it not appearing that the second bill could be produced by a fair amendment of the first. Cross costs in two suits ordered to be set off. Budge v. Budge, 12 Beav. 385.

TAXATION.-1. An ex parte order for the delivery of a bill of costs discharged with costs; the allegation of the professional employment being denied by the solicitor. Eldridge, In re, 12 Beav. 387.

2. Application by residuary legatee more than twelve months after payment for the taxation of a solicitor's bill against the executor refused, notwithstanding there had been some agreement between the legatee and solicitor, and that payment had afterwards been made behind the back of the legatee. Order for taxation, made upon affidavit of service, discharged with costs; the petition having misrepresented the case, and the real facts being found not to warrant the order. Rees, In re, 12 Beav. 256.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.-A. B. became the purchaser of a mansionhouse and park, under conditions of sale which stated that the whole property was freehold, except eight acres, which were copyhold, but undistinguished, except as to not including any of the buildings. The abstract of title having been delivered, and discussions thereon having taken place which raised difficulties in the way of completing the purchase, a supplemental agreement was entered into, detailing what requisitions as to title, &c. should be complied with. Among these requisitions was one in the following words, “Declaration of identity of lands mentioned in deeds to those now sold": Held, on a bill filed by the vendor for specific performance, that the supplemental agreement was a substitution for the original contract, and that A. B. was not entitled to demand that the vendor should distinguish the freehold from the copyhold parts of the premises, so as to show that the latter did not include any of the buildings. Dawson v. Brinckman, 3 M. & G. 53.

VOLUNTARY DEED.-Debtor and creditor.-A. conveyed

all his property to three of his creditors, in trust to pay the debts due from him to themselves and to his other creditors who should execute the deed. The trustees and some of the other creditors executed the deed, but with notice that B. had a demand upon A. and was about to enforce it; afterwards B. filed a bill against A. and the trustees to set aside the deed, on the ground that it was a mere voluntary deed of agency. The court, at the hearing, dismissed the bill with costs. Mackinnon v. Stewart, 1 Sim. 76.

WILL.-The word "estate" when used in a will is genus generalissimum, and will, of its own proper force, without any proof aliunde of an intention to aid the construction, carry realty as well as personalty, and is not to be confined or restrained to personalty only, unless there is a clear intent expressed in other parts of the will, to be gathered, either from the whole will, or from the way in which the word is used in the particular part of the will where the contested use of it arises. Mayor of Hamilton v. Hodson, 6 Moore, 76.

2. Suspicious testamentary disposition. - Where a testamentary disposition is propounded under circumstances of suspicion, as where the party propounding it was the drawer and was benefited by it, and it was executed at a time when the testator was of doubtful capacity, without any evidence of instruction previously given or knowledge of its contents, the party propounding it must prove that the testator knew and approved of the contents of the instrument. A codicil, which varied the bequests contained in the will of the testator to the benefit of the drawer, and executed at a time when the testator was supposed to be dying, in the absence of proof of the knowledge by the testator of its contents, pronounced against. Proof of the actual reading over of the instrument to the testator before execution is not necessary. Mitchel v. Thomas, 6 Moore, 137.

3. Construction-Heir-at-law.-A testator devised and bequeathed all his real and personal estate to trustees, upon trust (after certain life estates) for the heir-at-law of his family then living, whosoever the same might be Held, that the next of kin of the testator, according to the Statutes of Distribution, had no interest under the above gift. Tetlow v. Ashton, 20 Law J. (N. S.) Chanc. 53.

WINDING-UP ACT.-By a deed of settlement of a joint-stock company, executors were not to be proprietors: Held, nevertheless, that they were contributories, and might maintain a petition to wind up. Where a company is insolvent, and has been getting worse, it is no answer to an application to wind it up to say that the difficulties are temporary, and that there is hope of more prosperous times. Norwich Yarn Company, In re, 12 Beav. 366.

ECCLESIASTICAL.

20 Law J. (N. S.) parts 2, 3.

CLERGY.-Non-residence-Summons to show cause— -Monition -Order to reside-Sequestration-Right of clergyman to be heard before sequestration.-A writ of sequestration issued under the stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, to compel a clergyman to reside on his benefice, is not merely in the nature of a distress to compel residence, but is also a penal proceeding against him, as it is one step towards the forfeiture of the benefice. The bishop therefore ought to give the clergyman an opportunity of being heard before directing the sequestration. If, in obedience to a monition issued by the bishop, a clergyman goes into residence and again ceases to reside, the bishop may serve him with an order to reside, but if that order be disobeyed the bishop is not justified in directing a sequestration at once, and the sequestration will be void unless before issuing it he gives the clergyman an opportunity of rebutting the supposed facts, or of offering lawful excuse for his disobedience to the order to reside. Semble, that a summons to show cause should precede the issuing of the monition, as it has a penal character; and that the sequestration should recite the delinquency on account of which it is issued, and also the bishop's adjudication on the same. Bonaker v. Evans, 20 Law J. (N. S.) Q. B.

137.

ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.- Clergy-Union of beneficesNon-residence-1 & 2 Vict. c. 106-Sequestration-Jurisdiction of bishop.—The union of two or more benefices cannot be effected without the assent of the patrons. Quære, whether an union of two benefices during the life of the incumbent is valid. A., being perpetual curate of W. S., a benefice with cure of souls, was subsequently presented, instituted and inducted to a rectory, C., also with cure of souls, both benefices being in the diocese of N. and fifty miles apart from each other. Concurrently with his presentation and institution to the latter benefice, the bishop of N., by an instrument under his episcopal seal, addressed to A. as perpetual curate of W. S. and rector of C., which recited that good causes had been alleged, and allowed, united, annexed and incorporated the rectory with the perpetual curacy during the incumbency of A. in the latter, and so long as he should be perpetual curate there, and no longer, by the bishop's ordinary authority, provided that A. should keep a sufficient curate to instruct and teach the people of the parish in which he should not reside: Held, that the legal effect of this instrument was not to create an union of the two benefices in the proper sense of the term,

so that residence in the one produced a non-residence in the other of the two benefices, and that the bishop had jurisdiction, under the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 106, to appoint a curate for the parish in which A. did not de facto reside, and to enforce payment of the stipend assigned to him under sect. 83 of that act. A monition was issued by the bishop, which recited that a complaint had been made by the curate that arrears of stipend were due to him, which A. had wilfully neglected and refused to pay; and that A. and the curate having appeared before him, the bishop heard summarily the said differenees, and that the said complaint was duly proved before him, and that he adjudged the same to be true; it then admonished and required A. to pay the said arrears. Default being made in payment a sequestration issued, under which the fruits of the benefice were seized to satisfy the arrears of the stipend: Held, that A. could not, after the sequestratration issued, object that he had not been guilty of a refusal to pay the stipend, or that he had no notice of the curate being appointed by the bishop. Daniel v. Morton, 20 Law J. (N. S.) Q. B. 98.

ADMIRALTY.

Containing the Cases in 3 Admiralty Reports, part 1.

AGENT OF LLOYD'S.-Salvor.-An agent at Lloyd's is not entitled to sue as a salvor, for the mere hiring and engaging of men to assist a vessel in distress. Claim of alleged salvor dismissed with costs. The Lively, 3 Adm. Rep. 64.

BOND.-Registrar's report.-Question as to the costs of a reference to the registrar and merchants. Where a bond is pronounced for, and being referred to the registrar and merchants, large deductions are made in the registrar's report, the party setting up the bond will be liable to the costs of the reference. Semble, the main consideration in the judgment of the court will be the amount of the sum deducted in proportion to the sum which is claimed. The Catherine, 3 Adm. Rep. 1.

BOTTOMRY.-A vessel carried into a foreign port by a mutinous crew, with the master dispossessed and in irons, the expenses incurred by a party employed by the British Vice-consul to investigate into the mutiny, and re-invest the master in his command, allowed by the court to be a good foundation for a bottomry transaction, although no mention was made of a bottomry bond in the outset of the inquiry, and the bond was taken from the master on the eve of the vessel's sailing from the port. The Gauntlett, 3 Adm. Rep. 82.