of James I. than a lecture on jurisprudence for England on the eve of the Exhibition of Industry:

"I own that I look with great indifference on the progress among us of those additions to material comfort, on those appeals to mere convenience and physical enjoyment, to which the attention of the present age (even in places where our youths, instead of being the Helots of routine, should be trained to all that is refined and magnanimous) seems so exclusively to be dedicated. I would sooner live in an age when men wrote like Cicero, and studied Plato, than in one when they invented steam engines and made suspension bridges. The discovery of the lost book of Livy that describes the struggle between Marius and Sylla would be far more instructive to mankind than mountains full of fossils, or libraries of disquisitions upon light; and a play like those of Sophocles or of Shakspeare would, in my opinion, do more to elevate the condition of the species than an electric telegraph from London to Hindostan. At any rate, it is clear that we may safely leave to the propensities of the Anglo-Saxon race all those arts which are subservient to the sordid wants and gross comforts of our animal nature, which tend neither to fortify the judgment, nor to refine the imagination, nor to exalt the heart."

It is unfortunate for the effect of Mr. Phillimore's views, and their acceptance by his audience, that in this short passage he should have included two of the mightiest agents and most significant types of social and international intercourse as among the arts he deprecates as tending neither to fortify judgment, refine imagination, nor exalt the heart! It would be difficult to name any which have more largely contributed to the immense progress of this nation in moral as well as political welfare.

There is much in this motley Lecture which invites comment, provokes criticism, and commands admiration; but the prevailing feeling with which we close it is one of deep regret, that a man so richly gifted as Mr. Phillimore is with the highest faculties of the head, and the noblest feelings of the heart, should so tenaciously confuse the science of jurisprudence, with a moral philosophy unsuited to the times of activity and enterprise in which we live and to the practical requirements of this people and country.

We have spoken thus frankly, because Mr. Phillimore is capable of doing infinite good in his new post, by simply devoting himself to the exposition of definite branches of what is legitimately jurisprudence. If he will but confine and apply his great powers to any useful subject, or a series of them, he may then, drawing from the copious stores of his well-informed mind, give an interest and charm to the practical elucidation of law which our best lecturers and writers have hitherto failed to impart to it.

ART. XI.-NEW LAW STATUTES OF THE SESSION.

WE the articles which will have for their

E propose, under the above title, to insert in this Maga

object the presenting in an analytical and explanatory form such of the Statutes passed in the present and succeeding sessions of parliament as relate to the administration of justice, or in any way affect either the practice or jurisdiction of the superior courts of law or equity, or of the various inferior tribunals established in this country.

A mere digest or abridgment of acts, however useful it may be for the purposes of reference, is insufficient for those who desire to obtain an insight into the practical mode of applying the various enactments, or to compare the new mode of proceeding with that which has previously existed in like cases. In order to appreciate fully the extent and merits of any change, it is necessary to have the old practice as well as the alteration presented to the mind, which will thus be enabled to view them in connection with each other, and to judge between them. And this necessity applies most forcibly to matters of legal procedure, in which form is so often essential to the validity of the step taken, and in which an accurate acquaintance with the existing modes of practice is indispensable to the practitioner.

To those of our readers who carry on their business in the country, and are consequently less likely to have access to information upon novel enactments affecting their course of business-but to whom a correct knowledge of those enactments is equally essential-we conceive that such assistance as we propose to offer will be peculiarly acceptable. It usually happens that editions of statutes affecting the different branches of jurisprudence, with notes explanatory of their provisions, are published shortly after such acts have become law; and it is for the purpose of supplying information of the same character at a more early date, that the present series of articles is undertaken. If they have no other effect than that of directing the minds of our readers to the meaning and practical application of those enactments, the knowledge of which is so much required by the legal practitioner, they will not have failed of their object. Until the provisions of a new statute have received a judicial interpretation, it is obviously impossible to do more than give a general explanation of its scope and contents, suggesting doubts where any appear to arise, and pointing out distinctions between the

existing and previous practice where any such seem to be intended.

The present session of parliament promised to be very fruitful in changes of our legal system. The growing dissatisfaction with the delays and expense of the superior tribunals, both of law and of equity, has at length been observed upon in the speech from the Throne, and commissions have been issued to gentlemen well acquainted with the practice of their respective courts, requiring them to examine into and report upon the alterations which appear requisite for adapting the legal and equitable fabric to the wants of the times and the present state of society. It is understood that considerable changes will probably be recommended by these commissioners; but as their labours are not yet terminated, it would be of course premature to speculate upon the nature or extent of their recommendations. Another commission has also been sitting, of which the present Lord Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench is a member to inquire into the present state of the law of divorce à vinculo matrimonii-a subject in respect of which some amendment has been thought to be necessary, but upon which it is extremely difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. Let us trust however that the experience and energy of the noble lord who is at the head of that commission may be the means of leading to a satisfactory investigation of this important subject, and that, if any legislation should take place with reference to it, it may be as successful as that which simplified and settled the law of real property in accordance with the reports of a commission some years ago presided over by the same distinguished lawyer. While we are upon the subject of real property, we must not omit to mention the bill for a General Registry of Titles, which has been introduced into parliament during the present year, and which if passed into law would work a most important change in the dealings with landed property throughout the kingdom.

The apparent success of the establishment of county courts throughout England and Wales seems to have induced law reformers to imagine that much more extensive powers than at present exist might be entrusted to these tribunals, and we observe that measures are now in the course of progress through the House of Lords, by which it is proposed to transfer to the County Courts many of the functions of the Court of Chancery and of the Masters of that court. Upon this proposal we desire to say a few words. It cannot be denied that, according to the present constitution of the Court of Chancery, delay and expense must be inevitable; the tendency of the system there pursued being to throw vast accumulations business into the Masters' offices, the matters out of whi

the questions there arise having to be afterwards determined by the judges of the courts in which the causes themselves are to be heard. But it is surely worth while to inquire before, we cast these duties upon another tribunal, whether some mode of supplying and facilitating the decision of equity suits could not be struck out, by which it would be no longer necessary for the judge upon every matter of detail to refer the cause to the Master and afterwards to hear it upon exceptions to his report. It appears to us a vice in the present system, that the ultimate decision does not rest with the person who inquires into the facts; and we cannot help thinking that a more extensive adoption of oral testimony in equity suits would greatly diminish the delay and expense which are now inevitable on such inquiries. It is, we conceive, with some such view that the transfer of these inquiries to the County Courts is advocated by many persons. But while the advantage of such a mode of taking evidence is admitted, we cannot but think that it would be prudent to see whether, by a judicious reformation in that respect, the existing tribunals might not be rendered much more effective, instead of at once having recourse to the clumsy expedient of transferring the same duties, encumbered with the same difficulties to another forum, which, would thus speedily become choked with the multitude of business imposed upon it, and consequently unfit to discharge any even of the offices for the performance of which it was originally constituted. For be it remembered that all the country insolvency cases are now disposed of by the various County Courts, in addition to legal disputes of various kinds up to £50, and if, as proposed, they have besides attached to them a bankruptcy and equity jurisdiction, it seems impossible for them to dispose satisfactorily of all the questions submitted to them. We say nothing as to the competency of the judges of those tribunals: undoubtedly there are those among their numbers who are able lawyers and well qualified to decide the rights in dispute between litigant parties. But we doubt whether there is not a diminution of the confidence felt in these tribunals-a want which will surely exhibit itself more strongly in proportion as causes of greater amount are withdrawn from Westminster Hall and referred to the County Courts. Any one, who looks at the list of plaints entered for hearing at any County Court, must marvel how they can be satisfactorily disposed of in the time, if any of them, as most frequently is the case, involve the examination and dissection of accounts and dealings between the parties. doubt the returns show that a vast proportion of the plaints disposed of relate to questions in which less than 20s. is in dispute, and which never would have been litigated unless the parties

No

themselves could have been examined. But at the same time experience shows that many actions involving a balance of less than 201. may require that accounts should be closely looked into, and it is hardly to be expected that plaintiffs will run the risk of losing their costs by suing in the superior courts, more especially as the power which a plaintiff has of requiring to be examined as a witness in a County Court will not unfrequently, we fear, cause a dishonest demand to be supported by falsehood. The reports of criminal cases seem to show an increase in trials for perjury in these courts, and it is to be feared that the instances in which it is possible to prove the falsehood of the evidence of the party, are by no means in proportion to those in which it. escapes undetected. If this be a result of such a mode of proceeding it is questionable indeed whether the demoralization produced is compensated for by the cases in which justice is obtained by means of admitting such evidence. For these reasons we regret to see an attempt made to render admissible in the superior courts the evidence of the parties to the suit, at least if this power is to be carried to the extent of a plaintiff or defendant being able to require to be examined in his own behalf. This proposition will be found to be by no means so novel as it is generally supposed to be. It was considered by the Common Law Commissioners who sat twenty years ago, and the plan was by them deemed impracticable, and was therefore not recommended. Most of the members of that commission have now been elevated to the Bench, and we have reason to believe that their judicial experience has not altered the opinion which they then formed. So far as giving a plaintiff or defendant a power of compelling a discovery by his adversary, the plan might be feasible and useful; but if it be attempted to carry it further and enable a party to be a witness for himself, we believe that such a course of proceeding will more frequently tend to embarrass than to assist judges and jurors. It is not unusual that a cause at Nisi Prius is referred to an arbitrator for the express purpose of having the parties to the suit examined as witnesses, where it appears probable that no other evidence of the transaction can be obtained. But-and we are speaking the opinion of those most conversant with such references-it is the almost invariable practice of arbitrators to compel the parties to exhaust all other means of proof before deciding whether they will permit a party to give evidence in his own favour. The existence of such a discretion in the arbitrator enables him to prevent the substitution of a biassed statement for the evidence of more impartial witnesses. But how is this possible, if no such discretion exists?