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It will thus be seen by the extracts we have given that the effect of the act is:

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1st. To abolish the Court of Chancery and to create one
supreme tribunal to administer all the law of the State
whether in law or equity.

2nd. To abolish all previously existing rules of pleading
and different forms of action, and to substitute such a
system of pleading as parties would naturally adopt if
uncontrolled before an arbitrator; in the words of the
act, "the pleadings must be in ordinary and concise
language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to
enable a person of common understanding to know what
is intended;" and to provide that all causes shall be de-
cided on their merits alone by the various clauses re-
lating to construction, amendment and demurrers.
To abolish all statutes establishing or regulating the costs
or fees of attornies and counsel in civil actions, and all ex-
isting rules and provisions of law controlling the right of
a party to agree with an attorney or counsel for his
compensation.

And to make some important changes in the law of evidence. The importance of these changes is obvious, and we are glad to find that the Law Amendment Society have requested the American Minister in London to obtain from some of the leading merchants aud lawyers of the State of New York answers to the following questions:

Has the practical working of this code shortened the time of litigation in each suit?

Has the expense to the suitor been lessened?

Have the number of actions increased?

Whether they have been interested in or professionally engaged in any cause arising under it?

Whether any obstacles still remain to prevent a cause being decided on its merits alone? and if so, what are they?

What is the effect of the alteration in the law of evidence? Whether the members of the legal profession are, as a body, favourable to the new Code, or wish to revert to the old system? Whether professional incomes are lessened by it?

By these questions the practical working of the Code will be tested, and we shall then be able to judge whether it be absolutely necessary, or for the advantage of the public, that there should be two distinct systems of jurisprudence co-existing in the same country--whether the rules of pleading, as they now exist,' may not with safety be abolished, and whether the project of introducing a system by which all causes shall be decided on

their merits alone is Utopian, or, as it has been called simply, an amiable delusion. Upon these points, the commissioners have, in their third Report, expressed themselves so ably that we think we cannot do better, in this place, than give the substance of their Report. They say "it should seem to be scarcely necessary now for the commissioners to vindicate the policy of their reform. The history of the agitation which led to it, the manifest abuses of the old system of legal procedure, the demands of the people couched in language which could not be misunderstood, are familiar to the legislature. In conformity with this feeling, and in accordance with their instructions, the commissioners have removed the ancient forms from the paths of justice, and devised a new system, simple and natural in its construction, easily understood and readily adapted to any remedy which the nature of the case requires. In doing so, they have been obliged to recast the whole system of practice and pleading; with a single eye to a uniform system of pleading and trial, they have arranged the details so as to accomplish that object, and to lessen the labour and expense of legal proceedings. That there should be inconvenience resulting from these changes was inevitable. The former practice, with all its incongruities, was familiar to the Bench and the Bar; much of it consisted of arbitrary forms which a clerk could use. They who had mastered it in their youth, had forgotten the distaste with which they then regarded it, and had come to consider it as something necessary and unalterable. A sudden and total revolution in their art, a change in all their habitudes of thought and practice, the double need of forgetting the old and learning the new, the necessity of increased vigilance, and the still harder necessity of measuring themselves at a disadvantage with others having less to unlearn and more power to learn,—all these causes would necessarily make a new system unpopular with the members of the legal profession and no inconsiderable portion of the judiciary.'

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That however is not an argument against the change, it only proves the greatness of it. Had it been less complete it would have been less censured; general approbation would have proved it worthless by showing that it encountered no prejudices and opposed no interests. That the change is great is certain, but it is certainly not greater than was required; and nothing less would have effected a remedy for existing abuses.

The distinction of actions, and of legal and equitable remedies had their origin in a state of society as remote from our modern civilization as the modes of communication of our day are different from those of our ancestors. It was time that the forms

of action should pass away, to take their place with the wager of law, trial by battle, compurgation by witnesses, and the grand assize, which were once as important parts of the English law as are now the forms of actions. To resist their abolition now, is to maintain, either that they are eternal, or that society has not yet reached that stage of civilization when they can with safety be dismissed; neither can be maintained without disparagement to the intelligence of the age.

Law is not in its nature stationary, beyond all other sciences. It must change with changing manners, the diffusion of wealth, new channels of industry, and more general intelligence. That which was natural in the fifteenth century, is strange and uncouth in this; things which were then convenient have now become intolerable; the knowledge of that day has been multiplied many times; acts then in their infancy have grown to perfection. In other branches of knowledge advances are constantly made; the mind searches for new truths and the search is encouraged. In respect to law is the rule reversed? Are we to tread for ever in the ways of the past? In short, the argument for a legal system which is founded upon its antiquity, or indeed upon any thing but its intrinsic merits and its fitness for the people for whom it is framed, leads to an absurdity. The Report then says, "The change which the constitution contemplated, and the act appointing the commission required, had been long in coming, but was inevitable." The public mind had arrived at that stage when it could not be satisfied with less; and the commissioners say that they felt bound not to abandon it because some obstacles interposed to its immediate success, or because some present inconvenience might result from it. They then allude to the difficulty, under the most favourable circumstances, of making a new Code of laws, and claim the merit of having made the first Code of procedure ever made in a country holding the common law of England, and of supplanting, by a new work of their own creation, that heterogeneous mass called "Practice," which has been accumulating for ages; and then state that the few months of trial through which the Code has passed (written 30th January, 1849) has justified them in stating, that their Code has made justice more certain and more speedy, and that they have accomplished it in such a manner as to leave no case unprovided for and no right abridged.

We have now completed the task we proposed to ourselves, and we hope that we have discharged it so as to enable our readers who have not the Code by them, to form a clear notion of the present system, and the great changes it involves; and let us not forget, that it is not among a poor, homely, un

VOL. XIV. NO. XXVI.

C

educated and simple people that this great experiment in legislation is being tried, but among a people who are our rivals in commerce, equal to us at least in intelligence, wealth and luxury, with all the wants of a high state of civilization, and whose laws to be successful must embrace nearly as wide a field as our own. The boldness of the attempt, and the righteousness of the motives which led to it, should at least command our respect and sympathy. It is possible that the framers of the New York Code may have gone too far, and that difficulties may be experienced in the practical working of their Code which its authors may not have foreseen; when men's minds are strongly excited upon any subject, this is always to be apprehended; and public indignation against the abuses of legal procedure may have led in this case to the sweeping away some of the sound principles of law as well as the errors of practice, and we think that in some parts of this Code the commissioners have scarcely been sufficiently governed by caution or guided by experience. We do not here attempt a critical analysis of this Code, but have aimed simply in this article to lay its leading provisions before our readers. For ourselves we have derived great pleasure from this task, and we rise from it with increased respect for a people who could, with an energy of will characteristic of the American nation, resolve to throw off a system which, though sanctioned by the practice of centuries, they felt to be an evil, and who found agents able to execute with promptitude their wishes. To consolidate law is always beneficial; it is then better administered and better understood; it conduces to certainty, because the framers of the consolidated law have the whole of their materials at once under their eyes, and therefore can readily make the different parts consistent.

In conclusion, we venture to express a hope, that the example may not be entirely lost upon ourselves, but that it will stimulate our law reformers to raise their minds at once to the contemplation of a radical and efficient reform, for they now have before them a proof that it is possible to sweep away all preexisting laws without rushing into chaos; and further, that by going to work in a right spirit-by studying authorities simply for the sound principles to be found in them, it is possible for educated men and "experts," with a knowledge of the wants of the age in which they live and unencumbered by any check, to create a system which shall answer well in practice, which shall afford redress for all civil wrongs, and power to enforce all civil rights, and yet be cheap, simple, just, and intelligible: and we avow our opinion, that our own law is too mathematically correct to work well in every-day practice; that it is not necessary that

the rules of law, when they are beside the merits, should be rigidly adhered to; that it is necessary in law to have some elasticity to meet ever-varying circumstances; and that, in a country like this, with a free press ever ready to seize upon and chastise any violation of judicial rectitude, no danger can be incurred by allowing power to the judges to amend in all cases where the strict letter of the law would manifestly work injustice.

R. F.

ART. II. THE OFFICE OF WOODS AND FORESTS, LAND REVENUE, WORKS AND BUILDINGS.

THE HE "Wover anent. "Woods and Forests" is perhaps the best abused office in the Government. The Foreign Office may sometimes be exposed to more slashing charges; rendered more serious too, by the very different importance of its relations. But such charges are generally grounded on mistaken policy or stupidity, or at worst, partisanship, not upon nepotism or dishonesty. A Colonial Secretary sometimes excites a passing yet loudly expressed indignation by his petulance: but in this case as in the last there is always a large and powerful, sometimes the larger and more powerful, party bound by honour and inclination to support the ministers. Poor Law Commisioners are every now and then dragged blinking into unaccustomed light, when some pauper has been starved through the hard-heartedness or avarice of a relieving officer: but for a good, enduring cause of grumbling there is nothing like the Woods and Forests. Stupidity of intention, carelessness and petulance in transacting business, ignorance and wastefulness, gross frauds, or, in the words of an ExChancellor, negligence so crass as to amount to fraud-every description of charge is laid against the unfortunate "Woods," who have not equally with other branches of the Government the advantage of a disciplined phalanx to support them. Nor can it be said that these difficulties are altogether undeserved. No terms can be too decided to describe the transactions which were brought to light before the celebrated Committee appointed in 1786. Frauds and mismanagement of various descriptions have been exposed on various occasions by the committees of inquiry which have since then been from time to time appointed -and the last of such Committees, when preparing their Report,

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