many statutes, too numerous to be mentioned here, expressly provide that persons making false statements or declarations on oath, relating to the subject matter of these acts, shall be liable to the penalties of perjury, and punished accordingly.

The perjury must be corrupt, that is, committed malo animo, wilful, positive, and absolute; not upon surprise, or the like; it also must be in some point material to the question in dispute; for if it only be in some trifling collateral circumstance, to which no regard is paid, it is not penal.

Subornation of perjury is the offence of procuring another to take such a false oath as constitutes perjury in the principal. The punishment of either offence was anciently death; afterwards banishment, or cutting out the tongue; then forfeiture of goods; and now it is fine and imprisonment, with or without hard labour, as the court shall think fit.

16. Bribery is an offence against public justice when a judge, or other person concerned in its administration, takes any undue reward to influence his behaviour in his office. This offence is punished, in inferior officers, with fine and imprisonment; and in those who offer a bribe, though not taken, the same. But in judges, especially the superior ones, it has been always looked upon as so heinous an offence, that the chief justice Thorpe was hanged for it in the reign of Edward III. At the present day, however, the species of bribery to which the attention of the public and of the legislature is chiefly directed, is that which destroys the purity of the elections for members of the House of Commons. Professedly to prevent this crime, for in no other light can it be regarded, numerous statutes have been passed, but hitherto without success. Possibly when the offence is made felony, and a public prosecutor appointed, a different result may be attained.

17. Embracery is an attempt to influence a juror corruptly to one side by promises, money, entertainments, and the like, the punishment of which is fine and imprisonment. Connected with which was another offence, the fulse verdict of jurors; which, whether occasioned by embracery or not, was anciently considered criminal, and exemplarily punished. A wrong verdict can now, and in civil cases only, be set aside on an application for a new trial; but a corrupt juror may always be proceeded against, and punished as for a misdemeanor.

18. The negligence of public officers, intrusted with the administration of justice, is an offence subjecting the offender to fine; and in very notorious cases, to a forfeiture of his office, if it be a beneficial

one.

19. There is yet another offence against public justice which is a crime of deep malignity, though happily it has long been unknown in this country, viz., oppression on the part of judges, justices, and other magistrates, in the administration and under the colour of their office. This is highly punishable, as is,

20. Lastly, extortion; which consists in an officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man, any money or thing of value, that is not due to him, or more than is due, or before it is due. The punishment for this offence, which is fortunately equally rare with the former, is fine and imprisonment, and sometimes a forfeiture of the office; the defendant being also made to render double to the party aggrieved, and be punished at the pleasure of the crown, that is to say, at the discretion of the court.

CHAPTER XI.

OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE.

Riotous assembly-Riotous destruction of machinery-Proceeding against the hundred-Threatening letters-Threatening to publish a libel-Destroying dock-gates, sea-walls, and public bridges-Destroying turnpikes-Destroying public monuments or works of art-Affrays-Duelling-Affrays in a church-Riots-Duty of posse comitatus-Forcible entry-Challenges to fight-Libels-Fox's Act-Liberty of the press.

Or offences against the public peace, some are felonies, and some merely misdemeanors. Of the former class, are,

1. The riotous assembling of twelve persons, or more, and not dispersing upon proclamation, which was made high treason by 3 & 4 Edw. VI. c. 5, when the king was a minor, and a change in religion to be effected. That statute was repealed by 1 Mar. c. 1, but the prohibition was in substance re-enacted by 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 12, which made the offence a felony; and indemnified the peace officers and their assistants, if they killed any of the mob in endeavouring to suppress such riot. This was thought a necessary security in that sanguinary reign, when popery was intended to be re-established, which was likely to produce great discontents: but at first it was made only for a year, and was afterwards continued for that queen's life. And, by statute 1 Eliz. c. 16, when a reformation in religion was to be once more attempted, it was revived and continued during her life also, and then expired. From the accession of James I. to the death of Queen Anne, it was never once thought expedient to

revive it; but, in the first year of George I., it was judged necessary, in order to support the execution of the Act of Settlement, to renew it, and at one stroke to make it perpetual, with large additions. The capital punishment for these offences has, however, been taken away, but they are still punishable with great severity, if need be.

2. The riotous destruction of churches or other buildings, or of machinery, which in the reign of George I. was made a capital felony, is now punishable under the statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 11, which confers on the court a large discretion as to punishment.

In these cases of felonious destruction of property the law gives to the parties injured a civil remedy against the hundred in which the premises are situated, provided the persons damnified go within seven days before a justice of the peace, state upon oath the names of the offenders, if known, and become bound to prosecute.

3. The offence of sending or delivering a letter demanding with menaces property or money, is a felonious offence against the public peace, and highly penal. The analogous offence of publishing or threatening to publish a libel upon any person, with intent to extort any money, or obtain some other advantage, is a misdemeanor only. Similar offences were formerly high treason by the statute 8 Hen. V. c. 6.

4. Destroying any lock, sluice, or flood-gate, erected by authority of parliament on a navigable river, has long been a felony.

Removing any piles or other materials used for securing any seabank, &c., or doing any other injury so as to obstruct navigation, is also a felony; the punishment extending to penal servitude, in the former case, for life, and in the latter for seven years. Equally penal is the offence of destroying public bridges, which is likewise a felony.

The remaining offences against the public peace are merely misdemeanors; as,

5. Maliciously destroying turnpike-gates and toll-bars: or,

6. Maliciously destroying or damaging any book, print, statue, or other article, in any museum, library, or other public repository, or any public picture, statue, or monument.

7. Affrays; from affraier, to terrify; that is to say, the fighting of two or more persons in some public place; for, if the fighting be in private, it is no affray, but an assault. Affrays may be suppressed by any private person present, who is justifiable in endeavouring to part the combatants, whatever consequence may ensue. But more especially the constable, or other similar officer, however denominated, is bound to keep the peace. The punishment is by fine and im

Y

prisonment: the measure of which must be regulated by the circumstances of the case: for, where there is any material aggravation, the punishment proportionably increases. As where two persons coolly and deliberately engage in a duel: this being attended with an apparent intention and danger of murder, and being a high contempt of the justice of the nation, is a strong aggravation of the affray, though no mischief has actually ensued. Affrays in a church or churchyard are esteemed very heinous offences. And therefore by statute 5 & 6 Edw. VI. c. 4, if any clerk in orders shall, by words only, quarrel, chide, or brawl, in a church or churchyard, the ordinary shall suspend him from the ministration of his office during pleasure. But if he, in such church or churchyard, proceeds to smite or lay violent hands upon another person, he shall be excommunicated ipso facto. Laymen guilty of riotous, violent, or indecent behaviour in any church or chapel, churchyard or burying ground, or who molest, disturb, trouble, or mimic any preacher or any clerk in holy orders, incur on conviction a penalty of five pounds for each offence, or an imprisonment not exceeding two months. Two persons may be guilty of an affray: but

8. Riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies must have three persons at least to constitute them. Unlawfully assembling, if to the number of twelve, we have just now seen, may constitute a felony; but, from the number of three to eleven, the offence is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment only, to which hard labour may be added. Moreover, any two justices, with the sheriff or undersheriff, may come with the posse comitatus, and suppress any such riot, assembly, or rout, arrest the rioters, and record upon the spot the nature and circumstances of the whole transaction; which record alone shall be a sufficient conviction of the offenders. And all persons, noblemen and others, except women, clergymen, persons decrepit, and infants under fifteen, are bound to attend the justices in suppressing a riot, upon pain of fine and imprisonment; any battery, wounding, or killing of the rioters, that may happen in suppressing the riot being justifiable.*

9. Another offence against the public peace is that of a forcible entry or detainer; which is committed by violently taking or keeping possession of lands and tenements, without the authority of law. This was formerly allowable to every person disseised, or turned out of possession, unless his entry was taken away or barred by his own

* Nearly related to this head of riots is the offence of tumultuous petitioning which was prohibited by statute 13 Car. II. st. 1, c. 5. But as the Bill of Rights expressly declares the right of the subject to petition, and all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning to be illegal, the statute of Charles is practically repealed.

neglect, or other circumstances. But this being found very prejudicial to the public peace, it was thought necessary by several statutes to restrain all persons from the use of such violent methods, even of doing themselves justice, so that the entry now allowed by law is a peaceable one only. Two justices may also summarily restore the possession to the person entitled thereto.

10. Besides actual breaches of the peace, anything that tends to provoke or excite others to break it, is an offence of the same denomination. Therefore challenges to fight, either by word or letter, or to be the bearer of such challenge, are punishable by fine and imprisonment, according to the circumstances of the offence.

11. Of a nature very similar to challenges, are libels, libelli famosi, which, taken in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings, pictures, or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency; but, in the sense under which we are now to consider them, are malicious defamations of any person, and especially a magistrate, made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. The communication of a libel to any one person is a publication in the eye of the law: and therefore the sending an abusive private letter to a man is as much a libel as if it were openly printed, for it equally tends to a breach of the peace. For the same reason it is immaterial at common law, with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the matter of it be true or false; since the provocation, and not the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally, though, doubtless, the falsehood of it may, independently of any statutory provision, aggravate its guilt, and enhance its punishment.

In a civil action, a libel must appear to be false, as well as scandalous; for, if the charge be true, the plaintiff has received no injury. In a criminal prosecution, on the other hand, the tendency which all libels have to disturb the public peace, is what the law considers; and at common law, therefore, the truth of the libel not only constitutes no defence to the charge, but cannot even be given in evidence in mitigation of punishment. The statute 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, now, however, enables a defendant to prove its truth; but this does not amount to a defence, unless it was for the public benefit that the facts should be published. And after such a plea, if the defendant is convicted, the punishment imposed for his offence may be more severe, if in the opinion of the court his guilt is aggravated by the defence which he has set up, or the evidence given in support of it.

This statute applies only to libels of a private and personal character, and not to those denominated seditious or blasphemous. In these, therefore, and in all cases in which there is no plea of justifi