This question was before the Supreme Court of the state of Ohio in the case of State ex rel. Cooper v. Armstrong, 19 Ohio, 116, in which the court held: "When it becomes necessary for the sheriff to furnish food, etc., to juries impaneled in capital cases, the court will allow the account for such expenditures a necessary incident to their powers, and will compel the county auditor, by mandamus, if necessary, to draw his order upon the treasurer for the amount expended by the sheriff." power and duty of courts to exercise their not permitted to separate, and, in protracted functions must authorize such action as be cases it is frequently necessary to furnish comes expedient in the course of judicial them with lodging until they make up and business." In this case there was no stat- render their verdict, or are discharged for ute authorizing the incurring of the ex- want of agreement, or other cause; and here, pense of a place for the confinement of the where the English practice of starving them jury. So in the case at bar the mere fact into an agreement does not prevail, it is that the Legislature has made no provision customary and proper to furnish them with for the expense in caring for the appearance necessary food, etc. The costs of procuring and comforts of the jury other than that of | lodging and food for the jury in such cases board and lodging does not deprive the court is part of the expenses of the court, necesof the inherent power to make such provi- sarily accruing in the administration of jussion as it deems proper and necessary for the tice, and, we think, payable out of the councare and welfare of a jury while confined, in ty treasury, under the sections of the statorder that justice may be properly admin- ute above quoted." istered. The appearance, sanitary condition, and health of the jury, while in the custody of the law are just as much of concern to the state in making proper provision therefor, in order that the jury may perform the duties imposed upon it, as that of furnish ing them room and board. It is to my mind, a fact to which the power of the court extends in administering the laws of the state. In the case of Commissioners of Allegany County v. Commissioners of Howard County, 57 Md. 393, the court. in discussing this question, says: "In ancient times, after a case was submitted to the jury, and the bailiff had been sworn, the jury were kept locked in their room, without meat or drink, until they had agreed upon a verdict. But this rigorous rule has been greatly relaxed, if not entirely abandoned, and for many years past it has been the practice of the courts to keep jurors together, especially in capital cases, and to furnish them with their meals at the public expense, even before the case is closed and the bailiff sworn, and in both criminal and civil cases to so furnish them with necessary and reasonable meals after they are locked up in their room to consider of their verdict. After the bailiff has been sworn, and the jury have been locked in their room, they are no longer at liberty to order or have their own meals, or to regulate their own movements, but are under the immediate control and charge of the court in these respects, and cannot have anything to eat unless by order of the court, which, in the exercise of a sound discretion, may order necessary and reasonable meals The majority opinion holds that a juror's for them, as well as for the bailiff who has whiskers and hair will grow just the same them in charge, and the county commission- at home and at his place of business as ers are bound to pay the costs of the same." while serving on a jury, and that there is Is it possible in this state that the de- nothing peculiar or special about jury servmands of the law are so rigid that the com- ice which will cause whiskers and hair to forts and sanitary care of a jury are of grow, and for that reason seems to conclude no concern in the due administration of the that it is just as much the duty of a juror law? If these matters are incidents in the to shave and care for himself while on the due administration of the law, then the jury as though he were at home. It occurs court has the inherent power to make prop-to me, however, that the juror is at liberty er provision therefor, and it matters not at home, and at his place of business, to whether the Legislature has conferred this shave himself, select his own barber, and authority upon the court or not. As said by have his beard and hair clipped at will, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas in the case that while it will perhaps grow no faster of Bates v. Independence County, 23 Ark. during confinement than when at liberty, yet 722: "In the trial of felonies the jury are his personal liberty to stop the growth is Thus we see under these authorities that the court has the inherent power to incur, at the expense of the county, the necessary expense in the due administration of justice in caring for a jury. It is no argument against this inherent power to say that while the court has the inherent power to furnish board and lodging, it does not have the inherent power to shave and cut the hair of the jurors, for the reason that the former is necessary, while the latter is not. I apprehend, however, that where a jury is confined for the period of time the juries were in these cases, the personal attention of the jury and its sanitary wants necessarily become a matter of very great importance. It is not claimed that the jury, at the time the services were rendered, were not in need and did not require such services. That fact is admitted, and it appears was established to the satisfaction of the trial court, and by reason of such necessity he made the order under which the respondents rendered the services. denied while in confinement. taken possession of him, denied his right to stop the growth of his hair and whiskers. The law is responsible for the growth. He has no will with reference to the matter, and in my opinion it is the law which should take care of his personal appearance and supply him with the care which he is denied by reason of his confinement. The law has, a case; and, if the inherent power of the The majority opinion seems to hold that the claim of respondents is parallel to a claim for laundry or clothing furnished a jury; but to my mind the cases are not parallel, or in any way similar. The juror may send his linen, and have it laundered and returned, and again use it, so he may order new clothing and use that; but I am not advised of any process by which a juror could send to the barber shop his whiskers or hair and have them properly groomed and returned and placed in position for future use. In one case the article may be severed from the individual and treated separately, while the other requires the presence of the individual as a whole. Neither in my opinion is it sufficient to say that the barber may go to the jury room and perform the services there; for the juror is prohibited from communicating with the barber or receiving him in the jury room, and the barber is precluded from visiting the jury room except upon the order of the court. The juror has no right and is prohibited from ordering a barber to attend him and serve him. It is only upon the authority of the law that this service can be rendered; and in my judgment when the service is rendered and necessary in the due administration of the law, it should become a county charge. So in whatever way we may approach the subject, it is apparent that the juror is denied, by virtue of the law, the opportunity to exercise his will and give such attention to himself as he deems proper, and must depend wholly upon the law for his care and personal attention. These are matters, in my opinion, which are of a very great concern, and are important facts in the administration of the law. DUXSTAD v. DUXSTAD. (Supreme Court of Wyoming. March 10, 1909.) 1. DOMICILE (§ 4*)-CHANGE OF RESIDENCE. One going to another place must have an intention to make it a permanent residence in order to constitute a change of residence, and a residence once acquired continues until another is acquired. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Domicile, OF WIFE-FACTS CONSTITUTING RESIDENCE I'laintiff and her husband were married in Nebraska in 1904, and immediately came to this state, which was her husband's residence, where they lived together until March, 1906, when she left his house because of his wrongful conduct, and because she could not secure proper attenstayed with neighbors a couple of weeks, when tion while there, she then being enceinte, and she went to her parents' home in Nebraska about April 1st, and filed her petition for divorce in this state on April 8th, living in Nebraska, however, up to trial. She testified that she went to her parents to live temporarily, and that her residence was in this state, though she did not intend to return and live with her husband when she left. Held, that plaintiff did not lose her Wyoming residence so as to prevent her from bringing a divorce action there, under Rev. St. 1899, § 2989, as amended by Sess. Laws 1901, p. 4. c. 2. prohibiting the granting of a divorce, unless plaintiff has resided in this state one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. The same argument, made by appellant and approved by the majority opinion, says to the jury: "You have to live and lodge at home. Therefore, you should pay for your board and lodging while on the jury. You have to eat, whether confined or at liberty; your appetite will go on just the same whether at liberty or confined. Therefore the necessity does not exist for your having board and lodging at the public expense, while confined on the jury." Yet the authority of modern times has departed from the ancient practice of requiring a jury to be confined without meat or drink until a verdict is reached, and has adopted the humanitarian principle of properly caring [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. and providing for the jury, while considering | Dig. §§ 208-216; Dec. Dig. § 62.*] mined by plaintiff's residence at the time of filing the petition, and it is immaterial where she afterwards establishes her residence. 3. DIVORCE (§ 62*)--JURISDICTION-RESIDENCE | a number of acts of cruelty and to indigniOF PLAINTIFF-DOMICILE AT TIME OF SUIT. ties, and that she left on that account; that Jurisdiction of a divorce action is detershe was enceinte, and had not been in good health for some time; that it was necessary for her to have care, and that she had no place to go to but to her parents' home, and that she went there temporarily until the JEd. Note. For other cases, see Divorce, Cent. Dig. $$ 208-216; Dec. Dig. § 62.*] Error to District Court, Laramie County; trouble between her and her husband was Roderick N. Matson, Judge. Action by Anna Duxstad against Louis Duxstad. Judgment dismissing the complaint, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed, and remanded for further proceedings. See, also, 94 Pac. 463. Sullivan & Squires and M. A. Kline, for what she would do. plaintiff in error. BEARD, J. This is an action for divorce, brought by the plaintiff in error against the defendant in error, in the district court of Laramie county; the alleged grounds for such divorce being extreme cruelty, and such indignities offered by the defendant to plaintiff as to render her condition intolerable. The petition was dismissed by the district court on the ground that the plaintiff had not resided in this state for one year immediately preceding the filing of her petition, and that therefore the court was without jurisdiction. The correctness of that decision is the only question necessary to be determined on this appeal. settled. She remained with her parents up to the time of the trial in July, 1907, her child being born there about October 13, 1906. She also testified that she did not intend to return to Wyoming and live with her husband, and that she did not know The defendant in his testimony denied many of the charges made against him, but admitted that at one time he swore at her, and at another time applied to her the most vile epithet that can be applied to a woman; that at one time, while they were in bed together, he put his hand over her mouth and told her to hush up, and that, when she was about to leave in March, he took her cloak from her, and then followed her and caught her by the wrist and brought her back. Without stating the evidence more in detail, we think it sufficiently appears that her condition was such that she needed care which she could not, or at least did not, receive from her husband at their home. We think the rule is that the wife's residence is that of her husband, save in exceptional cases, when she can, on account of necessity, establish and claim a separate residence. One of such exceptions is when he has given her cause for divorce. In that case it has been generally held that she may acquire a separate residence in another jurisdiction which will entitle her to maintain an action for divorce in that jurisdiction. This she may do, but her husband cannot, by his wrongful acts, and by mistreating her, compel her to do so, when, as in this case, both parties have resided in the state for more than one year, that being the matrimonial domicile; and, the husband still continuing to reside here, she may still claim his residence as hers, at least until she has established a residence elsewhere. Ensign v. Ensign, 54 Misc. Rep. 289, 291, 105 N. Y. Supp. 917; Masten v. Masten, 15 N. H. 159; 14 Cyc. 584. There is no evidence in this case that the plaintiff intended, at the time she left her home, to go to her parents, or when she filed her petition to make her parents' home her paramount residence, except the inference that may be drawn from the fact that she remained there up to the time of the trial, and the further fact that she stated that she did not intend to return and live with her husband. But she repeatedly and positively stated that she was living with her parents temporarily, and that her residence was in Laramie county. A Our statute (section 2989, Rev. St. 1899), as amended by chapter 2, p. 4, Sess. Laws 1901, provides that "no divorce shall be granted unless the plaintiff shall have resided in this state for one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition, or unless the marriage was solemnized in this state, and the applicant shall have resided therein from the time of the marriage until the filing of the petition." In this case the parties were married in the state of Nebraska on April 6, 1904, plaintiff being a resident of that state, and the defendant being a resident of Laramie county in this state, where he owned a ranch, and was engaged in raising sheep. Immediately after their marriage they went to defendant's ranch, where they established their home and lived together as husband and wife until about March 16, 1906. About a year after their marriage they began to have trouble between them, and during the year they had several quarrels, the last one being on March 7, 1906, when she attempted to leave their home, after a combat, but was forcibly prevented from doing so by the defendant. She left, however, on March 16, 1906, and went to the house of a neighbor, where she remained for two or three weeks, and from there she went to the home of her parents in Nebraska about April 1st, and she filed her petition May 8, 1906. Between those dates she had been in this state for a few days. She testified to *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Reporter Indexes 100 P.-8 change of residence does not consist alone in going to and living in another place, but it must be with the intention of making that place the permanent residence. A residence once acquired continues until a new one is acquired. Watkinson v. Watkinson, 68 N. J. Eq. 632, 60 Atl. 931, 69 L. R. A. 397. In that case the court said: "To construe the temporary residence of appellant with his wife in New York to be a change of domicile seems to me to be unwarranted; for, as Mr. Justice Depue said, in Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 285, 51 Am. Rep. 17, 'to the factum of residence must be added the animus manendi, and that place is the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his habitation, not for a mere temporary or special purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, unless, or until, something which is uncertain or unexpected shall happen to induce him to adopt some other permanent home.' The doctrine laid down by the courts of the United States is that domicile, having been once acquired, continues until a new one is actually acquired animo et facto. 10 Am. & Eng. Encycl. L. 15; Cadwalader v. Howell, 18 N. J. Law, 138; Clark v. Likens, 26 N. J. Law, 207." See, also, Boreing v. Boreing, 114 Ky. 522, 71 S. W. 431; Haymond v. Haymond, 74 Tex. 414, 12 S. W. 90. The case at bar differs from one where the parties have never resided in the state, but one of them comes to the state and attempts to establish a residence here. In such a case the question is, Did the party acquire a residence here? While in this case the question is, Did plaintiff lose her residence here on account of her absence from the state for about six weeks under the circumstances attending her absence? We are of the opinion that she did not, and that the district court erred in so holding. It is the residence of the plaintiff for the required time, at the time of filing the petition, that determines the jurisdiction of the court, and it is not material where she may have established her residence after that time. Waltz v. Waltz, 18 Ind. 449. For the reasons above stated the judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. | with it so as to lower or depreciate its quality or purity, or (5) if any inferior substance is wholly or partly substituted for it, or (7) if it is an imitation; but that an article shall not be deemed adulterated if it is a mixture of recognized food products and not an imitation, provided each package sold as a mixture is labeled with the name and percentages of the components. Article 1, § 13, provides that maple syrup shall be the unadulterated product of the pure sap from the maple tree, with a certain stances with maple syrup or their substitution weight per pound, and the mixing of other subtherefor shall be deemed an adulteration. An information alleged that accused offered for sale wit, maple syrup and cane sugar mixed in cera half gallon can of recognized food products, to tain proportions, the can being labeled "W. syrup, a blend of pure maple and rock candy syrup," but was not labeled as a mixture with the name and percentage of each ingredient. Held, that the information did not charge an adulteration within section 13, which merely prohibited the sale of imitation maple syrup as pure syrup, or within section 6, and since the sale of unlabeled mixtures was not made unlawful by any statute unless they were adulterations, forbidden by section 6, which did not include unlabeled mixtures, the information did not allege an offense under the proviso of section 6. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Adulteration, Dec. Dig. § 10.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, pp. 210-212.] TION. 2. ADULTERATION (§ 3*)-STATUTES-CONSTRUCWhere the statute specifically defined what shall constitute an adulteration of food within the statute, the courts cannot extend it to include things not falling within the definitions. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Adulteration, Dec. Dig. § 3.] Exceptions from District Court, Sheridan County; Carroll H. Parmelee, Judge. T. H. Weeden was charged upon information with unlawfully selling adulterated syrup, and, a demurrer having been sustained to the information, the county attorney Exceptions overbrought the exceptions. ruled. W. E. Mullen, Atty. Gen., and Charles A. Kutcher, Co. & Pros. Atty., for the State. James J. Rowen (Thomas E. Lannen, of counsel), for defendant. BEARD, J. The county and prosecuting attorney of Sheridan county filed in the district court of that county an information containing a charge against the defendant, as follows: "That T. H. Weeden, late of the county aforesaid, on the 7th day of May, A. D. 1907, at the county of Sheridan, in the state of Wyoming, did then and there unlawfully offer for sale, for use and consumption as human food, one-half gallon of a mixture and compound of recognized food products, to wit, maple sprup and cane syrup, made up of maple syrup, 30 per cent., and cane syrup, 70 per cent., and as thus prepared was so offered for sale in a certain can containing said mixture and compound sold as aforesaid, which was then and there labeled and branded: 'Westmorland Syrup. A blend of pure maple syrup of 231 cubic inches in the state of Wyoming, shall be eleven pounds. And other substances mixed with the maple sugar or maple syrup or any other substance purporting to be maple sugar or maple syrup shall be deemed to be an adulteration within the meaning of the laws of the state of Wyo maple and rock candy syrup'-but was not | The standard weight of a gallon of such then and there labeled or branded as a mixture or compound with the name and percentage of each ingredient of said cane syrup and maple syrup contained therein." A general demurrer was filed to the information by the defendant, which was sustained by the court, and the defendant discharged, to which ruling the county attorney preserved his ex-ming, providing against the adulteration of ception, and brings the case here under the provisions of section 5378 et seq. Rev. St. 1899. * * foods, drugs, and drinks, and such party who makes or offers for sale such adulterated sugar or syrup shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and fined as herein previously provided for." Evidently the purpose and only purpose of this provision of the statute is to prohibit the sale of an imitation of or adulterated maple sugar or syrup as pure maple sugar or maple syrup; but the information in this case makes no such charge. Indeed, it appears from the information that it was not represented to be pure maple, but, on the contrary, was labeled otherwise. The information charged no offense, and the demurrer thereto was properly sustained by the district court. The exceptions of the prosecuting attorney are without merit, and are not sustained. POTTER, C. J., and SCOTT, J., concur. SOUZA v. LUCAS et al. (Civ. 590.) It is claimed by the prosecution that the information charges a violation of section 6, c. 82, p. 103, Sess. Laws 1903, which is as follows: "No person or persons shall within the state of Wyoming manufacture for sale, offer for sale, or sell any drug or article of food, drink or illuminating oil which is adulterated within the meaning of this act." The statute then defines what shall be deemed an "adulteration" in the following language, so far as it relates to this case: "Any article shall be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this act in case of foods or beverages : (4) If any substance or substances have been mixed with it so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality, strength or purity; (5) if any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted wholly or in part for it; * (7) if it is an imitation of another article." It is clear that none of these things which the statute defines to be an adulteration of articles of food is charged in the information. The Legislature has specifically defined what shall constitute adulteration within the meaning of the law, and, having done so, the court is bound to follow that definition and cannot extend it. It is urged, however, that the statute above quoted is followed by: "Provided, that an article of food or beverage shall not be deemed adulterated in the following cases: If it be a mixture or compound of recognized food products, or ingredients of food products not included in definition seven, * provided each and every package sold or offered for sale be distinctly labeled as mixtures or compounds with the name and per cent. therein and are not injurious to health."tachment, the officer must pay or tender to the Counsel have not referred us to any statute, nor have we found any, making the sale of such unlabeled mixtures or compounds unlawful, except as they are defined to be adulterations by the foregoing statute as quoted; and the definition of adulterations therein contained does not include such unlabeled compounds or mixtures. It is also contended that the information charges a violation of section 13 of article 1, c. 82, p. 105, Sess. Laws 1903, which is as 1. CHATTEL MORTGAGES (§ 22*) — MORTGAGES ON GROWING CROPS-VALIDITY. A chattel mortgage on growing crops, given as security for a note, and for such other sums the mortgagor, during the continuance of the as might be advanced, or merchandise sold to mortgage not to exceed a specified amount, is valid. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 68; Dec. Dig. § 22.*] 2. CHATTEL MORTGAGES (§ 249*) CLOSURE. FORE Where the sheriff attempted to levy an attachment on mortgaged chattels, but failed to comply with Civ. Code, § 2969, providing that before mortgaged chattels are taken under atmortgagee the amount of the mortgage debt and interest, or deposit the amount thereof, such attempted levy did not impair the right of the mortgagee to pursue the remedy in equity given by section 2967, authorizing a mortgagee to foreclose the mortgagor's right of redemption, etc., provided a judgment in such foreclosure might be carried out, though the sheriff was liable for a conversion. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Dec. Dig. § 249.*] FORECLO 3. CHATTEL MORTGAGES ($ 249*) follows: "For the purpose of this act maple of crops mortgaged does not impair the mortThe tortious removal, from the premises. sugar, and maple syrup, shall be the un-gagee's right to foreclose. adulterated product produced by the evapora- [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Morttion of pure sap from the maple or sugar tree. gages, Dec. Dig. § 249.*] For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Reporter Indexes |