States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the Reservation made by the in regard to the Monroe Doctrine. political question of policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything United States contained in the said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude towards purely American questions." In ratifying on April 2, 1908 this same convention as revised at the Second Hague Conference in 1907 the Senate of the United States made the same reservation. United States, If the Monroe Doctrine were a principle of international law, the United States would not be justified in changing its attitude upon the doctrine, but probably it A policy of the would not be seriously maintained that the not a principle United States might not enunciate another of international policy setting aside the Monroe Doctrine.1 Reddaway well says, "that it produced its desired effect as an act of policy, but in no way modified the Law of Nations." 2 law. Extent to which it has been The doctrine has always failed of direct legislative indorsement, and at times has been strenuously opposed by European powers. That it has been recognized, however, to a certain extent, appears by the course of events.4 It was in 1895 applied in the case of the intervention by the United States in the dispute over the boundary between recognized. 1 Hart, "Foundations of American Foreign Policy," p. 211 ff. 2 "The Monroe Doctrine," VI. "The 3 President Roosevelt in his message of December 3, 1901, said: Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it is of the United States. . . . The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American soil. . . . We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." • See Tucker, "Monroe Doctrine," p. 116. Venezuela and British Guiana. Arbitration settled this difficulty.1 In 1902 an attempt was made by Germany and England to enforce their money claims against Venezuela by sinking Venezuelan war vessels and blockading Venezuelan ports. Both the German and British governments disavowed any intention to acquire territory, and measures were finally adopted for the settlement of the claims of these and other states by reference to arbitration.2 policies. (b) Other American policies have gradually been developed in the western hemisphere. The proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine emphasized the growth of the feeling Other American that the states of America had interests peculiarly American. The American states which had so recently broken from European allegiance soon began their endeavor to unite for common action on American matters. A congress of American states was called at Panama in 1826.3 This Congress of Panama did not realize the hopes which had been entertained by some upon the possibility of developing a distinctively American policy. It had, however, among its objects the promotion of the peace and union of American nations. In 1831 another similar congress was called. Five South American states met at Lima in 1847. During the next forty years there were several congresses called with the idea of bringing the South American states into closer union and with the idea of providing means for the maintenance of amicable relations among these states particularly through mediation and arbitration. In 1888, after a considerable period of discussion, the United States Congress authorized the President to call a 1 Ann. Cycl. (1895), p. 741; (1896), p. 804; (1899), p. 845, also U. S. For. Rel. 1896. Early congresses of South American states. U. S. For. Rel. 1903, pp. 417 ff.; 452 ff.; 601 ff.; U. S. For. Rel. 1904, p. 509. 'American State Papers, 5 For. Rel., 839–905. Pan-American their aims Pan-American Conference to meet at Washington in 1889. This Conference voted various recommendations relating to the general and particular relations of the American states. Questions of private international law received much attention. Arbitration was indorsed as a means of settling international controversies. Other matters, as extradition, patents, trademarks, etc., were discussed. This Conference was followed by the Second Conference at Mexico, in 1901-1902, and the Third at Rio Janeiro, in 1906. Resolutions were adopted at this conference providing for the negotiation of conventions covering: (1) the status of naturalized citizens returning to the country of their origin; (2) the codification of public and private international law; (3) patents, trademarks and copyright law; and (4) arbitration of pecuniary claims. The First Pan-American Scientific Congress held at Santiago, Chile, 1908-1909, gave much attention to international questions of special interest to the American states. Certain prin only in the western hemisphere. There have come to be in the western hemisphere certain accepted international policies in which the European states have only a remote or occasional interest. Cerciples observed tain principles which European states have not yet admitted have by treaty been extensively adopted among American states, as in the case of the principle of obligatory arbitration in the event of international differences. The South American states have in the instance of Chile and the Argentine Republic, by the convention of May 28, 1902, led in the limitation of armaments. There has been manifested among the American states in recent years an increasing tendency to stand together and to develop policies which are American in character. As in Europe there has grown up the idea of the balance of 11 A. J. I. L. Doc., p. 294. power, so common interests and ideals have developed to some extent an American policy. 42. Non-intervention With the right of independence goes the correlative obligation of non-intervention, i.e. of refraining from all acts that would forcibly limit the freedom of another state. This obligation of non-intervention does not extend to the limitation of acts involving no display or threat of force, as in the case of mediation and arbitration. Nor can it be claimed that the obligation of non-intervention can be urged against measures undertaken by a state to preserve its fundamental right to existence. There is no right of intervention, as has been sometimes argued, though an act of intervention may be sometimes justifiable in itself.1 Intervention is the attempt of one or more states, by means of force, to coerce another state in its purely state action. The making of an alliance between two may influence a third state in its action, but it cannot be considered an intervention, nor is the tender of friendly offices in the settlement of a dispute to which a state is a party, intervention; but when a state directly interferes with the exercise of the authority in another state or by another state, it constitutes intervention. Intervention may vary greatly in degree and in character, whether it be armed or diplomatic. Each case must be considered separately on its merits, and if in any degree a justifiable measure, it must be on the highest grounds, and the motives of the intervening state must be pure. While it is still necessary to discuss the question of intervention in its various forms, yet, as Hall says: "It is unfortunate that publicists have not laid down broadly and unanimously that no intervention is legal, except for the purpose of self-preservation, unless a breach of the law as between states has taken place, or unless 1 Bonfils, No. 295; "Pradier-Fodéré," No. 355. the whole body of civilized states have concurred in authorizing it." 1 43. Practice in Regard to Intervention The nineteenth century might be called the century of interventions, for its whole political history has been closely related to the application of measures of intervention of the most varied sort. Naturally, all authorities do not agree as to the causes underlying the action of the several states, nor as to the nomenclature which should be used in describing these measures. A review of some of the cases of intervention during the nineteenth century shows that while the doctrine of non-intervention has been more and more widely professed, the practice has been strongly influenced by political expediency. Intervention for any cause may always be regarded by the state whose independence is impinged as a hostile act, and a ground for war, thus putting the matter outside the international law of peace.2 Intervention for selfpreservation. (a) As the right of existence is the first right of a state and universally admitted, intervention may sometimes be used as a means of maintaining this existence. In such a case it is clearly a matter of policy as to the means which a state shall use, and if it resorts to intervention rather than other means, it must have ample grounds for its action in the particular case. A case of intervention on the grounds of self-preservation which has caused much debate is that of England in the two attacks upon Copenhagen in 1801 and 1807, on the ground that it was necessary for English supremacy of the seas, which formed her chief defense, to prevent the union of the Danish forces with those of the other powers. Intervention cannot be justified by any appeal to general principles which inhere 1 Hall, 2 Ibid., p. 278, |