"A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before the commencement of war." 1 "The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden. "A place cannot be bombarded solely because automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbour." 2 Undefended towns may be bombarded if they refuse reasonable requisitions for supplies necessary for the immediate use of the naval force but not for failure to make money contributions.3 Provisions for protection of non-military buildings, monuments, etc., have been made.4 While the use of false colors in naval war is not yet forbidden, when summoning a vessel to lie to, or before firing a gun in action, the national colors must be displayed. The use of the conventional flag of truce, a white flag, or of the hospital flag, red cross on white ground, to cover military operations or supplies is forbidden.5 Stratagems, such as feigned attacks, ambush, and deceit not involving perfidy are allowed.6 By the declaration of the Hague Conference of 1899, "the contracting parties agree to prohibit, for Declarations of the Hague Conferences. a term of five years, the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature." 7 The declaration was renewed at the Hague Conference of 1907 to extend to the close of the Third Conference. There was also an agreement in 1899 "to abstain from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body." Appendix, p. 415. 5 Appendix, pp. 415, 430. "Holls, "Hague Peace Conference," 93 et seq., 455. The Hague Conference of 1899 also declared against the "use of projectiles, the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." 1 The Hague Convention of 1907 provided: "ART. I. It is forbidden: "1. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them; "2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings; "3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their mark. "ART. II. It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping." 2 Retaliation, devastation, refusal of quarter, and other severe methods once resorted to are now generally forbidden, except as punishment for violation of the laws of war. 112. Privateers A private armed vessel owned and manned by private persons and under a state commission called a "letter of marque, " 3 is a privateer. This method of carrying on hostilities has gradually met with less and less favor. From the early days of the fifteenth century neutrals were given commissions. Toward the end of the eighteenth century treaties and domestic laws gradually provided against this practice, though letters of marque were offered to foreigners by Mexico in 1845, and by the Confederate States in 1861-1865. These were not accepted, how1See Holls, "Hague Peace Conference," 93 et seq., 461. The United States did not sign this declaration. 2 Scott, "Conferences," p. 252. For form, see United States v. Baker, 5 Blatchford, 6; 2 Halleck, 110. See article of Dr. Stark on "Privateering," in Columbia University Publications (1897), Vol. VIII, No. 3. 1 ever, as such action had then come to be regarded as piracy by many states. Privateering of any kind, as Kent said, "under all the restrictions which have been adopted, is very liable to abuse. The object is not fame or chivalric warfare, but plunder and profit. The discipline of the crews is not apt to be of the highest order, and privateers are often guilty of enormous excesses, and become the scourge of neutral commerce. .. Under the best regulations, the business tends to blunt the sense of private right, and to nourish a lawless and fierce spirit of rapacity." The granting of letters of marque to private persons of either of the belligerent states was attended with grave evils, and, by the Declaration of Paris, 1856, "Privateering is, and remains, abolished.” 2 This declaration was agreed to by the leading states of the world, with the exception of the United States, Spain, Mexico, Venezuela, and China. In the Spanish-American War of 1898 the United States formally announced that it would not resort to privateering.3 Spain, while maintaining her right to issue letters of marque, declared the intention to organize for the present (May 3, 1898) a service of "auxiliary cruisers of the navy." The importance of the subject of privateering is now largely historical, as it is doubtful whether any civilized state would resort to this method of carrying on maritime war. The organiza 113. Voluntary and Auxiliary Navy (a) The relationship of private vessels to the state in time of war, which had been settled by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, was again made an issue by the tion of a volun- act of Prussia in the Franco-German War. By a decree of July 24, 1870, the owners of vessels were invited to equip them for war and place them under teer navy. 11 Kent Com., 97. Appendix, p. 379. Proclamations and Decrees (April 25, 1898), p. 77. the naval discipline. The officers and crews were to be furnished by the owners of the vessels, to wear naval uniform, to sail under the North-German flag, to take oath to the articles of war, and to receive certain premiums for capture or destruction of the enemy's ships. The French authorities complained to the British that this was privateering in disguise and a violation of the Declaration of Paris. The law officers of the crown declared that there was a "substantial difference" between such a volunteer navy and a system of privateering, and that the action of Prussia was not contrary to the Declaration of Paris. With this position some authorities agree, while others dissent.1 The weight of the act as a precedent is less on account of the fact that no ships of this navy ever put to sea. The similar plan of Greece for a volunteer navy in 1897 was never put into operation.2 Russia, in view of possible hostilities with England in 1877-1878, accepted the offer of certain citizens to incorporate into the navy during the war, vessels privately purchased and owned. Vessels of this character are still numbered in the "volunteer fleet," and though privately owned and managed are, since 1886, under the Admiralty. These vessels may easily be converted into cruisers, and are, so far as possible, favored with government service. There seems to be little question as to the propriety of such a relationship between the state and the vessels which may be used in war. (b) Still less open to objection is the plan adopted by Great Britain in 1887 and by the United States in 1892, by which these governments, through agreements with certain of their great steamship lines, can hire or purchase at a fixed price specified vessels for use in case of war The construction of such vessels is subject to government approval, and certain subsidies are granted to these companies. In time of war both officers 'R. D. I., IV, 695. The use of auxiliary vessels. 1 Hall, p. 520. and men must belong to the public forces. The plans of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States have met with little criticism.1 The method of commissioning auxiliary vessels has given rise to much discussion, particularly during the RussoJapanese War in 1905. Certain states contend that the conversion of a merchant ship into a war ship should not be permitted on the high sea. Other states take the opposite position. The Hague Conference of 1907, as the London Naval Conference of 1908-1909, was unable to reach an agreement as to the matter of conversion of merchant ships into war ships on the high seas. There is, however, a general recognition of the necessity for control of a converted ship by direct authority of the state whose flag it bears. Such a ship should also have the external marks of a war ship and should observe the laws and customs of war, and the belligerent making such conversion should immediately make it public.2 114. Capture and Ransom For more than one hundred years the capture of private property at sea has been regarded with disfavor both on the continent of Europe and in America. The exemption (a) The attitude of the United States is shown by the provision in the Treaty with Prussia of 1785, whereby merchant vessels of either state are to pass "free and unmolested."3 John Quincy Adams, in 1823, asked England, France, and Russia to exempt hostile private property from capture. The proposition was not accepted. The United States withheld its approval of the Declaration of Paris of 1856 because private property was not exempted from capture. The property at sea. 1 See Act of May 10, 1892; 27 U. S. Sts. at Large, 27. 2 For Convention of 1907 see Scott, "Conferences," p. 246. 7 Moore, § 1198. |