arisen to furnish the reformers with a pretext for introducing innovations."

Otto describes the movement for a commercial convention and continues: "The authors of this proposition had no hope, nor even desire, to see the success of this assembly of commissioners, which was only intended to prepare a question much more important than that of commerce. The measures were so well taken that at the end of September no more than five states were represented at Annapolis, and the commissioners from the Northern states tarried several days at New York in order to retard their arrival. The states which assembled, after having waited nearly three weeks, separated under the pretext that they were not in sufficient numbers to enter on the business, and, to justify this dissolution, they addressed to the different legislatures and to Congress a report, the translation of which I have the honor to enclose you."

"In this paper the commissioners employ an infinity of circumlocutions and ambiguous phrases to show their constituents the impossibility of taking into consideration a general plan of commerce and the powers pertaining thereto, without at the same time touching upon other subjects closely connected with the prosperity and national importance of the United States. Without enumerating these objects, the commissioners enlarge upon the present crisis of public affairs, upon the

dangers to which the Confederation is exposed, upon the want of credit of the United States abroad, and upon the necessity of uniting, under a single point of view, the interests of all the states. They close by proposing for the month of May next a new assembly of commissioners, instructed. to deliberate, not only upon a general plan of commerce, but upon other matters which may concern the harmony and welfare of the states, and upon the means of rendering the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the union."

The call for the convention, which met at Philadelphia, May, 1787, provided that it should "revise the Articles of Confederation." That pretext having served its purpose, no more attention was paid to it. As soon as the delegates met, the real design of a restoration of government was taken in hand. The scheme of the national politicians was thus borne to its destination on the back of a

movement for commercial regulations. It is an early specimen of "the rider," that ruse so frequently resorted to in political strategy for the control of legislation.

CHAPTER IV

THE RESTORATION

THE way things had been going on since the colonies had become independent states had greatly excited among the delegates the traditional prejudice against democracy. That which they had feared all along, which had made them so reluctant to carry their resistance to parliamentary oppression to the point of declaring their independence of the British crown- the outbreak of democratic licentiousness had come to pass, and they were aghast at the evil look of the times. They met behind closed doors, and could talk freely. Roger Sherman, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, solemnly laid down the rule that "the people should have as little to do as may be with the government."1 George Mason thought "it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for chief magistrate to the people, as it would be to refer a trial of colors to a blind man." Madison did not think large bodies of men had much regard for honesty. "Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number

1 All the quotations from the convention debates are taken from Madison's Journal.

among whom the blame or praise is to be divided." Elbridge Gerry remarked that "he did not deny the position of Mr. Madison, that the majority will generally violate justice when they have an interest in doing so." The great argument in behalf of the states' rights doctrine, to which the particular interests of the smaller states naturally impelled them, was that its adoption would provide additional social security, making the ship of state a compartment vessel, as it were, so that a democratic inundation would be limited to the vicinity of the breach, and would not at once overwhelm the whole fabric. Said John Dickinson, "Of remedies for the diseases of republics which have flourished for a moment only and then vanished forever, one is the double branch of the legislature, and the other the accidental lucky division of this country into distinct states."

Frequent reference was made to the corruption and incapacity of state legislatures. Madison complained that "the backwardness of the best citizens to engage in the legislative service gave too great success to unfit characters." John Francis Mercer of Maryland dwelt upon the need of protecting the people "against those speculating legislatures which are now plundering them throughout the United States." But there was small hope that a national legislature would be much better. Mason remarked that, "notwithstanding the precautions taken in the constitution of the legislature,

it would still so much resemble that of the individual states that it must be expected frequently to pass unjust and pernicious laws." Edmund Randolph argued that "the Senate will be more likely to be corrupt than the House of Representatives, and should therefore have less to do with money matters." Hamilton remarked: "We must take man as we find him, and if we expect him to serve the public we must interest his passions in doing so." Gouverneur Morris said: “One interest must be opposed to another interest. Vices, as they exist, must be turned against each other."

But how was this to be accomplished? The model of government all had in mind was the English constitution. Many eulogistic references to it were made in the course of the debates. It was, however, admitted that American society did not afford materials from which such a constitution could be formed. There were no distinct orders in the state which could be balanced against one another like the crown, lords, and commons. The best the delegates could do was to frame a government on the principles of the English constitution. They were agreed on this, but there were sharp differences as to the application of those principles under the conditions set by the political situation. In addition, they had to consider above all things the practical question: How were the states to be brought into subordination again? Since their approval was necessary to give effect to any plan