CHAPTER XXVII

THE POLITICAL PROSPECT

ALTHOUGH "the Cause of the Present Discontents has taken rank as a classic, it does not appear to have had any marked effect upon contemporaneous thought. The general current of political speculation continued to be deeply tinctured by the fallacies of the old Whig theory. John Adams probably expressed the prevailing opinion when he wrote that Burke was far inferior to Bolingbroke as a thinker. Burke's essay gave great umbrage to reformers and called forth counter manifestoes. What the age admired was Churchill's satire, the invectives of Junius, and Mrs. Catherine Macaulay's1 dissertations proving to the satisfaction of every one not a dolt or a knave that the corruptions of politics were due to

1 Mrs. Macaulay was in high repute as the "celebrated female historian." She is referred to by John Adams as a recognized authority. A poet of the age declared:

"Macaulay shall in nervous prose relate

Whence flows the venom that distracts the state."

The prophecy was exactly fulfilled by a Macaulay whose fame has obliterated that of his predecessor, whose name is now preserved from oblivion mainly by some ungallant remarks at her expense by old Dr. Johnson, duly recorded by Boswell.

the disturbance of the constitution caused by the growth of partisanship.

The belief that the constitution could be tinkered into some sort of mechanical excellence possessed reformers too strongly to be disturbed. An elaborate presentation of their ideas was made in Burgh's "Political Disquisitions, an Inquiry into Public Errors, Defects, and Abuses," published in 1774John Adams mentions that it was favorite reading in the colonies, and Jefferson recommended it to a friend as a good work on politics. It is cited in The Federalist as a standard authority. In its three stout volumes one finds all the familiar nostrums for remedying the ills of the body politic such as annual elections, rotation in office, the ballot, the extension of the suffrage, the requirement of residence in the constituency as a qualification for election, and above all things the suppression of partisanship. In England the course of practical politics would not budge for such reforms, but they have had a grand field in this country. New nostrums are now in favor, but the spirit of reform is unchanged. The great object is still, as in Burgh's time, "not to set up one party against another, the one to battle against the other; but to take away the fuel of parties, the emolumentary invitations to the fatal and mischievous strife, in which every victory is a loss to the country." 1

1 Burgh's Disquisitions, Vol. III., p. 332.

Legislation conceived in this spirit has had grave consequences; but for the present purpose it is sufficient to remark that there is nothing in the present condition of our politics to indicate that constitutional development is taking any different course than it has followed hitherto, as described in the second part of this work. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence to confirm the opinion that party organization continues to be the sole efficient means of administrative union between the executive and legislative branches of the government, and that whatever tends to maintain and perfect that union makes for orderly politics and constitutional progress; while whatever tends to impair that union, disturbs the constitutional poise of the government, obstructs its functions, and introduces an anarchic condition of affairs full of danger to all social interests. This is the cardinal principle of American politics.

This disposition of executive authority institutions to infer

The situation is such that the extension of executive authority is still the only practical method of advancing popular rule. American politics to exalt causes some critics of our that democracy tends towards personal rule. Appearances seem to corroborate this theory; but all that it really amounts to is that at the present stage of our political development American democracy, confronted by the old embarrassments of feudalism, compounded from new ingredients, in

stinctively resorts to the historic agency for the extrication of public authority from the control of particular interests the plenitude of executive power. The circumstances are such as are likely to put increasing emphasis upon this tendency.

The actual situation as regards the practical work of government assigns real control to two systems of authority: one the power of the Speaker of the House over the opportunities of legislation; the other the power of senators over the details of legislation. The latter is by far the more important, as it is the positive force; the former operating simply as a check or inhibition at large, and, from its gross and massive nature, incapable of discrimination. The senatorial control is supple, insinuating, and under existing conditions it is ordinarily incontestable. By so much as particular interests are brought under a general control in the House, the more they value the opportunities afforded by senatorial prerogative; and thus there is created in the membership of the House a sense of dependence upon the offices of senators, which greatly weakens the House as a body in any controversies with the Senate. There are always a large number of members who are fearful of injuring some special interests which they are pursuing by the aid of senators, so that they have no stomach for a conflict, and are quite willing to sacrifice the dignity of the House for their individual advantage.

The possibility that the constitutional privileges of the Senate might be abused, so as to erect oligarchical power, was foreseen by the framers of the constitution, and the representatives of the larger states would never have agreed to equality of senatorial representation with the smaller states had it not been supposed that the House of Representatives would dominate the legislative branch of the government. Speaking of that equality,

Madison remarked:

"The peculiar defence which it involves in favor of the smaller states would be more rational if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other states, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar dangers. But as the larger states would always be able, by their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser states; and as the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation." 1

In this, as in all their estimates of the practical working of the constitution, the fathers were misled by deceptive analogies drawn from the English constitution. All the checks upon which they relied for the control of the Senate, by means of the superior weight and influence of the House, 1 The Federalist, No. 62.