July 25, 1866. Thus step by step the states have been brought into a uniformity of system in national politics, and this again has reacted in various ways upon state politics, so as to produce a general conformity in political methods.

A fact of the highest importance, which has been made manifest by this process, is the plastic nature of constitutional arrangements, however rigid their formal character. The electoral college has been entirely divested of its original functions, without a change of a letter of the law. Instead of possessing discretionary powers, it has become as mechanical in its operation as a typewriter. The case is conclusive evidence of the ability of public opinion to modify the actual constitution to any extent required. It has also revealed wherein the true strength of a constitution resides. There is not a syllable in the organic or in the statute law to safeguard the present constitutional function of the electors, and yet such is the force of public sentiment that there is practically no danger that any elector will ever violate his party obligations, although it cannot be doubted that those obligations have been established in opposition to the expectation of the constitution.

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CHAPTER XIII

DEMOCRATIC REFORM

At the time Jackson was elected to the presidential office, Congress had acquired great weight in the government, and had practically become the seat of administrative control. The idyllic conceptions of government proclaimed by Jefferson had not fared well in this rough and bustling world. A strong reaction in favor of more vigorous and efficient government set in and made itself felt in Congress. In a speech delivered in the House, January 31, 1816, Calhoun remarked: "In the policy of nations there are two extremes : one extreme, in which justice and moderation may sink in feebleness; another, in which the lofty spirit which ought to animate all nations, particularly free ones, may mount up to military violence. These extremes ought to be equally avoided; but of the two, I consider the first far the most dangerous." Such language indicated a change of heart in the Republican party. It began to lean to a policy which could be distinguished from the old Federalist policy only by nice discrimination. Internal improvements were begun under Jefferson's administration, and before

Madison left office another national bank had been chartered with the same general powers as the one of Hamilton's creation against which Jefferson had fulminated. Such changes provoked the taunt that the Republicans were turning Federalists, but in reply it was argued that with Republicans at the head of affairs things could be allowed that might justly have been regarded as dangerous while Federalists were in control. This ingenious

view of the case was Madison's own, produced during his philosophic retirement at Montpellier after the close of his public career. Writing under date of May 22, 1823, he said, "It is true that, under a great change of foreign circumstances, and with a doubled population and more than doubled resources, the Republican party has been reconciled to certain measures and arrangements, which may be as proper now as they were premature and suspicious when urged by the champions of Federalism.”

Notwithstanding such soothing lotions, the sense of consistency in the old Republican leaders smarted under the necessity of having to reconcile themselves to theories and measures which they had formerly denounced, and an easy way of avoiding it was to throw the responsibility on Congress. As for themselves, they admitted the desirability of enlarged powers of government, if only the constitutional authority could be found. So Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe each recom

mended that the constitution should be amended for this purpose. Congress hearkened respectfully, and then assumed the necessary authority. In 1806 the government began the construction of the Cumberland road. In 1808 Secretary Gallatin submitted an elaborate plan of internal improvements, including the construction of both roads and canals, which was received with enthusiasm. The financial embarrassments caused by the embargo put an end to that scheme, but in 1816 a scheme of the same nature was brought forward in the House by Calhoun. The bill passed Congress, but was vetoed by Madison in the last hours of his administration. His message was in effect a plea to Congress to amend the constitution so as to obtain the undoubted right to enact such very desirable legislation. Nevertheless, the policy of internal improvement continued to take shape in Congress. Monroe was so hard pressed that, in his turn, he was compelled to vindicate the consistency of his principles by sending in an elaborate veto message, which in a stately and dignified way performed the dialectic feat vulgarly known as beating the devil around the stump. After arguing at great length that he could not really be expected to sanction internal improvements unless authorized by an amendment to the constitution, he contrived this loophole for Congress: "My idea is that Congress have an unlimited power to raise money, and that in its appro

priation they have a discretionary power, restricted only by the duty to appropriate it to purposes of common defence and of general, not local, national, and state benefit." Congress promptly acted upon this hint and exercised its discretionary power. Items on account of internal improvements became a regular feature of the ordinary appropriation bills.

Such an attitude of the executive department connived at the concentration of power and responsibility in Congress, and promoted the establishment of a parliamentary régime. The party arrangement by which the Congressional Caucus named the President, gave a parliamentary origin to the administration, and the government began to take its tone and character from Congress. The presidency seemed on the way to becoming the headship of a permanent bureaucracy, at the top of which stood the Cabinet. After the traditional two terms had expired, the incumbent retired to private life, to be revered as a sage, and the Secretary of State was promoted to fill the vacancy. For more than a quarter of a century after the accession of Jefferson, the Cabinet resembled the Senate in being a continuous body, each president as he stepped into the office from the Cabinet retaining his old associates. Such was the permanency of tenure that a sense of individual right in the retention of Cabinet office grew up. The force of this sentiment is displayed in some cor