the world, origin of the species, question of races, destiny of man in this life and in the other, relations of man to God, duties of man to his fellow men, rights of man over the creation-he is ignorant of none of these points; and when he shall have grown-up, he will as little hesitate with regard to natural right, political right, or the right of nations. All this proceeds, with clearness, and, as it were, of itself, from Christianity. This, then, is what we may call a great religion, for it leaves no question unanswered which interests humanity."

M. Royer Colard was the founder of the Eclectic school, in Paris, to which Jouffroy belongs, but never published any thing on philosophical subjects in his own name, except the "Introductory Discourse," at the commencement of his lectures in 1813. A very interesting summary of his lectures, however, prepared from the manuscripts of the author, is given by M. Jouffroy in his translation of the works of Dr. Reid. It may not be unserviceable to mention, that Dugald Stewart's "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind" was, several years ago, translated into French by M. Prevost of Geneva, and the second volume by M. Farcy; and that his " Philosophical Essays" have since been translated by M. Huret; his "Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Principles," by M. Buchon; and his "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," by M. M. Simon and Huret.

Jouffroy disputes the assumption that the Science of Reality is solely physical. He believes that there are Facts of another kind—not visible to the eye, not tangible by the hand-which neither the microscope nor the scalpel can reach, perfect as we may suppose them, which equally escape the taste, the hearing, and the smell, and which, nevertheless, are capable of being observed and verified with an absolute certainty. Consciousness is one :-it is not one intelligence which perceives external objects, and another which takes cognizance of inward phenomena--one which recalls past events, and another which reflects, compares, and reasons. We feel, on the contrary, that it is the same principle which unites all these functions; this is one of the clearest decisions of our consciousness. Both classes of phenomena have, therefore, the same evidence, the same certainty. We can, then," says Jouffroy, “determine, in a scientific manner, that is to say, by Observation and Experience, the laws of the internal phenomena; we can, also, obtain from them, by logical reasoning, valuable and rigorous inductions." We more than doubt the possibility of this-we know that laws are discovered in no such way-they are à priori intuitions, assumed, in every act, by the consciousness-in a word, Consciousness is itself the Law. The "Ultimate Facts" of Stewart are not Laws, as he supposed, but Exponents of Laws. To the à priori philosopher, they would be the Primitive Facts, accompanying, and identified with, the Evolutions of the one Law-namely, the One Consciousness.

In a subsequent section, Jouffroy says something almost like this himself. "It is (he tells us) not true, as is commonly supposed, that axioms are the exclusive property of the sciences of reasoning. They belong also to the sciences of facts; and without them, observation cannot advance a step in the comprehension of nature. The notion of the constituent circumstances of every phenomenon bears all the characteristic, and in the natural sciences of Facts all the influence of a genuine axiom. This notion is nothing else than the necessary law of every phenomenon, the expression of that which inevitably takes place whenever a change is produced in nature. Whence do we obtain the knowledge of this law? How do we know that it is universal? Why do we believe that all phenomena, past, present, and future, in whatever corner of space they have been or can be produced, must be subject to this law? We have already said that this conviction is not the product of experience. Experience does not reach to all possible cases; and in the phenomena which it lays hold of, it would see only one fact succeeded by another, did not the notion of the law of every phenomenon aid it in discovering the relations which exist between these facts. The law of every phenomenon is a pure conception of reason, like all legitimate axioms. As soon as we perceive any change whatever, we know at once that it is an effect, that it has a cause; that this cause has acted to produce it; that it has been determined to produce it by

some deciding influence, and, finally, that this effect becomes itself a cause, and produces, in its turn, some new result. All this is the produce of reflection alone, before observation has ascertained the cause, the operation, the sufficient reason, and the result. All this appears to us be true; not because we see that it is, but because we know that it must be; and precisely on account of this necessity, our reason confidently applies it to all possible cases, and regards it as the universal law of every phenomenon."

This and other passages of similar import, indicate that the system of M. Jouffroy is a kind of synthesis between Stewart and Kant. In conclusion, he argues that, it being conceded that there are Facts within us of a different nature from sensible facts, there must also be within us a Reality of a different nature from sensible reality. There must be a Soul, distinct from Body; and to this soul we must refer all the facts of consciousness, as to their principle or their actual subject. In other words, we are to believe in a special being, of which sensibility, volition, intelligence, are the specific attributes, and which is as distinct from material realities as these phenomena are distinct from material phenomena. Of the modifications which this principle experiences, the brain is the indispensable condition.

The phenomena of consciousness, therefore, being of a distinct nature, and bearing no resemblance to the other phenomena of human organisation, should be made the object of a special science, which should bear a special name. What name? The term Ideology, says Jouffroy, is too narrow-for it designates only the science of a part of the external facts. The term Psychology, consecrated by usage, appears to him to be preferable; for it designates the facts with which the science is occupied by their most popular characteristic, namely, that of being attributed to the soul. The term represents a science which should be no less thoroughly cultivated, and in a manner no less methodical and rigorous than its sister science, Physiology.

The Philosophy of the Mind. By James Douglas, Esq., of Cavers. Edin. burgh: Adam and Charles Black; Longman and Co., London. 1839. Tais writer distinguishes between metaphysics and philosophy. Metaphysics, he says, have occupied a large share of attention; the philosophy of mind is but of yesterday. Religion and philosophy, he adds, have their origin in the same law of thought, which ascribes every event to a cause. No wonder, therefore, that true philosophy is connected with true religion. But how does this agree with the yesterday origin of philosophy? Religion was from the beginning! To metaphysics the author ascribes a data no earlier than Thales: ergo, Philosophy is older than Metaphysics.

From Thales to Professor Brown, Mr. Douglas runs through the history of speculative opinions, making some shrewd and some captious remarks. Of Stewart, he says, that—

"It might have been hoped a mind so well trained and so well regulated, besides making known the merits of another, would have added new discoveries of its own; but the changes from Reid's opinions are few, and these apparently not for the better. The connecting belief with imagination was a return to the tenets of Hume and Hobbes. In changing what has been called the conceptualism of Reid for nominalism, he pushed a useful truth to an unnecessary as well as erroneous extreme. That words are the chief instruments of thought, is a truth in which all will agree; that they are the sole instruments of thought is erroneous; for the previous exercise of thought is implied in their application and discrimination.

"How admirably (continues Mr. Douglas) Stewart could discourse from his own proper fund of thought, is seen in his remarks upon the acceleration in the trains of our ideas from practice and habit. It is much to be regretted, that other passages, which are chiefly to be admired, are generally reflections upon the thoughts of others, rather than the original meditations of his own well-balanced mind; and it is often a disappointment to the learner, who thinks he has secured an incomparable guide along the steep and dizzy path that leads to mental truth, to find that all that guide proposes is a peripatetic ramble over a tesselated pavement of quotations."

The German methods of philosophising are held in little repute by Mr. Douglas; he clearly knows nothing of Coleridge's writings, and prefers before all theories that of the Baconian Induction. He proposes, therefore, to investigate the philosophy of mind by the process of induction. He seeks less after novelty, he tells us, than that central point of view which reconciles conflicting opinions, and changes those who deem themselves mutually opposed into fellow-labourers, co-operating, though unconsciously, in the establishment of the same ultimate principles.

Some of his objections are curious enough. To Kant's doctrine, that space is the form of outward sensations, he objects, that of the five senses two only have reference to extension; and each of these to a different extension. Singular that Wirgman should have been teaching Kantism for several years with a recognition of the distinction stated. At a fitting time we shall enter at large on this point. In the mean time, suffice it to assert, that there is no object of any one sense that occupies not space.

The origin of thought, according to Mr. Douglas's induction, is threefoldsensation, reflection, and suggestion. Causation not being derived from sensation and reflection, there must be some third inlet by which we receive information. On all this we are already sufficiently informed. Nor do we know that the author presents us with any thing new, relative to "the train of thought and the mental faculties." That the association is under the control of our will is a truth well recognised by the writer, in the following terms :

"The moral and probationary state of man is strongly exemplified by the law which the associations of ideas obey. These associations, which at first are obedient to the conditions of thought imposed upon mankind in general, begin more and more to take the hue of personal character-they are marked with the singularity and impress of each peculiar individual-they are moulded to suit professional habits of thought, and they are regulated by virtue, or disturbed by uncontrolled passion. The raw materials are furnished to every mind, but each constructs his own edifice-a hovel or a palace. Association has been compared to gravitation; each is the building principle in the separate worlds of matter and of mind. The resemblance is striking, but still more so is the difference: the force of gravitation is uniform-that of association ever varying. At first a natural law,-at last it is almost transformed into a moral principle; as the man is, such is the train of his thoughts. To read at once the history and the destiny of an individual, we need only behold the acquired association of his ideas. He needs no other oracle than the manner in which the images of his mind are grouped together; and in the characters which are engraven on his mental tablet, he carries within him the handwriting of his doom."

"The dividing the soul into various faculties, and giving names to every power, real or supposed, though it is attended with its conveniences, and though without this we should neither be able to dispute nor to speak concerning metaphysics, yet is apt to give us a false view of the mode of operation of the mind. In perception, for example, all the powers of the mind are exercised; the impressions come to us single, and in succession; but by the aid of memory we gather them together, and by the aid of imagination we blend them into a whole. We also unite an analysis with our synthesis; for while we collect every perception together, respecting each external object, and at the same time individualise it, we carry on a degree of abstraction, which separates the less important from the characteristic qualities of the object, and by the power of generalisation, and by the medium of language, assigns it to that class of beings to which we suppose it naturally to belong."

In treating of Imagination, Mr. Douglas tells us very finely, that it has been the great civiliser of mankind. It has reflected, indeed, earthly events and human passions, but always with less grossness than their reality, and with more heavenly hues. Thus the ideal has always gone side by side with the real-softening, amending, exalting; throwing a veil over what it could not change, and keeping alive ceaseless aspirations, if it often fell short of attainments. But if it was well for each generation to be attracted to a higher

vantage ground than that upon which it stood, posterity are often deceived, on the other hand, in mistaking the aim for the attainment, and the aspirations of poetry for the progressions of history. Sismondi has given an excellent instance of this, when he points out the confusion between chivalry and feudalism, the last, the actual condition of the middle ages; the former, that state which existed in imagination, in poetry, and in the loftier aspirations of the mind, but whose brilliant territories are chiefly beyond the confines of our nether world. Imagination is eminently fitted to man as a progressive being. He requires its wings to lift him up from where he is grovelling upon the earth. Its domain forms the boundary between sense and faith; and we must first pass through its portal before we can gain even a distant view of the regions of endless hope and immortality. All the improvements that have ever been effected in the world, necessarily had first their place in imagination. It is the nursery in which heavenly fruits must be acclimated before they can be transplanted to our daily world. Every discovery of science has had its first gleam there, before it settled into a steady radiance, and became fixed as one of the lights of heaven. The world of imagination has a double horizon. It affords an ever-widening prospect of progress and improvement upon earth, while in its loftier expanse, it discloses to us the worlds upon worlds on high, infinite in number, and endless in duration; where the individual soul shall attain that perfection above, which the short-lived generations of mortals below are ever pursuing, and ever slowly approaching, but which they can never attain.

Of what are called our abstract and general notions, the author judiciously remarks, that such "ideas are merely the simple and original ideas of our childhood, and our original perceptions, which we are endeavouring to regain in their simplicity, by endeavouring to abstract our attention from those complicated adjuncts which the plastic power of the mind is ever uniting with them." The truth is, that what Dugald Stewart denominated the Ultimate Facts are the Primitive Ones. We ought to ascertain them synthetically rather than analytically. These facts are few-the sevenfold evolutions of one principleand are wisely provided to give unity to the indefinite multitude of objects in nature, or at any rate to reduce the variety to number.

Mr. Douglas points out a serious error into which Professor Stewart fell, regarding language, which he considered as necessary to a train of thought. On the contrary, Mr. D. rightly contends that it is Thought which is necessary to language. Without thought we could have no classification; without classification, no general terms. The modifying one single word (and this might be applied to many discussions and endless disputes) would have set every thing right. If, instead of affirming that we think solely by means of language, it had been affirmed that we think chiefly by means of language, there would have been no dissentients, and the doctrine and its inferences would have been the more correctly limited. As it is, Mr. Stewart lays far too definite a stress on language as the instrument of thought. If the doctrine of the nominalists were true, the maxim of Condillac would be true likewise-" L'art de raisonner se réduit à une langue bien faite." But though there is much truth in this, there is much more truth in the converse. If to speak well is to reason well, it is still more just, that to think right is to speak right. He who had the most felicitous choice of words of all writers, Horace, justly affirms,

"Scribendi rectè, sapere est et principium et fons."

"Thoughts and words (continues Mr. Douglas) act and react upon one another, but variously in various minds; master thoughts govern words, while words rule over the common understanding. Mr. Stewart himself is an instance, in whose writings great pains have been taken with the terms and phrases, but where the result is not proportionable to the preparation, and where, perhaps, from the overcare and caution of the writer, the reader is better furnished with phrases than with thoughts: while Bacon, on the other hand, who advisedly, and with the intention not to recede from use and antiquity, is often very censurable in his terms, leaves a well-defined and luminous tract of thought behind, in the mind of the reader.

Words are but hints; and the best selected phrases and sentences must both be limited, and filled up by the reader. A strong hint is more likely to be taken than a delicate one; and forcible words, rather than nicely selected ones, convey most clearly an author's meaning."

Nouns and verbs are convertible,-the action and the agent being denominated by the same root; and an example of this might be found in the Sanscrit radicals, which become either nouns or verbs, according as they are declined. Moreover, the ancientest words are imitative terms; and these were at once verbs and nouns. To trace, however, the original condition of speech, we should require to have the roots, not of one only, but of many tongues. It is pretended that the roots of the Sanscrit are determined; but they have been determined by the Bramins themselves, it is likely, too often upon arbitrary principles; and it would require the acuteness of some new Horne Tooke, with a more sober judgement and an intimate acquaintance with the language, to develope its structure, and show its original form. In the Sanscrit, two characters ought to be discoverable, the primitive, where it closely resembled the ancient Persian, when those who spoke it carried their arms and their religion into India; the artificial, when it had become a sacred language, apart from vulgar use, cultivated by the priests, as the speech of the gods, deflected from all vulgar appliances, and flowing into sesquipedalian verse and mystical philosophy. It would be extremely curious to compare the two extremities of the chain-the Sanscrit and the Gothic; the Sanscrit so elaborately wrought up, and the Gothic long retaining its rude simplicity; and to show in what manner, languages, so very dissimilar in their features, have retained so many marks of their common origin.

The following is in a majestic strain of thought :

"The pyramids may represent the greatness of the departed kings of Egypt, but Language is the only fitting monument of those geniuses that have given their light to the earth for a season, and of the thoughts which have passed with such intense rapidity through their master minds. It was an argument which struck the ancients, and which is forcibly expressed by Cicero, that the mind itself must be immortal, since the produce is so. And not only is its immediate produce, thought, imperishable, but the material vehicle, whether language or writing, in which it is conveyed-the characters which the hand of man has graven, still rekindle and reanimate, though in a succession of other bosoms, the images and the emotions which the authors desired to trace; and even when the connexion between the character and the thought has been broken, and the meaning appeared to have perished, as well as the hand which traced its signs, a resurrection may be awaiting all these buried workings of the mind, over which thousands of years had cast their veil, and then they may awaken again to life, and to greater interest than when they were first chiselled upon the stone. Thus the hieroglyphics of Egypt, engraved with a careless hand, and as a matter of mere formality, are viewed anew, and with intense interest, after their superstitions and their institutions so long have perished. Nor can we conceive otherwise, when the slightest shade of motion awakens a correspondent movement within ourselves, nor believe that the cause can cease while the effect remains; or that the mind that composed the Iliad and the Odyssey, removed to another stage of being, has lost any of the vividness with which it contemplated existence. But the argument becomes still stronger when it is considered that the moral effects of thought never perish-that the succession of generations forms only one community-that the virtues or the vices of ancient times, and of minds so long removed from the earth, still affect the moral condition of the present world-that the measure of benefits and injuries is still filling up-and that if the condition of men after death is to be determined by their fruits, that those fruits are still ripening and augmenting-and if their quality in many cases can be easily ascertained, that their full amount can only be determined when the earth and all its concerns are brought to their final period, and the ultimate reckoning is closed."

We shall be better able to follow Mr. Douglas through his chapters on reasoning and logic, on the emotions, on taste, on freedom and the will, on morals and religion, when we have opportunity to write at large on those high