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They urged in its favour only, that the same duty was imposed on exports to their own colonies in America, and that if any change was made in it, to satisfy the claim of the United States on the principle of the right of the most favoured nation, it would be to raise it on the goods exported to other countries, not to reduce it on those sent to the United States. The principle, however, established by this article, being applicable to that duty, it was to be presumed that it might fairly be relied on to obtain a modification of it, either by reducing the duty on exports to the United States, or raising it on those to other nations. There is nothing in this article to restrain the United States from adopting measures to counteract the British policy with respect to the West Indies. If that object had not been secured by a special article, from the possibility of being affected by the others, the principle established by the present one could not have affected it, otherwise than beneficially.

Having replied to your objections to the several articles of the treaty, and the papers connected with it, and given our view of them, I shall proceed to make some remarks on the whole subject to do justice to the conduct of the American commissioners in that transaction.

In every case which involved a question of neutral right, or even of commercial accommodation, Great Britain was resolved to yield no ground which she could avoid, and was evidently prepared to hazard war, rather than yield much. There seemed to be no mode of compelling her to yield, than that of embarking in the war with the opposite belligerent, on which great question it belonged to the national councils to decide. We had pressed the claims of the United States in the negotiation, to the utmost limit that we could go, without provoking that issue. It is most certain that better terms could not have been obtained at the time we signed the treaty than it contains.

The state of the war in Europe suggested likewise the propriety of caution on our part. Russia was then on the side of England, and likely to continue so; and Austria,

known to be in the same interest, was holding an equivocal attitude, and ready to take advantage of any favourable event that might occur. Prussia, lately powerful, had been defeated, but was not absolutely subdued; her king, the ally and friend of Alexander, kept the field with him, and made head against France. The emperour of France, far removed from his dominions, was making the bold and dangerous experiment, of the effect which his absence might produce in the interiour, and in a situation to be compelled to risk every thing, if pressed by his adversary, on the precarious issue of a single battle. These were strong reasons why we should not throw ourselves too decisively into that scale.

The situation of the United States, always a respectable one, was then less imposing than it usually was. It was known that they were not on good terms with Spain, and that France was the ally of Spain. Their interiour too, was disturbed by a conspiracy of doubtful extent and dangerous tendency, the consequences of which were sure to be greatly magnified by all who were unfriendly to our happy system of government. Those circumstances could not fail to be taken into view, by any the most friendly administration in England, when pressed to make concessions which it was unwilling to make. Add to these considerations, the important one, that the British ministry had become much impaired in its strength, especially in what concerned the United States, by the death of a very eminent and distinguished statesman, and had not the power, or thought that it had not, to pursue a liberal policy towards the United States, and that its power was evidently daily diminishing.

These considerations induced us to sign the treaty, and submit it to the wisdom of our government, after obtaining the best conditions that it was possible to obtain. We were aware that, in several points, it fell short of the just claims of our country. But we were persuaded that such an arrangement was made of the whole subject as justified us in the part which we took. In the rejection or adoption of

the treaty, I felt no personal interest. Having discharged my duty with integrity and zeal, I neither wished applause nor dreaded censure. Having the highest confidence in the wisdom, the rectitude and patriotism of the adminis tration, I was satisfied that it would pursue the course, which an enlightened view of the publick interest, and a just sensibility to the national honour, might dictate.

Our letter of January 3d, was written in haste, and was deficient in many of the explanations which would otherwise have been given of the treaty. I was happy when at Washington to find that you were perfectly willing to receive any explanations which I might now be disposed to give of that transaction, and to allow them the weight which they might deserve. In making this communication I have indulged the freedom which belonged to it, in full confidence that it would be approved.

I cannot conclude this letter without adding my most ardent wish, that the administration may succeed in conducting our affairs with every power, to the happiest result. My retirement, which had been long desired, and delayed only by the arduous and very important duties in which I was engaged, had become necessary as a relief to my mind, after much fatigue, and to the interest of my family, which had been neglected and greatly injured by my absence in the publick service. It is still my desire to cherish retirement. Should it, however, be our unfortunate destiny, which I most earnestly hope will not be the case, to be involved in foreign war or domestick trouble, and should my services be deemed useful, I will not hesitate, at the desire of the administration, to repair again to the standard of my country.

I have the honour to be, with great consideration and esteem, your very obedient servant,

JAMES MONROE.

Extract of a Letter to Mr. Monroe from General Armstrong.

SIR,

PARIS, JULY 7, 1807.

"THE accounts you have had of recent captures made by French privateers of American vessels, under cover of the decree of November last, are not correct; at least, if such captures have been made, I know nothing of them. The only captures I have at any time heard of, were those made from Porto Ferrago. They are by no means of recent date, and have all, I believe, been redressed by the council of prizes. Two of these cases, to which I attended personally, received decisions equally favourable and prompt. Interest and damages were given to the plaintiffs, and I know not why decisions, equally favourable, should not have been given in the other cases. I have, within a week, been informed by Mr. Erving, that he had reason to believe that a French privateer, then in a port of Spain, had plundered American ships, either going to or coming from England, of dry goods, to the amount of $500. Before any thing could be done in Spain for the recovery of these goods, the ship went to sea, and professedly for the purpose of returning to the port of her armament. Believing her to have arrived there, I put all the evidence I possessed before M. Decres, who closes his answer with the following assurance: "Your excellency may be assured, that as far as it depends on me, the captains of these vessels, or their owners, shall obtain, if there is ground for it, a prompt and full reparation." I quote this to show you that there is no disposition in the ministers of this government to sanction or protect such enterprises upon our commerce. From the uses you may be able to make of the facts, and their relation to your question generally, I subjoin a brief exposition of the construction now given

*V. E. peut etre assuree qu'il ne tiendra pas a moi que les capitaines de ces navires ou leurs proprietaires n'obtiennont s'il y a lieu une reparation prompte et pleine.

to the November decree. It was, you know, admitted by both ministerial and judicial authorities, that this decree did not infract the provisions of the treaty of 1800 between the United States and France. Still it was contended that Vessels (of the United States) coming from any port of Great Britain since the date of the edict, could not be admitted to entry in the ports of France. This rule, without some qualifications, was likely to become mischievous, and accordingly obtained the following modifications of it, and hope to obtain a further modification, which will render it perfectly harmless. These changes took place as circumstances rose to produce them; for though the necessity for them was both foreseen and represented, it was only upon real, not upon hypothetical cases, that the ministers of his majesty were willing to act.

1. Vessels leaving ports of the United States before a knowledge of the arret had been promulgated there, are not subject to the rule.

2. Vessels not coming directly from a British to a French port, are not subject to the rule.

3. The cargoes of vessels coming directly from a British to a French port, and offered for entry, on proof that the touching of the ship in England, &c. was involuntary, are put in depot or sequestration, until his majesty shall have decided on the sufficiency of the proof offered; or they are at once given up to the consignees, on their giving security to abide the decision which shall be ultimately taken by the emperour in their respective cases. The vessels can go out freely, and without impediment of any kind. The former rule, of which this is an amelioration, was, that ships, as well as cargoes, coming under this description, should be sequestered, &c. The farther alteration which I have asked is, the establishment of some principle which shall regulate the kind and degree of proof required with respect to the alleged application of a force majeure, &c. My own opinion is, that this may best be found in the greater or less correspondence which shall exist between the cargo when shipped in America, and when arrived here. * VOL. III.

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