the necessary information, and save America from a civil CHAPTER war by proving that England interfered in the troubles of the West. "I do not recollect," continued Fauchet, 1795. "that he gave me at that time any details as to the manner in which this discovery would produce this last effect; but I perfectly recollect to have heard it said, by some person or other, that the insurgents would be abandoned by the greatest number of those whom they believed on their side, and that the militia would march with cheerfulness if it were proved that the English were at the bottom of these maneuvers. I think, therefore, that probably this was the manner in which he conceived the thing would be settled. At the moment of his mounting his horse, he observed to me that the men whom I might be able to employ might be debtors to English merchants; that in this case they might perhaps be exposed, on the slightest movements in this important affair, to see themselves harassed by process, and even arrested by their creditors; and he asked if the payment of the sums due to them, by virtue of the existing contracts, would not be sufficiently early to render them independent of British persecutions ? This proposition to obtain intelligence, I confess, surprised me. I was astonished that the government did not procure for itself information so precious; and I made the reflections contained in my letter on this affair, because I believed that all the citizens in the United States ought to endeavor to furnish intelligence so important, without being stopped by the fear of British persecution; and because I, moreover, thought, when I committed my reflections to paper, that it was proposed to obtain the foregoing intelligence by assisting with loans those who had contracted with me. But now calling to mind all the circumstances to which the questions of Mr. Randolph direct. CHAPTER my attention, I have an intimate conviction that I was VIIL mistaken in the propositions which I supposed to have 1795. been made to me." That Fauchet might have misapprehended the purport of Randolph's conversation at the interview in question is highly probable; nor ought any serious regard to be paid to the extensive superstructure of inferences which the lively fancy of the French minister had erected upon it. Yet the new version of that conversation concocted at Newport, and based upon Randolph's explanatory suggestions upon his first reading the intercepted dispatch, has all the marks of a pure romance. A civil war to be prevented by penetrating into the secrets of a presumed cabal in New York between the British minister and others, and this object to be accomplished by means of the contractors for supplying flour to the French government-very likely persons indeed to be in Hammond's confidence! And then the precautions of Randolph to secure these agents against possible arrest for supposed British debts, by urging the payment of the amounts due them on their contracts! It is difficult to suppose that a man of Randolph's sagacity made a special visit to the French minister's country house to propose any such ridiculous scheme, and not less difficult to imagine that Fauchet could so far have misunderstood a conversation, which strongly excited his attention, as to transform these nameless flour contractors into "four men" able, by their talents, influence, and energy, to save the country from a civil war, but needing a loan from the French minister to protect them from arrest by their English creditors. So little, indeed, was Randolph satisfied with a story which he himself had put into Fauchet's mouth, that, although he argued very stoutly, in his published Vindication, for VIII. the probability and consistency of that statement, he CHAPTER declined to say that he himself remembered one single particular of it; indeed, rather suggesting that he had 1795. merely challenged Fauchet to avail himself of the opportunity to substantiate the complaints he had often before made of machinations carried on in New York by Hammond, designed to operate on American politics unfavorably to the French republic. Taking into account that Randolph was excessively embarrassed in his pecuniary circumstances, and that he left office a defaulter, the conjecture does not appear improbable that, to obtain some relief for himself, he might have attempted an experiment on the political credulity of the French minister. At all events, his conduct in the matter was by no means that of a man conscious of innocence. Instead of indignation against Fauchet, his whole anger was directed against Washington; and he attempted to withdraw attention from the true issue, and to shield himself behind the popular excitement against the British, by undertaking to show, in his published Vindication, that the intercepted dispatch had been communicated to Washington as part of a scheme concocted between Hammond and the cabinet officers to insure the ratification of the treaty, to drive Randolph from office, and "to destroy the Republicans in the United States." The ratification of the treaty by no means quieted the public excitement. The idea was started that, although the president might ratify, it still rested with the House of Representatives to refuse, if they chose, the pecuniary means to carry the treaty into effect. The elections in all the states were not yet completed, yet it was confidently alleged that a majority hostile to the treaty had been already chosen. IV.-N N CHAPTER But in proportion to the zeal with which the treaty had been attacked was the rally made in its favor. The 1795. Boston Chamber of Commerce, a few days before the president's decision, had passed a resolution, with only one dissenting voice, in favor of ratification. This was followed up by a memorial from the merchants and traders of Philadelphia, taking the same ground, and signed by a long list of names. Of the numerous public meetings which continued to be held in all parts of the country, many came out in support of the treaty, and of the president's constitutional power in the matter. Some of the more violent of the Boston Democrats, as a counterdemonstration, paraded the streets with an effigy of Jay, which they persisted in burning. They then attacked the house of a Federal editor, but were fired on and repulsed. Disturbances were kept up for several nights; but, by alarming all friends of order, they served to strengthen the opposite party. The question had already been carried into the newspapers, where it was discussed with great warmth, and in several cases with great ability. Not to mention numberless inferior writers, Brockholst Livingston assailed the treaty as Decius, to whom Hamilton, ever ready and able, responded as Camillus. So much was Jefferson alarmed at the force of Hamilton's reasoning, that he Sept. 21. pressed Madison, "for God's sake," to take up his pen, there being nobody but him able to meet that Federal champion, whom he described as "really a Colossus," "a host within himself," and whose reasoning he had found by experience that "honest, sound-hearted men were unable to parry." Notwithstanding the exclusion of American vessels from the British West Indies, and the various annoyances to which American trade was subjected, that trade was VIII. increasing at a rapid rate. The exports had risen in CHAPTER five years from nineteen millions annually to forty-eight millions. A large part of this increase was in foreign 1795. merchandise, brought to the United States and again exported; but the value and amount of the domestic exports had also been greatly enhanced. Such a trade was not to be sacrificed to a war with Great Britain, except for the most urgent reasons; and, in spite of all the efforts of the opposition to arouse their passions, the great body of the merchants, and of the more judicious and reflecting portion of the people, came to the conclusion that the president had acted wisely in ratifying the treaty. Prudential considerations like these had, however, little weight with the more ignorant, thoughtless, passionate, and violent, the bitter haters of England and partisans of France; and, unfortunately, the conduct of too many of the British officials had been, and still continued to be, but little calculated to allay prevailing antipathies. Hammond, the late British minister-for he too, as well as Fauchet, had gone home-was described by Wolcott as a weak, vain, and imprudent person, very much in the company and under the control of sour and prejudiced Tories, associations into which his connections by marriage naturally led him. The British naval officers were far from using that caution and delicacy by which alone the Americans could have been reconciled, if, indeed, any thing could have reconciled them, to the impressment of British seamen from American vessels. Indeed, the opinion very generally prevailed that most of these officers were quite careless whether the men impressed were British or not. Nor were the English, any more than the French cruisers, always observant of American territorial rights. Considerable feeling had lately been excited by an attempt to seize Fauchet, the |