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lative and judicial authority, in favor of natural justice CHAPTER and the personal rights of the individual-restrictions set out more at length in the Bills of Rights proposed by Vir- 1789. ginia, New York, and North Carolina; and, secondly, particular restrictions as to some matters of peculiar or local interest, such as the prohibition to levy direct taxes, and the two thirds vote for borrowing money, declaring war, ratifying commercial treaties, and maintaining standing armies. It may hence be concluded, and this is a matter of great importance toward a correct understanding of the subsequent history of the United States, that no question of fundamental principle as to the theory of government was really in debate between the Federalists and anti-Federalists, and that the different views they took of the new Constitution grew much more out of differences of position and of local and personal interest, than out of any differences of opinion as to what ought to be the ends and functions of government or the methods of its administration. The Federalists, anxious to accomplish certain great objects-to consolidate the Union, to uphold the public credit, to aid and encourage the national commerce, navigation, and manufactures, to prevent paper issues, and to enforce the obligation of contractswere chiefly intent upon securing a government capable of accomplishing those objects; and they appeared, therefore, at the present moment, as the special advocates of power and authority. The anti-Federalists, on the other hand, alarmed at the idea of national taxes, fearful lest the interests of agriculture might be sacrificed to the protection of commerce and manufactures; not over-anxious for the payment of debts either private or public, and more concerned for the interests of debtors than of creditors; looked with alarm upon the extensive powers vested in the new national government, and sought, by

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CHAPTER various petty cavils and particular restrictions, to hamper an authority the necessity of which they could not 1789. deny, at the same time that they dreaded even its legiti mate exercise, not to insist on its possible abuse. "Various and numerous as they appear," said Madison, in a letter to Jefferson respecting the proposed amendments of the Constitution, "they certainly omit many of the true grounds of opposition. The articles relating to treaties, to paper money, and to contracts, make more enemies than all the errors of the system, positive and negative, put together." Jefferson, at first, had been a good deal of an anti-Federalist; but ultimately his objections seem to have been reduced to two, the re-elegibility of the executive, and the want of a bill of rights. This latter want was in part supplied by the amendments adopted; the other objection seems not to have been very permanent, since Jefferson not only urged Washington to stand as a candidate for the second time, but even consented to a second term of office in his own person, though to his case but few of the arguments urged upon Washington would apply.

Madison's proposal to take up the subject of amending the Constitution encountered considerable resistance in the House. Some members expressed themselves decidedly opposed to all amendments till experience could be had of the working of the Constitution. Others were disinclined to go into the subject till the government was first completely organized. Madison urged, in reply, the necessity of some speedy action to meet the expectation and to quiet the impatience of the numerous friends of amendments out of doors. He wished by no means to go so far as to open a door for reconsidering the general frame and structure of the government; but he thought it desirable, both from motives of policy and because it

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would be an actual improvement, to incorporate so many CHAPTER of the proposed provisions for the protection of personal rights as might secure the concurrence of two thirds of 1789. both houses, and of the Legislatures of three fourths of the states. He introduced a series of resolutions embodying certain amendments which he thought of that character; and, after some discussion, it was agreed to refer them to a committee of the whole. Previously, July 21. however, to any further discussion, both Madison's resolutions, and the amendments proposed by the various state Conventions, were referred to a special committee of one from each state. The report of that committee Aug. 13. coming up for consideration, the first question that arose was, In what form should the amendments be made? Should they be incorporated into the text of the Constitution, or should they be appended to it, as a series of distinct provisions? Sherman suggested the latter method, the more feasible in the present case, inasmuch as the articles proposed by the committee were mostly in the nature of a mere bill of rights, by no means inconsistent with the Constitution as it stood, but, in fact, for the most part, implied by it. This suggestion, though voted down at first, was ultimately adopted. The report of the committee was debated from time to time, first in Committee of the Whole and afterward in the House, occasionally with a good deal of warmth. It was denounced by Burke as not containing "those solid and substantial amendments which the people expected;" as, in fact, "little better than whipped syllabub, frothy and full of wind, formed only to please the palate; or like a tub thrown out to the whale, to secure the freight of the ship and its peaceful voyage." He noticed that on this committee of eleven there were no less than five who had been members of the Federal Convention. Gerry, who

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CHAPTER took a very active part, complained of a disposition to smother debate. The committee of eleven had been got 1789. up lest "a free discussion should lay bare the muscles and sinews of the Constitution." The only debate of much interest arose on a motion by Tucker to add to the proposed amendment securing to the people the right of peaceably assembling together, the right also "to instruct their representatives." This proposal was supported by Jackson and others, with the understanding, however, that it would not imply, on the part of the representative, any obligation to obey. Gerry, who was very urgent for the amendment, seemed to look at the matter in the same light; but this idea was combated by Page, Sumter, and Burke, who maintained that the representative would be bound to obey, as Gerry admitted he ought to be. Page thought "this amendment absolutely necessary, and strictly compatible with the spirit and nature of the government. All power vests in the people of the United States. It is, therefore, a government of the people, a democracy. For convenience, and for convenience only, the people had agreed that their representatives shall exercise a part of their authority. To pretend to refuse them the power of instructing their agents appeared to him to deny them a right." The proposed amendment was warmly opposed by Hartley, Clymer, Sherman, Wadsworth, Smith of South Carolina, and Madison. If the right to instruct implied no obligation to obey, it was amply secured already; if it did imply such obligation, it was highly pernicious, and ought not to be given. "Suppose," said Madison, "a representative is instructed to violate the Constitution: is he at liberty to obey such instructions? Suppose he is instructed to support certain measures which, from circumstances known to him, but not to his constituents, he is

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convinced will endanger the public good, is he obliged CHAPTER to sacrifice his own judgment to theirs? Suppose he refuses, will his vote be the less valid, or his constituents 1789. less bound to yield that obedience which is due to the laws of the Union? If his vote must inevitably have the same effect, what sort of a constitutional right is this to instruct a representative who has a right to disregard the order if he pleases? The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Gerry) asks if the sovereignty is not with the people at large? But would he infer that the people, in detached bodies, can contravene a law established by the whole people? My idea of the sovereignty of the people is this: the people can change the Constitution if they please; but, while it exists, they must conform to its provisions. I do not believe that the inhabitants of any district can speak the voice of the people; so far from it, their ideas may contravene the sense of the whole people, and hence the doctrine of the binding force of instructions is of a doubtful, if not a dangerous character." It seems difficult to answer these arguments, yet they departed very far from the popular opinion of Madison's own state, and from what came to be the recognized political creed of the party with which Madison ultimately acted. The restricted right of suffrage, and very limited constituencies in many parts of Virginia, and the ample leisure of the planters for the discussion of political affairs, to which subject many of them devoted their principal attention, naturally made the right of instruction a very popular doctrine in that state, and in others in which a similar social condition prevailed.

Seventeen amendments were finally agreed to by two thirds of the House. The Senate, by compression and modification, and leaving out two articles altogether, reduced the number to twelve. Of these twelve, the first